TO THE READERS OF THE THIRD EDITION, VERSION "A"

This Edition takes you through the first five chapters. The Table of Contents will, however, give you a general idea of what Chapters Six through Eight, plus incomplete parts of the back matter, will cover. These remaining chapters will be completed as soon as possible.

It is my plan to produce successive editions and versions of the Handbook for instructional use by myself and others, and gradually to collect and incorporate suggestions from instructors and students, prior to more formal publication. Each major re-edition will be copyrighted.

The charge for this Edition is $12.50, inclusive of postage. This charge is calculated on a non-profit, cost-recovery basis. Any net surplus will be deposited in the Cultural and Educational Futures Research Fund at Stanford University, to support further research in this field.

Because this Edition had to be produced in order to meet teaching and other deadlines, I hope you will be tolerant of occasional written-in editorial corrections.

R. B . T.
October 28, 1980
DEDICATION

This Hardback is dedicated to my late friend and colleague

Margaret Mead

who during the last ten years of her life was essentially a student and propounder of alternative cultural futures.

A HANDBOOK ON ETHNOGRAPHIC FUTURES RESEARCH

DEDICATION

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PREFACE

While intelligent concern over future possibilities is as old as man -- and indeed stems from a capacity unique to man -- the systematic exploration of alternative futures in the middle or longer range is relatively recent in man's history on earth, and the formalization of a futures field of inquiry is only fifteen or twenty years old. Probably more than half of the professional literature in what one could loosely call "Futures Studies" or "Futures Research" is less than five years old. As this literature explodes, some scholars have pointed to inadequate methodology as a major obstacle impeding the progress of the futures field. I concur. This Handbook is one scholar's attempt to contribute to the improvement of this methodology by offering an alternative approach, namely "Ethnographic Futures Research", or EFR, which is essentially ethnography adapted to the needs and constraints of Futures Research.

I have been involved in Futures Research only since 1976, and first conceptualized and used EFR in 1977. I have by now employed EFR in a variety of teaching and research projects, either alone or in collaboration with colleagues or students (see Bibliography under Aguirre et al., ASEAN Scholars, and 1xtor). At the risk of committing the academic sin of exuberance, I must say that it has been great fun, and every bit as rewarding as some rather interesting experiences I have had in conventional ethnography. Each project has taught me something new about how to improve EFR as a method, and about how to teach EFR more responsibly, effectively, and economically. Everything thus learned has been incorporated into this Handbook.

EFR is at once both a research and an educational undertaking, and the educational results of my having taught or co-taught EFR to several cohorts of students at my university, both graduate and undergraduate, are discussed in Chapter 7. Suffice here to say that these results have been highly encouraging. EFR produces enthusiastic student-ethnographers, and also enthusiastic interviewees. EFR clearly serves to stimulate the clarification of values and goals, and the development of a proactive attitude toward "taking charge" of the future. And the inculcation of an informed proactivity is, ultimately, the goal of all Futures Research and all Futures Education.

In addition to serving as a text for my courses in Alternative Cultural Futures and in EFR, this Handbook is intended to reach other audiences as well, namely: (1) the ethnographer or similar professional who wishes to teach himself or herself how to do EFR; (2) such a professional who wishes to teach his students how to do EFR; and (3) the non-ethnographer executive, planner, leader, critic, or citizen who wishes to learn to do EFR. The Handbook is written in sufficient detail so that, I hope, the professional will be able to teach himself EFR, on his own. Should such a professional also wish to teach his students EFR, it is my hope that he will first do some EFR, for EFR Skills, like those of conventional ethnography, are best learned through the doing. At the very least, such a professional should participate with his students as they learn EFR by doing it.
With respect to the non-professional, this Handbook is not intended as a self-teaching device that will take the place of training by a professional. While the Handbook makes every effort to simplify and clarify, I believe that there are too many skills involved in EFR, just as there are in conventional ethnography, for a total beginner to become proficient without the benefit of professional instruction.

In order to serve the training needs of non-professionals as well as professionals, I have recently been attempting to develop the most efficient and economical training format possible, by designing and teaching short intensive training practicums. My hope, which may prove to be overly ambitious, is that such a practicum can, with sufficient care, be so designed that it can be completed within one working day. This would not only have obvious advantages in holding costs down, but would also mean that busy executives and planners could more likely find the time to enroll. In hopes of being able to confine the practicum to one day of actual instruction time, I have tried to put as much concrete detail as possible into this Handbook, so that the practicum participant can do careful preparation through advance reading in leisure moments, and so that he or she can have a practical guide to use after the practicum, in getting started on an actual EFR project of his or her choice.

Such a use of the Handbook, together with the intensive practicum itself, will, I hope, produce researchers who will be capable of carrying out their own EFR projects, individually or in small groups, up to some reasonable level of competence, and usefulness in terms of their purposes -- whether or not the research product is ethnographically elegant. It need hardly be added that a course in EFR taught over an academic quarter or semester by a professional ethnographer, with weekly meetings for explanation, training, practice, critique, discussion, and trial write-up, will produce much better results -- and the Handbook is designed to facilitate the fulfillment of this need as well. By having a variety of instructors try out a variety of training formats, we shall gradually accumulate enough experience to revise the Handbook adequately, and to devise the most effective training formats.

My efforts to develop EFR as a research and educational tool have also involved professionals and non-professionals from the Third World. I am especially attached to this, since Third Wonders are in special need, I feel, of skills that will enable them to assert control over their futures. This Handbook, therefore, attempts to be as non-culture-bound as possible.

This Handbook is an effort, then, to reach several diverse audiences at the same time. It attempts to provide both a social science rationale, and a practical guide in "how to do it." To help satisfy both needs, there are numerous cross-references, indicated by numbers between parentheses, to other sections or sub-sections. I ask the indulgence of my social scientist colleagues for what will doubtless seem to be an undue emphasis on the practical details, and call their attention to the numerous end-notes, indicated by numbers between square brackets, most of which deal with more technical matters of a social science or professional educational nature. At the same time, I also ask the indulgence of the less professionally specialized reader - the publicist, critic, or citizen - for what will doubtless seem to be an undue emphasis upon somewhat remote social science considerations.
Because of the rapid pace at which EFR has been evolving, this Handbook has been produced by word processor, which facilitates revision A number of subsequent editions may be necessary before the Handbook stabilizes. Your comments and criticisms would be welcome.

Robert B. Textor
School of Education and Department of Anthropology Stanford University
Stanford CA 94305
October 28, 1980
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this Handbook is to state the rationale and specify the procedure for Ethnographic Futures Research (EFR). The Handbook - also explores the possible contributions that EFR might make to the emerging field of Futures Research, to anthropology and the other social sciences, to education, and to social planning and participation.

1.1 DEFINITIONS

It is best to start by defining the following key terms, as they are used in this Handbook. The definitions given below are in no case substantively exhaustive or logically complete; they are intended simply to be sufficient to permit the reader to understand this Handbook.

1.11 FUTURES RESEARCH

Broadly speaking, Futures Research (FR) is any systematic inquiry into alternative futures that are possible or probable for a given population or social group. Specifically, Futures Research attempts to:

1. Describe alternative futures that are possible or probable for a particular population.
2. Determine the state of our knowledge (or uncertainty)
   1. about this or that possible future.
   2. Identify implications and possible consequences of
      3. this or that possible future.
   4. Provide early warning signs of undesirable possible
      5. futures.
   6. Understand underlying change processes. (Adapted
      7. from Institute for the Future 1976: 1).

1.12 FUTURES STUDIES

"Futures Studies" is here distinguished loosely from "Futures Research." "Futures Studies" is used to refer to undertakings that have the same general purposes as FR, but which are more intuitive, less disciplined, and less data-oriented. A speculative think-piece that uses no new data, and no systematic re-working of existing data, would fall into the "Futures Studies" category. FR, on the other hand, tends to be more explicitly formulated and more explicit as to its methodological procedures, and tends to generate new data as the basis for its conclusions.

To make the above distinction is not to denigrate Futures Studies. On the contrary, some works in Futures Studies are brilliantly imaginative and stimulating, we need more of such works, and indeed could not progress without them. On the whole, however, I take the position that the futures field has now reached the point in its development where relatively more emphasis needs to be placed on what is here termed FR.

1.13 CULTURE
While, like many of my fellow anthropologists, I do not wish to be held precisely to a highly explicit definition of "culture," the approximate definition here used is that culture is a learned and shared set of more or less stable, consistent, and patterned standards of and for behavior, characteristic of a particular population, which standards often condition actual behavior (adapted from Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952:181). These standards apply to decisions made by members of the population as to (1) what is, (2) what could be, (3) how one feels about what is and what could be, (4) what can be done about what is and what could be, and (5) how one goes about doing at (adapted from Goodenough 1971.22).

1.14 CULTURAL FUTURES RESEARCH

Loosely speaking, Cultural Futures Research (CFR) is simply that branch of FR in which central use is made of the concept of culture. More strictly speaking, CFR, as the term is here used, will refer to those research undertakings in which the concept of culture (or of "cultural system" or "sociocultural system") is employed with some measure of explicitness, consistency, and sophistication; that is, in which there is at least some noticeable effort to employ an explicit theory, model, or set of propositions as to how a particular system changes from Time 1 to Time 2.

Just as conventional research on culture change takes into account both cultural and non-cultural variables, so does CFR. In CFR, a cultural system is seen as being in interaction with a variety of types of non-cultural phenomena, processes, or systems. Examples of the latter include the following.

1. Natural change, e.g., earthquakes, desertification processes, climatic changes, epidemics, or crop failures.
2. Political change, e.g., the change of a country's ruling regime not accompanied by any very prompt or significant change in the country's cultural standards for political behavior.
3. Economic change, e.g., a sudden depression not accompanied by any very prompt or significant change in the country's cultural standards for economic behavior.

1.15 ETHNOGRAPHIC FUTURES RESEARCH

Ethnographic Futures Research (EFR) is one method by which the cultural futures researcher can go about his or her task. EFR stands to CFR in much the same relationship that conventional ethnography stands to cultural anthropology. Just as the cultural anthropologist conventionally uses ethnography to study an extant culture, so the cultural futures researcher uses EFR to elicit from members of an extant social group their images and preferences (cognitions and values) with respect to possible or probable future cultures for their social group. Note that ER makes no literal claim to "studying the future." In my epistemology that would be technically impossible, because there are no future facts; indeed, one could reasonably take the ontological position that the future, as such, does not exist. EFR does, however, elicit, describe, analyze, and interpret people's present images of possible or probable future cultures, and their preferences among those hypothetical cultures. And statements about such presently held images do fall within the realm of the factual.

1.16 FRCUECTION
A projection is here defined as a conditional statement of what is likely to occur in the future. It might take the form of: "If A remains constant and B increases at a constant rate, then within 20 years C will occur."

1.17 FORECAST

A forecast is simply that projection which, in the judgment of the researcher, is most plausible or probable -- as compared with alternative projections. Forecasts are sometimes wade as the result of an FR project, but this is not essential; an FR project can be quite respectable even if it does not result in a single forecast. This point must be emphasized, because many otherwise well informed people are unaware of it, and this unawareness is at the root of many mischievous and anti-scientific perceptions of Futures Research that serve no useful purpose.

1.18 SCENARIO

The "scenario" is central to the EFR interview. It is essentially a story, and deals essentially with two matters: (1) what things could, might, or will be like as of an approximate horizon date; and (2) what could, might, or will be the process by which things change between now and then. For details, the reader may consult the literature, e.g., Wilson 1978. (See also 2.53 and 5.21.) The scenario is likely to be confused with the projection or forecast, so some distinguishing differences should be noted.

1. A scenario is usually more complex than a projection or forecast, and covers a wider range of phenomena. A scenario will usually embody a number of projections or forecasts; the converse would not occur. A projection or forecast may deal, for example, just with air pollution rates for the Bay Area of California in approximately A.D. 2005, while a scenario would quite likely deal with a whole range of pollution phenomena as of that approximate date, plus the talowts of these phenomena on people's lives, plus people's reactions to these impacts through time, resulting in policies that alter the pollution rates and may in turn have economic impacts, and so on. In EFR, as distinct from other FR methods (5.21), the notion of scenario is pushed about to its limits, since the interviewee is asked to scenarize about a whole culture as of a specified horizon date.

2. Consistent with the fact that the scope of a projection or forecast is limited, is the fact that it is more likely to be an essentially quantitative statement, while the scenario is more likely

1. to be largely, or even totally, qualitative in nature.
2. A scenario is much more likely to specify the process of change from Time 1 to Time 2, than is a projection or forecast, which might say little or nothing explicitly about process.
3. A forecast is defined as the most probable of several alternative projections. A scenario, by contrast, need only be probable enough to be plausible. Thus, in the EFR interview, an "Optimistic Scenario" and a "Pessimistic Scenario" are elicited, about which no probability statement need be made, other than that, in the interviewee's judgment, the scenarized events are merely possible. After these two, a "Most Probable Scenario" is elicited. (Details appear in 2.54-2.56.)
1.2 SOME CAVEATS: WHAT E.F.R. IS NOT

The futures field is new, and the people who work in it represent an extraordinary array of personality types, intellectual interests, value positions, disciplinary background, and methodological training. While this heterogeneity is a source of strength, it also poses problems. The problem that I have found most formidable, over the past three years, is that when I present EFR to an audience of social scientists, I sometimes find myself quite obviously being perceived and judged NOT in terms of what I am doing in EFR, but by what someone else in the futures field has done or is perceived as having done. Such misperceptions represent, of course, the very antithesis of the scientific attitude.

As a precaution against such misperception, it is useful to make a number of short concrete statements as to what EFR is not.

1. EFR confers no charisma. It is nothing at all like divinatory prediction. EFR does not conceive of a single future "out there," capable of somehow being "revealed" by the practitioner with the right formula. EFR, like scholarly FR is general, conceives of a multiplicity of possible/probable futures, and explores their implications.

2. EFR, as I practice it, places little emphasis on "prediction" in any conventional sense. It does not necessarily lay any greater claim to possessing the power to predict than would conventional cultural anthropology, and most members of that profession would doubtless concede that theirs is not a very predictive discipline. Moreover, EFR on the whole lays less claim to predictive power than would certain undertakings in, say, econometrics (macro or especially micro), or in small group interaction studies in sociology. EFR, like FR in general, uses a longer time frame than that usually used in most social science research, and this fact makes attempts at prediction inherently more hazardous.

Thus, in practicing EFR, I forego any intention of predicting future events or episodes in any pin-pointed sense, though I might or might not engage in broad-scale cultural forecasting, in the sense of identifying what I consider to be the most plausible projection (among several) with respect to future cultural changes, phrased loosely as changes in patterns.

3. EFR, like the type of FR I advocate in general, is not a science in its own right. I do not believe that there is or will be a futurology. Indeed, having read widely in the futures literature, I am probably much more convinced of this than are most social scientists.

I do not perceive EFR as being a discipline or a subdiscipline, nor do I see it as being a substitute for such, or for a good theory or model.

Rather, EFR and FR constitute, in my view, simply a perspective which can be valuable, especially when undergirded by one or more disciplines, subdisciplines, theories, or models.

1.3 THE NATURAL PARERSHIP BETWEEN E.F.R. AND CONVENTIONAL
The above array of caveats will perhaps suggest that the distance between the use of EFR to study possible/probable future culture change, and the use of conventional ethnography to study past/present culture change, is not as great as it might at first seem. This, at any rate, has been my conclusion since conceiving EFR in 1977, and utilizing and teaching it ever since. Indeed, in practicing EFR I view myself as being essentially a researcher on culture change. Doing EFR imposes relatively little "role strain" upon me as a cultural anthropologist.

The reason for this minimal role strain is that in doing EFR the ethnographer remains an ethnographer. In seeking to elicit the interviewee's perceptions and preferences concerning hypothetical future cultures, the ethnographer does not - and of course could not - shed himself of what he knows about the extant culture. Nor does the native interviewee suddenly turn his vision exclusively forward and cease all consideration of the past and present versions of his culture; on the contrary, the interviewee's comments constantly refer to these versions, and to their relationship to possible future cultures. It could hardly be otherwise, if we make the assumption, which seems generally reasonable, that most culture change is more or less incremental. An example is seen in my 1977 research on alternative cultural futures for Thailand - which, incidentally, will be used illustratively throughout this Handbook. I deliberately chose Thai culture for my first experimental application of EFR, because this is the culture on which I have specialized since the 1950s. In conducting EFR with Thai interviewees, I find myself constantly interpreting the possible/Probable scenarios for hypothetical future Thai cultures which the interviewees give me, in the light of what I already know, or think I know, about actual past and ongoing processes of change in Thai culture.

The EFR product I have so far produced on Thailand (Appendix Four and Textor 1978), whatever its faults, is certainly considerably better than it would have been if I had not had an ethnographic background on Thai culture. By the same token, I believe that doing EFR on Thailand -- some 70 interviewing hours of it -- has given me insights of genuine value in broadening and sharpening my understanding of past and ongoing processes of culture change in that country.

The above-stated position has two implications. First, it suggests that the reader who wishes to do EFR should start by applying it to a culture on which he or she is already well informed, which might be, of course, his or her own native culture. And second, it suggests that there are important advantages to be gained by combining in one research project both conventional ethnographic research on change, and EFR. In my own case, I plan to do just this with respect to culture change as experienced and anticipated by villagers in Bang Chan, Thailand. This plan is outlined in Chapter 6. In short, although EFR has been designed for both standalone use and joint use with other methodologies, for serious ethnographers its principal utility will doubtless be as a supplement to conventional approaches.

1.4 THE CHALLENGE

Despite the above comments, the fact remains that any social scientist who becomes involved in FR, of whatever kind, is likely to be putting his status as a social scientist at risk to some degree. At most universities in America and elsewhere, it is probably still true that an anthropologist, for example, stands to gain more, at least in the short run, if he studies the traditional kinship
categories or vestigial marital patterns of, say, Mexican farmers undergoing modernizational change, than if he studies the perceptions and preferences of such people vis-a-vis possible/probable cultural or national futures. In other words, there persists in anthropology a strong preference for the study of the esoteric and the unapplied. I must confess that I share this interest in the esoteric. I have, for example, devoted extensive fieldwork efforts to describing and understanding, as thickly and deeply as I could, phenomena of spirit worship and magic in a Thai village beliefs and practices some of which were, even as I studied them, palpably disappearing from rural Thai culture. The results of my fieldwork were enough to fill several volumes -- and, what's more, I enjoyed the experience immensely.

I take the position that it is vital that anthropologists remain free to study such "mere esoterica," to use a term that detractors sometimes use, not always jokingly -- and I will vigorously defend their right to do so. However, there is another right that I will also defend, with equal vigor, namely the right of the anthropologist, or other social scientist, to decide to concentrate on "saving the world," to borrow another well-worn detractor's term, need both types of orientation, and both types will sometimes be found, and properly so, in the same individual. The world futures orientation in anthropology responds to challenges to be faced in the 1980s and beyond, which are utterly without precedent in man's experience on earth, which stem from the new human capacity quite literally to alter, fundamentally and permanently, the chances for survival of our species and of civilization.

The first time, for example, that I read Margaret mead's well-known statement that the final quarter of the 6Lentith Century will probably be the most dangerous quarter-century through which mankind has ever passed, I tended to put it down as hyperbole. Now that I have steeped myself in the futures literature, I no longer do so. The current world crisis in population, food, non-renewable energy and mineral supplies, pollution, and uncontrolled weapons technology is indeed unprecedented in the world's history.

Not only are the danger and potential of our times without precedent, but the effects of what we do, or fail to do, will in some cases be with the world for a period of time into the future vastly longer than the known life to date of any extant culture. As the scientist John Platt puts it, "many of our jumps in the last 40 years...would appear to be comparable to the biggest jumps in the whole 4-billion-year history of life on earth, if judged by their probable long-run consequences, say for the next thousand years or million years or billion years. So, today, nuclear missiles are the most overwhelming weapons ever known. Our new contraceptives are having global effects, but are now overshadowed by recombinant- DNA technology which might be able to create millions of new species.... Solar-electric power may be as important as photosynthesis ... [the] electronic revolution may be a more dramatic extension of our nervous system and vision than the first development of image-forming eyes..." and so forth. Platt adds that the social design and construction problem is central," and urges the intensive involvement of social science (1980: 12-15)

I accept the essential message of Mead and Platt. Although a single individual can usually do little about matters this staggering, I see nothing to apologize for in trying to do what I can, as an anthropologist, methodologist, educator, and citizen. EFR is intended as a methodological contribution which, after additional testing and development, might materially help people to overcome tempocentrism (Section 2.22), to get into touch with their own values, and to deal proactively rather than reactively with today's decisions, which serve to limit or strengthen
tomorrow's options in a variety of ways. To put it another way, I believe that applied anthropology has never been as profoundly challenged as right now, and I believe that EFR, or something like it, can help applied anthropology to move more effectively in meeting this challenge.

1.5 THE SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF E.F.R.

As we saw in Section 1.14, Cultural Futures Research (CFR) is seen as that variant of FR in which the concept of culture is central, and in which theories and models of culture change are important. While other types of change than cultural are also examined, there is a bias toward using these concepts of cultural anthropology wherever they seem relevant and helpful.

The scope and purpose of EFR have to do with the utilization of the concepts, theories, models, and propositions of cultural anthropology in actually carrying out CFR, through the interviewing of a specified sample of members of a specified culture or subculture. EFR is thus a methodology, a logic-in-action, subsumable under CFR. It need hardly be added that other styles and formats for conducting EFR, beyond those presented or anticipated in this Handbook, might be developed as more researchers become involved, and indeed one of the purposes of this Handbook is to stimulate just such developments. Furthermore, it should be observed that EFR by no means exhausts the types of anthropological methodology that could be applied to the futures field. 11.2]

1.51 E.F.R. AND CONVENTIONAL FUTURES STUDIES COMPARED

It is my view that EFR holds important advantages over what might be termed a "Futures Studies" (1.12) approach toward a problem. To illustrate, let us assume that my purpose is to examine how the people of the village of Bang Chan, Thailand, view the middle-range future. The "Futures Studies" approach would essentially be for me to consult my field notes, many of which happen to be more than 20 years old, to see what material is in them that relates to perceptions and preferences about middle-range futures. I will probably find very little, because my earlier research did not focus too directly on this problem. Let us say, however, that I do find some material.

Beyond this, I can rely on my memory -- which is certainly vivid, though doubtless subject to various systematic and unsystematic recall biases. From this I can piece together an article as to how I think particular types of villagers perceived and preferentialized alternative futures then, looking toward a horizon date one generation later -- that is, about 1980. If that is all I wish to say, my problem is perhaps not so serious. However, I must certainly be careful about inferring from this unsystematic data base anything having to do with how the same or similar villagers would perceive and preferentialize alternative cultural futures now, vis-a-vis a horizon date one generation from now -- for in the interim there have been drastic changes in the village situation. In the mid-1950's, the villagers' perceptions of village demography and its possible/probable changes were uninformed by any widespread knowledge of, much less experience with, modern birth control. By 1980, probably most married couples had used some kind of modern contraception, and anyway, the person-land ratio and employment patterns had changed profoundly. Not only had such situational factors changed by 1980, but so had cultural attitudes and values. Thus, my old data would be, at best, of questionable relevance and thoroughness, and possibly downright misleading.
The EFR approach, by contrast, would involve my actually going to Bang Chan, drawing an appropriate sample of villagers, and administering to each of them a complete de novo EFR interview dealing specifically with alternative possible/probable futures for their way of life as of an approximate horizon date of, say, A.D. 2005. Each interviewee would be stimulated in about the same way, probed in about the same way, and so on. The interview would be projecting from a 1980 situation known in some detail by them and by me, and their interview protocols would reflect their culturally conditioned values, attitudes, and percepts as of that year. I think it is obvious that this second method of Futures Research would yield a product superior to that which would be yielded by the aforementioned Futures Studies approach.

All of this is said not to put down "think-pieces" in Futures Studies, for many of these are highly stimulating, usefully heuristic, and helpfully programmatic. However, at least in cases where one's focal interest is alternative futures for a specified particular sociocultural population and system, it seems clear that all of the advantages of the ethnographer's having steeped himself in a culture, having participant-observed in it, having learned its language, etc., which would give value to a "Futures "Studies" article, are also available in the case of an EFR undertaking, plus a whole set of additional advantages.[ 1.3]

1.52 E.F.R. AND CONVENTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY COMPARED

Since EFR draws its principal inspiration from conventional ethnography, a brief consideration of the similarities and differences between the two would be instructive at this point.

1.521 SIMILARITIES: Among the many ways in which EFR is similar to conventional ethnography are the following. Both start with a broadly phrased problem and gradually refine the problem on the basis of interaction between ethnographer and interviewees; that is, the researcher is at first more tentative than he or she would typically be if his discipline were, say, sociology or psychology. In both cases, the researcher is also inclined to emphasize relativism, context, history, and holism more than would be the case if his discipline were otherwise. Further, the researcher in both instances works with fewer interviewees than he typically would if he were, say, a sociologist, and tends to produce a product etched in broad, qualitative, cultural brushstrokes. In doing this, the researcher sacrifices some detail and much quantitative specificity of the type that is typically the strength of the sociological approach. For a further discussion of the typical distinctions between ethnographic and non--ethnographic research, consult Pelto and Pelto 1978 and Sections 5.22-5.24.

1.522 DIFFERENCES: As for the differences between conventional ethnography and EFR, the salient one is, of course, that the former deals with culture patterns in the past or present, while EFR deals with possible, probable, or projected culture patterns in the future. To the extent that conventional ethnography is successful, it results in a research product that describes extant (or past) reality, in some sense. By contrast, the only "reality" that EFR produces is the reality of the image of the future which is held, in the present, by one or more interviewees, for EFR is based on the epistemological and ontological position that there are no future facts, but only present (or past) facts about how the future is perceived, preferentialized, and so on. Put another way, another profound distinction between conventional ethnography and EFR is that the former is based on a combination of interviewing and observation, while EFR is necessarily based on interviewing
alone.[1.4] This is indeed a profound difference, since in conventional ethnography the results of observation can be used to check the results of interviewing, and vice versa, in a fairly direct fashion, while in EFR this advantage is absent. For example, if a Thai villager interviewee gives me a statement concerning the form of the extant ordination ritual, I always have the convenient option of actually attending such a ritual and satisfying - myself directly as to the adequacy of his statement. However, if the same interviewee projects some sort of patterned change in the ordination ritual by the year 2005, I have no such observational option. In evaluating the latter statement as to plausibility, I am limited to what I know, or can ask about, or can observe, in the approximate present. This is a limitation that EFR must simply live with.

1.6 THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS HANDBOOK

The organization of the remainder of this Handbook reflects my basic purpose, which is to encourage the adaptation and application of EFR to a variety of problems, and to accumulate experience in such a way as to rapidly and efficiently perfect this new tool. Accordingly, the remainder of this Handbook is oriented strongly toward the actual decisions and operations that one must go through in order to complete an EFR project. I will welcome suggestions and criticisms from any reader, but especially from readers who have actually carried out an EFR project, for EFR is a considerable departure from most other types of social science research, and it cannot be fully understood, even by a seasoned ethnographer, unless it is experienced.

Chapter Two moves directly to the heart of the EFR operation, which is the one-on-one, confidential, open-ended, interactive, non-directive, semi-structured, scenario-eliciting interview. It then deals with a new technique, the Cumulative Summarization Technique, which emphasizes continuous feedback and is designed to summarize the interview in protocol form -- efficiently, reliably, and cumulatively.

Chapter Three covers the operations one must carry out in order to reach conclusions from a collection of completed protocols, and to write up the research report. This process is also cumulative, and also involves feedback from interviewees.

Chapter Four then deals with various sampling considerations, and especially with fitting the sample of interviewees to the particular requirements of one's EFR project, so that valid generalization from sample to population becomes possible.

Chapter Five examines ways of fruitfully combining EFR with other FR methods, depending on the nature and requirements of one's research problem.

Chapter Six explores EFR's potential role as a catalyst in helping promote productive relationships between anthropology and Futures Research, and takes the position that each is in a position to help the other quite considerably, in ways that might not be immediately obvious.

Chapter Seven examines a built-in dual function of EFR, namely that it produces not just a research product but also, inevitably and felicitously, an educational product. Experience to date in pursuing this dual orientation is reported, and further possibilities are explored.
Chapter Eight projects needed next steps in the development of EFR as a tool to serve various needs in Futures Research, 'the study of culture change, and the educational sensitization of people to alternative possibilities for the future.

Appendix One then provides an example of how each element in an EFR interview is introduced and explained to the interviewee, for possible adaptation and use by the reader who wishes to conduct his or her own EFR research.

Appendix Two provides an example of the kind of instructions one would give to one's transcription typist in order to get back from him or her a protocol that would be maximally usable.

Appendix Three provides an example of an EFR protocol. This protocol is that which resulted from my interview with Mr. Chiab Kanchanalak, a Thai graduate student residing in the United States. Selected portions of this interview are included in the training videotape, A Guide to Ethnographic Futures Research, (Textor 1979b), which I have produced as a training aid for teaching EFR. Both protocol and tape are used, of course, with Khun Chiab's permission.

Appendix Four includes portions of the actual write-up of an EFR project, namely the Thailand Futures Project, which I carried out in 1977. This Appendix is designed to show how the ethnographer interprets his protocols in the light of what he knows, or believes he knows, about the extant sociocultural system whose alternative futures are under examination.

Finally, Appendix Five presents portions of an EFR7based article written by ten distinguished educators and educational scholars from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), concerning their shared perceptions and preferences regarding possible/Probable futures for the five countries that comprise ASEAN, and for ASEAN as an entity, as well as their ideas as to how education should be utilized to promote the realization of desired futures.
CHAPTER TWO: THE STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURE OF THE E. F. R. INTERVIEW

Since the EFR interview refers not to events that have actually happened or are actually happening, but only to changes that are perceived by someone as possible or probable, it is especially important that the procedure of the EFR interview be carefully specified. Accordingly, this chapter will deal with the rationale, structure, and procedure of the EFR interview in considerable detail.

From this point forward, in order to avoid stiltedness, I shall use the pronoun "you" in addressing the individual who contemplates being the interviewer in an EFR interview. Similarly, to avoid endless pronominal befuddlement, I shall refer to the interviewee as "him," with the understanding that this individual might be either female or male.

2.1 THE GOAL OF THE E.F.R. INTERVIEW

At this point it is important to define briefly, and necessarily with some oversimplification, just what the goal of an EFR interview is. The single sentence below attempts to do this. Each capitalized term will then be explored for its implications.

The goal of an EFR interview is to ELICIT SCENARIOS from a sample of interviewees, that will support conclusions as to their SHARED and PATTHRNED perceptions and PREFERENCES with respect to POSSIBLE or PROBABLE future CULTURES (or subcultures) for their society (or group), usually as of some approximate time horizon in the MIDDLE range future.

The term ELICIT means quite literally that you "draw out" from the interviewee his images of alternative futures. Elicitation means that, within wide limits, the interviewee is free to move in directions of his own choice, and to construct scenarios in terms of his own categories, rather than being asked to use the categories of the researcher, which might be quite different. The categories the interviewee chooses to use will, of course, typically reflect (to varying extents) his enculturation, so that, for example, the content and style of images elicitable fLoa a peasant or post-peasant agriculturalist in a Thai village will almost certainly differ in importance from those that are elicitable from a farmer in Kansas, or from a member of the Thai governing elite (3.5).

The term MIDDLE-range means that the "horizon date" of an EFR project is usually about 20 to 30 years, or roughly one generation, into the future. The "horizon date" is a specified tentative end-point in time to which the interviewee is asked to forecast. It is the date as of which, approximately, the interviewee forecasts that certain changes can, might, or will have occurred; certain existing practices can, might, or will have died out; certain evolutionary processes can, might, or will have been partially completed, and so on. While EFR can be used with a wide variety of horizon dates, from near to far, depending on one's research purposes, I have found the middle-range horizon date to be most useful for most purposes, for two reasons. First, it is far enough into the future so that the interviewee's imagination is freed from the limitations of overattention to the real or perceived constraints of the present. This consideration will be dealt with further in the discussion of the phenomenon of tempocentrisu (2.22). Second, a middle-range horizon date is not so far into the future as to destroy the interviewee's motivation; it is near enough so that he takes the interview very seriously, since he, or at least his children, can normally expect to live that long, and hence stand to gain or lose from the culture that by that time emerges.
The term POSSIBLE implies that you discourage the interviewee from wild, utopian, or Gitter&nimerung-like thinking or fantasizing, and encourage him to keep his cultural scenarios within limits that are realistic. Lest you constrain him too much, however, you let him be the final judge as to what is realistic and what is beyond the bounds of realism.

The term PREFERENCE implies that, within the range of realism as defined by the interviewee, you seek to learn the kind of culture that the interviewee, on balance, prefers. Unlike some Futures Research methods, EFR places as much emphasis upon what people want, as upon what they expect.

The term PROBABLE refers to the fact that, after you have elicited the interviewee's preferences, you will seek to learn from him which of a plurality of hypothetical future cultures is, in his judgment, relatively most likely - quite apart from the question of desirability. The term CULTURES implies that you encourage the interviewee to scenarize in terms of hypothetical whole cultures (or sub-cultures), a culture being seen as a patterned or organized system of standards that inter-relate and hang together (1.13). That is, EFR focuses, at least initially, upon the interviewee's perceptions, expectations, and preferences with respect to possible or probable changes in future whole ways of life, as distinct from how particular organizations or individuals will change, or how particular episodes or events will occur.

Consistent with maintaining this emphasis on holism, the investigator is also free, of course, to focus more sharply on some particular aspect of culture that especially interests him, such as environmental protection standards and practices, emerging religious belief systems, or the like. (2.58, 2.621).

The terms SHARED and PATTERNED imply the expectation that the research product you finally produce will indicate numerous cognitive and evaluative positions that tend to be held in common by all or most of the members of your sample, and that there will be, in addition to this commonality, a measure of consistency and patternedness in these positions. This patternedness will often, but not always, bear a noticeable relationship to the patternedness found in the extant culture. Of course, this does not come close to meaning that all cognitive (or expectational) positions, or all evaluative positions, taken by one interviewee will be shared by all others. There will almost certainly be numerous areas of non-consensus and ambiguity and a skillful ethnographer who knows the extant culture well can often provide useful analyses and interpretations of these (3.35, 3.4). It follows that this attempt to ascertain the degree of sharedness and patternedness that exists across the sample obviously implies that you build into the interview format sufficient structure to insure that the material elicited will offer a reasonable degree of comparability across interviews. The building of this structure will be accomplished, however, by the use of questions that are as non-directive as possible, so as to preserve the essential spirit of elicitation (2.62).

The term SCENARIO implies that you desire to learn from the interviewee both (1) his perceptions of the nature of the hypothesized culture as of the approximate horizon date; and (2) his perceptions of a plausible model or process by which change from the present culture to the hypothesized future culture is likely to occur (1.18, 2.53, 5.21).
2.2 THE GENERAL INTERVIEWING STRATEGY

The general spirit of EFR interviewing is broadly similar to that of conventional ethnography. Readers who wish to become more familiar with the rationale and procedure of one kind of systematic conventional ethnographic interview are advised to consult Spradley 1979, while those who seek a broader understanding of anthropological and ethnographic methodology are advised to consult Pelto and Pelto 1978. The present chapter undertakes simply to explain those aspects of the EFR interview which are different, at least as a matter of emphasis, from the approach that most ethnographers would probably take in pursuing conventional ethnographic tasks.

2.21 BUILDING MST= RAPPORT

It is axiomatic among anthropologists that the creation of an atmosphere of rapport is vital, and that interviews -- even those that produce voluminous field notes -- might lead to unreliable, invalid, or unbalanced results unless conducted in an atmosphere of rapport. While good rapport is certainly not in itself a sufficient factor in insuring good results, it is a necessary one, in most conventional situations, and in most EFR situations as well An essential basis of good rapport is trust. The interviewee must truly believe that everything he tells the ethnographer will be used only for scientific purposes, and never in such a way as to bring harm to the interviewee. Trust thus implies safety: safety from the disapproval or ridicule of the interviewer, and safety from the disapproval, ridicule, or tangible punishment of third parties - such as persons in authority, secret police agencies, or the like. The interviewee must believe that if there is ever a conflict between serving scientific purposes and protecting the interviewee, the ethnographer can be trusted to do the latter. The burden is totally on the ethnographer, and not at all on the interviewee, to so conceptualize and conduct the research that science may be served without impairment of the welfare or dignity of the interviewee or his group or community.

The EFR interview poses ethical problems that are more serious than those often faced in conventional ethnography, for EFR creates a situation in which the interviewee is strongly encouraged to get into touch with some of his deepest values, and to express them. These values are elicited in the context of constructing cultural scenarios that are (at least in the interviewee's judgment) realistic, which in turn implies that they are policy-relevant, rather than merely quasi-aphoristic, as sometimes is the case with more conventional values-eliciting techniques In the Thailand Futures Study, for example, some interviewees found themselves describing realistic-optimistic scenarios for a future Thai cultural system in which the distribution of political power would be radically different than that which at present prevails Inevitably, such a scenario carries with it the message, at least implicitly, that the interviewee is to some extent dissatisfied with the status quo Scientifically, such honesty is appropriate and valuable But unless precautions are taken, the results could be punitive for the individual concerned In 1977, when I did the Thailand EFR interviews, the ruling regime was one which, though well-intentioned, was highly restrictive of its citizens' personal freedoms. Most of the interviewees were Thai students doing graduate study in the United States, and in this capacity they had actually been officially notified not to become involved in "political" activities -- a term whose very vagueness caused anxiety and fear, especially since, at that time, the Cabinet, under emergency regulations, actually had the
power, without habeus corpus, to imprison or punish citizens deemed a threat to the state -- and this included the power to administer capital punishment. The fact that the interviewees in my sample were, in my judgment, extremely open and trusting, suggests that the elaborate arrangements I made for confidentiality were both necessary and successful. It further underlines the necessity for a clear commitment to confidentiality on the part of the investigator, and permanent adherence to that commitment.

It was not, of course, my intention to conduct a "political" interview. Rather, it was my intention to conduct a free interview, in which those interviewees who wanted to discuss any particular aspect of a hypothetical future culture for Thailand, political or whatever, could do so, and those who did not wish to, need not. As matters turned out, however, every interviewee wanted to say something about politics, and many had more to say about that domain of culture than any other.

Because of this climate of danger, I established more elaborate precautions to guarantee confidentiality than I had ever before used in many years of ethnographic fieldwork. In my introductory statement, I assured the interviewee that I would never divulge to anyone what he or she told me about any domain of culture, in a manner that would reveal the source of that remark. Of course, I remain free to arrive at, and state in publications, my conclusions based on a number of protocols; the important point is simply that I will never identify a particular position with a particular interviewee.

Further, I assured the interviewee that his interview protocol will be distributed only to him and to my file. It may be used by him in whatever way he wishes, but will be used by me only for research purposes. If I ever work with a collaborator, that person will simply work with the protocol without knowing whose protocol it is.

The protocol itself is identified only by a serial identification number, and these identification numbers are retained by me in a safe place. The protocol is dictated and edited in such a fashion as to give no information or hints as to the interviewee's identity (2.741). The interviewee's name is not used; he or she is simply referred to by a standard abbreviation, "S," meaning "scenarizer" or "scenario-builder." This renders the possessive form "S's," which is preferable to "his" or "hers" from the standpoint of preserving anonymity. No references are made in the protocol itself, as distinct from the Biographical Sketch (2.52), to any aspects of S's personal situation. Thus, should a copy of the protocol ever fall into the wrong hands, there is no way in which it could be traced to a particular person.

Now that the term "S" has been introduced, I will hereafter use it interchangeably with "the interviewee," both for the sake of variety, and for the purpose of encouraging the habit of viewing S as being of either sex.

Since the completion of the Thailand Futures Study, I have discussed with some interviewees various points that they made during their interviews -- but always in private. While some interviewees have discussed their interviews with other interviewees, and even shown their protocols to other interviewees, or to other friends and colleagues, my position remains that this is solely a matter for their choice, and in no way releases me from my obligation to remain silent.
Are such elaborate precautions necessary in every situation in which EFR is used? Probably not. This remains to be worked out on the basis of experience. In the meantime, however, it is my judgment that interviewees definitely prefer an interview relationship that is unambiguously safe, and that therefore it is best, in doubtful situations, to lean on the safe side. Whatever your decision, it is important for you to make a clear commitment to S, and then to keep it, permanently.

2.22 REDUCING TDUUCENTRISM

tempocentrin" is a term I have coined to refer to a complex psychological state in which one is locked into a narrow or otherwise inappropriate time frame and lacks the sense of salience, clarity of awareness, and strength of motivation necessary to attend to, and reach adequately informed and useful judgments about, longer-range phenomena or issues. People become so wrapped up in matters like running a government, getting the next fiscal year's budget through the legislature, reducing this year's unemployment rate, meeting a payroll, bringing off a business deal, getting promoted, winning a spouse, surviving until the harvest, paying the bills, moving to a new house, planning the annual vacation, or even shorter range concerns -- that they do not attend to problems like: whether there is a true cancer epidemic impending in Chicago, or whether Tokyo really can tolerate more private automobiles, or whether it is acceptable to let additional foreign firms export their pollution into Brazil's rivers, or what will happen to cherished traditional affiliative values in Shetlands culture as as result of the North Sea oil bonanza, or what will happen to political stability in the Philippines if the university graduate production rate remains at present extremely high levels, or whether Palo Alto should encourage the creation of four or five times as many local jobs as it has local space to house job-holders.

Using an archaeological metaphor, tempocentrism can be conceived of as the vertical analog of the horizontal notion of ethnocentrism. In the case of ethnocentrism, the individual is cognitively and emotionally unable to deal with another culture that exists contemporaneously with his own. In the case of tempocentrism, the individual is similarly unable to deal with his own culture as it could or might change through time Tempocentrism, like ethnocentrism, involves a whole complex of attitudes and values. Just as ethnocentrism is more than an occasional or isolated "prejudice," so tempocentrism is more than an occasional or isolated "lack of foresight." I am positing, then, that tempocentrxism is a whole system of culturally conditioned attitudes or tendencies that are quite deeply rooted in the personality, and not likely to change unless the individual experiences trauma, followed by appropriate learning.

All of this is not to deny, however, that ethnocentrism and tempocentrism do, in fact, provide a certain kind of psychological comfort, and help us get the immediate tasks of daily personal life accomplished. However, the crucially important point is that neither ethnocentrism nor tempocentrism is appropriate as a conscious or unconscious stance for a leader, planner, or educator, or, indeed, for an active citizen. In the case of ethnocentrism, this inappropriateness is now fairly widely recognized, at least in principle. In the case of tempocentrism, however, it remains much less widely recognized.

The EFR interview employs a variety of strategies to encourage the interviewee to free himself from his tempocentric moorings. A basic strategy is to designate a horizon date for the scenarios which S is asked to construct, which is far enough into the future so that he needn't feel constrained
by what he perceives as powerful constraints in the extant culture - which may in fact be powerful, but are in many cases almost certain to prove of limited durability. Thus, for example, a Filipino interviewee projecting to a horizon date of A.D. 2005 is free to assume that the present national political leadership will, well before then, have relinquished the reins of control, that capital for major infra-structural development can by then be found, that educational processes will by then have had time to produce considerable change in cultural attitudes, and so on.

It should be noted in passing, finally, that an EFR experience which effectively moves an individual out of his tempocentrian appears, on the basis of existing experience, not to be psychologically destructive, but, on the contrary, to be quite constructive and integrative (2.59, 7.11).

2.23 ENCOURAGING SNTAZNEIT

Cutting S loose from the moorings of excessive tempocentrism, and creating a confidential and safe atmosphere, are part of a broader process of freeing him from conventional inhibitions in general. Your task as ethnographer is to encourage S, by all reasonable means, to express whatever cognitions and values he might wish to express, without fear or embarrassment. 'lb the greatest extent possible, he. is encouraged to build scenarios giving emphasis to those elements that he thinks are important, and to disregard any notions he might harbor as to whether what he has to say, and what emphases he places on the various points he makes, are "right" in the perception of the ethnographer -- or anyone else but himself. In this respect the EFR approach overlaps somewhat with that used in certain types of projective tests.

2.24 DISCOURAGING UTOPIANISM

EFR, at least as I practice it, is not interested in Utopian fantasies. Balancing the emphasis upon spontaneity, therefore, are various - procedures designed to keep the interviewee's forecasting or scenarizing realistic (2.54). However, EFR calls for the interviewee, not the ethnographer, to determine where these boundaries of realism lie [2.1]

2.25 INSURING CROSS-INTERVIEW COMPARABILITY

Though the EFR interview is loosely structured, it does contain enough structure not only to discourage utopianism, but also to insure a reasonable measure of cross-interview comparability. If S does not spontaneously bring up certain topics that are of interest to the ethnographer and/or to other interviewees, appropriate non-directive probes are used (Section 2.621). The number of such standard probes increases as the project moves toward conclusion (3.223).

2.26 ENHANCING PRODUCTIVE INTERACTION

All ethnography places greater emphasis on reciprocal interaction between interviewer and interviewee, than is typically found in most other methods of social science research. EFR, with its emphasis on cumulative summarization (2.7), goes farther than conventional ethnography probably does in most cases. Incidentally, EFR also offers possibilities of continued productive interaction well after the interviews and write-up are finished, by means of such follow-up activities as
involving interviewees in report editing (3.61); conferencing (3.62); or treating the EFR experience as the first element in a course on futures (7.3).

2.27 CREATING AN APPROPRIATE ADSPHERE

Since S typically has never before experienced anything very similar to an EFR interview, he usually has little idea what to expect. This places a special burden on you to create and sustain an appropriate atmosphere, and calls for verbal and non-verbal communication skills, for tact, for patience, and above all, for respect for the interviewee. You will find yourself explaining, then later re-explaining in other words, interpreting, then later re-interpreting in other contexts, just what the purpose of a given element of the interview is. Below are listed some behaviors that have been found useful in creating and sustaining the appropriate atmosphere for an EFR interview.

2.271 PUTTING THE INTERVIEWEE IN CHARGE: It is important that you let the scenarizer know, early on, that he is pretty much in charge of the interview. Through verbal and non-verbal interaction, you encourage S to actually feel and experience this sense of in-chargeness. This can be a heady experience for S, and can motivate very active participation and thus bring about a very rich interview.

2.272 IMPARTING A SENSE OF ADVENTURE: Experience suggests that as the EFR interview moves along, S comes to see alternative futures as more "real," and often begins to feel a stimulating sense of adventure, a sense that S is moving along through terrain that, while of course not totally unfamiliar, is new enough to be interesting. Some scenarizers appear to develop something like a vicarious sense of efficacy as they proceed to "create" futures in the form of images. Within reasonable limits, I judge this sense of adventure to be an aspect of positive rapport, which is likely to produce a considerably more fruitful protocol than might otherwise be the case.

2.273 SHOWING NON-JUDGMENTAL RESPECT: You should make it clear from the outset that, within all reasonable limits, "anything goes," and that any statement made, or value expressed, by the interviewee will be respected and duly noted in a quite neutral, non-judgmental manner.

2.274 DISPLAYING ATTENTIVENESS: The ER interview is open-ended, and can last for three or even four hours, during which time your task is to remain attentive and receptive -- an interested, interesting listener and summarizer. This is not always easy, but interviewees appreciate it enormously, perhaps because they are not accustomed to having anybody listen to them so long and so patiently on any subject, let alone an interesting and important one.

2.275 CREATING A SENSE OF PARTNERSHIP: Experience indicates that Your attentiveness, and your patient use of prompt summarizing feedback, (2.7), tend to create a mood of partnership between S and you, but one in which S is definitely the senior partner. This symbiotic mood helps, I believe, to make the EFR interview more productive and efficient than some more conventional types of ethnographic interviewing usually are -- at least if my own experience in conventional ethnography may be taken as a guide.

2.3 PHYSICAL SETTING FOR THE INTERVIEW
The choice of where to conduct the interview should be made in consideration of the interviewee's wishes and convenience. If he wishes, it can be his residence. In some cultures, where interviewer and interviewee of opposite sex are not supposed to be in a residential room alone, the setting might appropriately be an office, or some place where a third person, perhaps a family member, can be present; in such cases, it is highly desirable that you try to arrange things so that the third person will not be within earshot of the actual interview, in this way preserving confidentiality and encouraging spontaneity. In some cases you might wish to conduct all of your interviews in the same place, so as to control the environmental stimulus. Especially if you were to create and have available visual aids tailored to the purpose of the interview, and/or if you were to have available an interviewing room that is unusually comfortable and restful, this might be an advisable arrangement. However, such an arrangement must not impose a hardship on the interviewee, such as requiring him to travel too great a distance. For example, in the Thailand Study some of my interviewees lived 50 miles away, so that the only practicable arrangement was for me to go to them, and interview them in their residences. Other S-s lived close to me, and I interviewed some of them in my office, some in my home, and some in their residences, at their option. On the whole, rapport is a more important consideration than control of environmental stimulus, though this latter consideration can also be important. In seating yourself, it is best to sit so that you do not symbolically re-enact a formal job interview, school interview, or "official" interview. I find it best not to sit on one side of a desk, with S on the other side, as this seems to suggest officially, at least in many cultures. If there are two chairs, or a chair and a couch, at 90 degree angles to each other, that is often best. If you sit on the couch, you can place your tape recorder next to you on the couch, unobtrusively. If one seat is more comfortable than the other, try to get S to take the more comfortable one. In any case, try to let your sitting posture symbolize relaxation, short of slouching or sitting in a manner defined in his culture as undignified or inappropriate.

2.4 EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES NEEDED

The equipment needed for a ER interview is simplicity itself, but the following checklist might be useful.

1. Clipperboard.
2. Ample supply of paper.
3. Ballpoint pen plus spares.
4. Outline of points to make in introducing yourself and the interview (2.511) and each element of the interview.
5. List of standard probe items (2.6215).
6. Tape retarder (or similar device). This should be chosen with your and your transcription typist's convenience in mind, subject, of course, to financial constraints. I have had excellent results with a Grundig Stenorette 2050.
7. Ample supply of cassettes (or belts, etc.).
8. Spare set of batteries to use in case you do not have a regular electricity supply to plug into, and the first set wears out.
9. Supply of soda, beer, or the like, plus snacks, as appropriate. I sometimes take a few cans of cool drinks in my briefcase, to offer S and give him a choice, plus a packaged snack of
some kind, if am to interview him in a place other than his residence, where he usually feels that he is the host.

10. In some cases, you might need to take a second tape recorder and supply of cassettes, as when (1) you have decided to use one recorder for cumulative summarization, and one to simply record the entire interview (2.7); or when (2) you wish to offer S the opportunity to scenarize in more than one language. Fbr example, I have research plans that call for my offering to a Thai interviewee the opportunity to choose between English and Thai. S might, for example, prefer to scenarize about economics and technology primarily in English, but feel more comfortable scenarizing about religion and the arts in Thai. In such a case, I might find it advantageous to dictate my English summaries into one recorder, and my Thai summaries into another recorder, with each recorded segment appropriately marked to avoid confusion. By use of an appropriate numbering system and appropriate instructions to the transcription typists, I can then produce a single, interleaved protocol in which the English portion is transcribed by a typist expert in English, and a Thai portion transcribed by a typist expert in Thai.

11. (Incidentally, it is well to bear in mind that you must also make provision for your typist's subsequent use of a play-back machine, unless it is technically and logistically feasible for the typist to use the same tape recorder for transcription during times when you do not need it for interviews.)

2.5 ELEMENTS OF THE INTERVIEW

The EFR interview format, as it has been developed so far, consists of the following eight elements.

1. The Ethnographer's Introduction and Self-Presentation serves to get the interview started and keep it properly oriented and motivated throughout (2.51).
2. The Biographical Sketch of the Interviewee is taken at whatever point in the interview seems least likely to damage rapport, and gathers enough material to serve as a reasonable guide in subsequent analysis of the corpus of protocols (2.52)
3. The Optimistic Scenario elicits, within the realm of the possible, a cultural future which S considers highly desirable, by his own values (2.54)
4. The Pessimistic Scenario does the same, except that the cultural future is highly undesirable, by S's values (2.55)
5. The most Probable Scenario totally ignores desirability, and concentrates simply on scenarizing that cultural future, as of the horizon date or thereabouts, which S believes is most likely to occur (2.56).
6. The Interviewee's Change Model gets at how — by what causal or processual chain-- S believes the Most Probable Scenario is likely to occur (2.57).
7. Optional Elements might follow, such as project- specific elements designed to get at implications for policy or for participation (2.58).
8. Finally, the Encouragement of reactions signals the end of the interview, and encourages S to abreact, to let out any further thoughts, forecasts, or values S wishes to share, including S's personal feelings or intentions as these may have been affected by the interview. (2.59).

The subsections below present these elements, and are followed by
a final subsection which examines possible alterations or additions in this list of elements, designed either to improve the EFR method as a whole, or to diversify it so that it may be adapted to serve a wider variety of specialized purposes.

2.51 FIRST ELEMENT: INTRODUCTION AND SELF-PRESENTATION
This is here treated as the "First" Element in the EFR interview, in the sense that the first thing you do is to introduce the purpose of the interview, and to begin to present yourself, both as a professional and as a person. It should be borne in mind, however, that the purposes of the interview might need to be re-introduced, or supplementarily explained, at numerous points throughout the interview -- as often as, in your judgment, proves necessary or desirable, given the need for both clarity and rapport. And the presentation of your social "self" is, even more emphatically, a continuing process, which lasts as long as the interview does.

2.511 INTRODUCTION: The Introduction should make clear what is expected of the interviewee, and what you in turn are committing yourself to do or not do. Examples of an Introduction are given in Appendix One. Regardless of details, an Introduction should always include the following points.

Indicate the purpose(s) of the interview, and of each of the elements within it. Almost invariably, one purpose is to produce a research product, and often a publishable product -- and this should be made clear. Some EFR projects also have other purposes, such as: (1) to offer counseling (7.21); (2) to conduct a conference based on the findings; (3.62); or (3) to conduct an educational course for interviewees or others. (7.3). All such additional purposes should also be mentioned.

Make clear what are the rewards that S may expect from the experience. Normally there are at least two such rewards: (1) an interesting experience and perhaps a raised consciousness on the part of the interviewee, and (2) a gratis copy of the protocol of the interview, which the interviewee may file for future reference and use. In addition, if you intend to offer counseling, a conference, or an educational course for interviewees, those would be rewards to mention.

Specify the precautions you commit yourself to take to protect S's privacy, dignity, and well-being (2.21). Especially, make sure S understands the precautions you will take to protect the anonymity of the interview and resulting protocol If any other researcher or collaborator is expected to, or might, ever see the protocol and learn of the identity of the interviewee, tell S all about this, and what the limits are as to who might be involved - and secure S's consent.

2.512 SELF-PRESENTATION: The introduction of the "nuts and bolts" arrangements for the interview intergrades with your actual presentation of yourself as a researcher and a human being. At a minimum, it is important in presenting yourself to come across as a professional person, honest, reliable, and altruistically motivated - but not judgmental If, in addition, you can come across as someone who is pleasant, supportive, interesting, and fun to talk to - so much the better.

2.52 SECOND ELEMENT. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE INTERVIEWEE
I have found generally that it is possible, and apparently does not diminish rapport, to ask for, and record, this Sketch right at the beginning, immediately after that part of the interview in which I explain the precautions I take to protect the anonymity of the protocol. However, if in your
judgment this is not the appropriate point at which to do the Sketch, then you should follow your judgment, and in no case allow taking the Sketch to damage rapport.

The Sketch should not be long or tiresome. Normally, it is merely for the purpose of recording enough basic information so that crude cross-breaks can be made during the analysis phase to check whether patterned responses tend to differ by the interviewee's basic background characteristics (3.35).

The Sketch should follow a roughly fixed format of items, such as the following:

1. Sex of interviewee.
2. Where reared - location, rural or urban, etc.
3. Where educated and in what.
4. Occupation.
5. Ethnicity of parents, language spoken in the home, etc.
6. Approximate age.
7. Marital and family status.

As you take the Biographical Sketch, you make rough notes on your clipperboard, while also maintaining eye contact with S from moment to moment. Sometimes it is a good idea to hold your clipperboard in such a way that S can see what you write on it -- simply to reassure him that your procedure is totally open. In any case, don't hold the clipperboard so that it becomes a visual barrier, so to speak, between you and S. This is S's first opportunity to observe your procedure, and a good "first impression" is helpful.

Tact is always essential, as is cultural sensitivity. If you are from a culture where a woman's age is not a sensitive matter, and are interviewing a middle-class American Anglo female who is obviously over 30 and under 65, it is well to bear cultural differences in mind and be sensitive to the probability that she does not wish to be pressed about her exact age. If your judgment tells you that this is so, then it is better to skip the question on age rather than risk endangering rapport; you can always later make a rough estimate of S's age, and for most purposes this will be satisfactory, anyway. If you are a non-Thai interviewing Thais, it is well to bear in mind that some Thais don't like being asked whether they have Chinese forebears, though they probably will not object to being asked what languages they spoke in their home during childhood. It is better to end up with an incomplete Biographical Sketch than to endanger rapport by pressing too early, or too firmly, for every last detail that you would like to know.

Rather soon, you will be ready to dictate the Biographical Sketch.

Turn on your tape recorder (or other recording instrument) and hold it (or its microphone) in such a way as to permit you to maintain eye contact with S between glances at your clipperboard. Let S see that you are alert to verbal and non-verbal indications on his part that you have distorted some information, left out an important point, or whatever. Since this is normally the first instance in which S will experience your dictating style, it is important to get off on the right foot by making it clear that S has nothing to fear from your use of the tape recorder. The dictating style that seems to work best is one that is brief, clear, straightforward, matter-offact, and even-toned (that is, free of
intonation that might convey judgmentality or otherwise embarrass S or make him feel uncomfortable). A hypothetical example from the 1977 Thailand Study might be as follows.

[Typist's name], make this Part One, Biographical Sketch. S No. 009 is male, aged 32, born and reared in Bangkok, a graduate of St. Gabriel School and then Chulalongkorn University, Department of Physics. He worked in the personnel field for a European oil firm in Bangkok and upcountry for about five years after graduating from Chulalongkorn, and is now in his second year of study for a master's degree in Industrial Engineering. As a child S spoke only Thai in his home. S is married to a Thai lady, who remains in Bangkok with their two children.

If S gives evidence that he wants to discuss his biographical background at some length, it would be wise to acquiesce in this for a while, and to dictate at least some of the material that he volunteers, even if you hadn't intended to ask about those points. However, in general it is well to get the Biographical Sketch over and done quickly.

2.53 THE SCENARIOS: BACKGROUND COMMENTARY AND GENERAL STRATEGY
The heart of the EFR interview is the eliciting of scenarios. These constitute the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Elements in the interview format and normally take up 90% or more of the total interviewing time you spend with S. Some background commentary about scenarios in general would therefore be appropriate at this point.

An authoritative general treatment of scenarios is that by Wilson, who specifies three basic characteristics of the scenario, as follows.

A, scenario is "hypothetical." It is not a prediction, because "the future is, and must always remain, in a fundamental sense, unknowable. The best that Futures Research can do is to explore alternative possible futures, and for such an exploration scenarios are admirably suited" (1978: 226).

A scenario is "only a sketch, an outline" (1978: 226). It necessarily omits a great deal of detail.

A scenario is "multifaceted and holistic...for it is the cross-impact of events and trends that gives history (and the future) its dynamic" (1978: 226-7). Wilson emphasizes holism throughout his article although he does not, interestingly, mention the concept of culture as a tool for comprehending and analyzing holism.

The scenarios elicited and dictated during an EFR interview exhibit all three of Wilson's criteria. In EFR, however, the concept of culture is central, and for that reason the scenarios elicited are probably quite a bit broader than would be the case with most other scenario-using methods. As for formal definitions, Wilson (borrowing from SRI/CSSP 1975: 193) provides first a very broad one, by defining a scenario as "an exploration of an alternative future,' or, more precisely, as 'an outline of one conceivable state of affairs, given certain assumptions." Then he selects a more detailed definition from Kahn and Wiener, who define a scenario as "a hypothetical sequence of events constructed for the purpose of focusing attention on causal processes and decision points" (1967).

The first definition emphasizes the description of a situation that could exist as of a certain horizon date, while the second emphasizes more the process by which the present situation could change to
become that new situation. It is my judgment that both the "what" and the "how" questions are important in the elicitation of scenarios, with the relative emphasis on the one or the other to be determined by the particular research interests of the investigator.

Elements Three and Four of the EFR interview format tend to focus upon the "what" (temporary end-states as of a specified time horizon) while Elements Five and Six tend to focus upon the "how" -- though neither focus is ever exclusive of the other. To be more specific, Elements Three and Four (the Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios) emphasize the merely possible rather than the relatively more probable, while Elements Five and Six (the Most Probable Scenario and the Interviewee's Change Model) emphasize the relatively most probable and ignore the merely possible. Elements Three and Four emphasize what the interviewee desires (as long as it is possible) while Elements Five and Six emphasize what the interviewee considers most likely, and why and how -- whether or not it is seen as desirable. Elements Three and Four appropriately come earlier, for they are designed to free S from his tempocentrism and "stretch" his creativity (while keeping him from indulging in unrealistic utopianism of dystopianism), while Elements Five and six stress hard-headed realism at the possible cost of creativity. Experience suggests that as the interview moves from an emphasis on the desirable to an emphasis on the probable, the interviewee naturally finds himself emphasizing the "what" somewhat less, and the "how" somewhat more.

2.54 THIRD ELEMENT: THE OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO

With that general introduction, we may now consider in more detail each scenario element in the format. After taking the Biographical Sketch, you move to the Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios, which I have adapted in a number of ways from the original and creative work of Amara and Lipinsky (1976). Experience suggests that it is generally best to start with the Optimistic Scenario, though if S indicates a clear desire to do the Pessimistic one first, you should go along with S's preferences. The Optimistic Scenario normally takes longer than all other elements combined, and becomes the positive, assertive "heart" of the interview. In introducing this element, as well as the Pessimistic Scenario, you ask S to conceive of possible alternative future cultures for, let us say, Thailand as of A.D. 2000, as having 100 identifiable variants. That is, there are assumed to be 100 realistically possible future cultures for Thai society. These are numbered from 1 to 100, in the order of least to most desirable. You should stress that "desirability" refers strictly to the interviewee's own Personal notion of the desirable, whether or not he believes his fellow Thais would share such notions [2.21 It is sometimes useful to make clear to the interviewee that he need not worry about whether a given numbered scenario is more or less probable than another, but needs simply to keep in mind that all scenarios less desirable than No 1 are defined as being unrealistic and impossible -- "hell on earth," as it were, which could not happen. Similarly, all scenarios that are more desirable than No. 100 are also defined as being unrealistic and impossible - - "heaven on earth." (In Thai culture "heaven" (sawan) and "hell" (narog) are meaningful concepts; if this were not the case, I would, of course, have used different metaphors.) Scenarios around No. 50 are defined as being neither particularly desirable nor particularly undesirable.(2.3] You then ask S to focus his attention on Scenario No. 90 -- not quite the very best culture that Thailand could attain by the horizon date, but nonetheless very desirable. (Choosing No. 90 rather than 100 forces the interviewee back a bit from the extreme edge of realism, providing a margin, as it were, which helps further to discourage utopianism.) You ask S to describe what this desirable-but-realistic
culture would be like, in his own words, starting with whatever aspect or domain of the culture he wishes.

Often, S will have a number of questions about this theoretical continuum of possible cultures, and you should answer all such questions as non-argumentatively, non-directively, and simply as possible, taking care to avoid any sign of impatience. Even very intelligent interviewees might sometimes ask questions about the continuum that you will feel to be naive or unnecessary, but it is vital that any such feelings on your part remain uncommunicated.

It is probably desirable to expand a bit on what you mean by "culture" -- and in doing so, it is usually better to use an explanation that will standardly convey the essential idea you have in mind, rather than to be overly concerned about getting just the right definition that will satisfy a rigorous social science audience. In the Thailand study, I offered a working definition which glossed the English term "culture" into two somewhat differing but jointly perhaps adequate Thai terms, wadthananatham and thaang chiwid, adding something like, "the total way of life of the Thai people at that time; all the main patterns and standards in terms of which the Thai people will live in that year." It is best to avoid emotionally loaded terms such as "the Thai nation" or "the Thai kingdom." In order to exemplify how broad the concept of culture is, I would then add that S should feel free to talk about any aspect of the culture, "such as religion, the arts, patterns of interaction among people, education, economics, technology, social patterning, relations with the natural environment, politics, agriculture, relations between the sexes -- whatever you wish." I didn't mention politics or economics early in the list, simply because there was some tendency for interviewees to concentrate rather heavily on these two rubrics -- but neither did I avoid mentioning those terms. [2.4] Once this step is over, the ordering of domains within a scenario is entirely up to S, and it is unacceptable for the interviewer to attempt to tell the interviewee what the "proper" order of presenting the domains ought to be.

2.55 FOURTH ELEMENT: THE PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO

When the Optimistic Scenario is completed, the next element in the interview is normally the Pessimistic Scenario. You introduce this by reminding the interviewee of the idea of a 1-10-90-100 continuum of possible cultural scenarios for Thailand, and then ask him to describe in his own way what the culture would be like if it were at Number 10 on the continuum -- not quite the worst that could occur, but very undesirable.

Beyond this difference, you handle the Pessimistic Scenario in very much the same manner as the Optimistic, mutatis mutandis, reminding, re-explaining, and reclarifying as need arises -- but always non-directively.

Pessimistic Scenarios are normally much shorter than Optimistic ones. The interviewee who has just spent one, two, or even three hours on his Optimistic Scenario might have little inclination to go into such detail on the Pessimistic side, and the latter may be all over in 15 minutes. Often, he will simply say that the Pessimistic Scenario is more or less the opposite of the Optimistic, domain by domain and subject by subject. In any case, the proper tactic is to keep S talking about the
Pessimistic Scenario to the extent (1) that it seems necessary; (2) that he seems willing; and (3) that rapport does not seem to suffer – probing to the extent possible to draw him out on the same domains of culture that he covered in his Optimistic Scenario.

2.56 FIFTH ELEMENT: THE MOST PROBABLE SCENARIO

Next comes the Most Probable Scenario, and with it an abrupt shift from an emphasis on desirability within the realm of the possible, to an emphasis on probability regardless of desirability. Now, you are emphasizing cognition and expectation, quite apart from normative considerations. Essentially, your key question now becomes: Of the 100 possible cultural scenarios for Thailand, which is the most likely to occur? You must be prepared for surprise here, for his most likely scenario might turn out to be much more like his little-elaborated Pessimistic Scenario than his much-elaborated Optimistic one, necessitating a fair amount of clarificatory probing (2.62) on your part in order to draw out the major patterns of the most probable culture.

At this point you might be wondering: Why not start out by going straight to the Most Probable Scenario, and skip all the work of eliciting the Optimistic and pessimistic Scenarios? The short answer is: Because it doesn't work! Occasionally some of my students, becoming impatient with what they regarded as an overly elaborated interviewing format, have tried this "short cut," only later to lament that the results have been uniformly disappointing. It seems clear that S must first be "stretched" out of his normal tempocentrism before his imaging capacities are fully activated, and experience demonstrates that the Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios produce this result quite effectively. Lacking this, S's Most Probable Scenario will probably turn out to be sparse, unimaginative, and lacking in interest either to the interviewer or, indeed, to S himself.

2.57 SIXTH ELEMENT: THE INTERVIEWEE'S CHANGE MODEL

The next element is the Interviewee's Change Model, which is really the "bow" question to accompany the "what" question that has just been answered, thus fulfilling the "what plus hour" ideal for a scenario, as discussed in Section 2.53. The purpose of this element is to ascertain the interviewee's basic model for change, however loosely cognized it might be. In order to give sharpness to the question, he is asked what his model is concerning the specific causal chain or process that will (or would) make the Most Probable Scenario become reality, that is, what the "prime movers" of change are most likely to be. In other words, he is asked what the most plausible or probable "how" is, with respect to the most probable "what" that could occur. Experience suggests that this sharpening produces better results than if the question is left more diffuse.

In the Thailand Study, some interviewees saw change as stemming basically from the influence of foreign (Western) ideas, while others employed a more nearly "political economy" model. In addition, a small minority invoked causation by the mechanism of Buddhist Karma (3.5).

This element of the interview elicits relatively little material, in some cases, simply because the Most Probable Scenario has already produced both a "what" and a "how" response. To insure completeness, however, this element is built into the interview format, and in other cases proves quite useful.[2•5]
The standard EFR interview is now practically over, aside from the final "warming down" and adieu-saying (2.59). With reasonable luck and skill, you should by now have moved the interview to a point where both S and you feel a quite satisfying sense of closure and completeness.

However, it might also be the case that an additional element or two are needed, in order to satisfy the particular purposes and special emphases of your research project. If so, this is the point in the interview at which this element or these elements should be introduced, for you have now set the stage for more specialized, focused inquiry - first by "stretching" S in optimistic and pessimistic directions, and then by drawing his attention to the Most Probable Scenario, and the most plausible process by which this scenario could become reality. All of this constitutes a broad and vivid context of possibilities, probabilities, and preferences, within which smaller-scale trends or events may be projected.

2.581 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY: One optional element that might usefully be added at this point would be an "implications for policy" element aimed at eliciting from S specifically what policies some government or organization -- e.g., the United Nations, the government of Indonesia' etc. -- ought to adopt, in order best to cope with the future. While some of these policy decisions might already have been more or less casually volunteered by S during earlier elements of the interview, the advantage of a specific element dealing directly and specifically with policy matters would be, of course, to provide an opportunity for S to deal much more systematically with all of the principal policy implications of his scenarios, and to become more sensitive to, and more inclined to examine, possible inconsistencies or trade-offs among policy options.

You might find it helpful to concentrate your inquiry upon particular policy domains, such as ecology and environmental preservation. This would save time, help minimize fatigue, and insure more rigorous cross-interview comparability in matters deemed crucial to the logic and focus of your research interests.

2.582 IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTICIPATION: A second element that might be included here (in addition to, or instead of, the foregoing) would be one designed to elicit from S his own prospects or plans for participation in the future, in an effort to help bring about the realization of his Optimistic Scenario, or at least a desirable one. Since people tend to see their efficacy in terms of group membership and collective action (and usually quite realistically so) the optional element might focus primarily upon S's organization, group, institution, or social category -- such as the Ministry of Education, the Social Science Association, the Central Labour Federation, the Chamber of Commerce, "the press," or "the intellectual community." Your questions could, accordingly, focus upon S's potential participation in the context of such an institutional structure. Probes might be designed to get at the conditional nature of S's thinking about his potential role, for example: if there were an ecological system break, S's pattern of participation or activism would be altered in such a way; or: if S became a leader in a particular organization, he would lead it in such and such a way, and so on
The extent to which you can or should try to elicit specific personal plans (conditional or otherwise) from S depends, in part, on whether you deem it appropriate to ask him questions that are that personal. This in turn depends on your rapport with S, and upon the way he would perceive the legitimacy of your asking him such a question. If your services have been requested by S or his organization and if part of the request was that you look at interviewees' sense of personal involvement in the future, then such a research strategy might be quite appropriate. If, however, you are simply interested in how your interviewees perceive their personal alternatives, but have no further legitimation for such inquiry, then, obviously, you must be quite tentative and careful in your questions, for some interviewees might regard questions about their plans as an invasion of their privacy, and this privacy must always be scrupulously respected. Having said this, however, it is well to add that the educational impact of an EFR interview will doubtless be greater (7.11, 7.32) if you can somehow manage, toward the end of the interview, to relate alternative futures directly to S's sense of personal stake, involvement, and efficacy.

2.59 FINAL ELEMENT: THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF ABREATIONS

The final act in an EFR interview is, of course, to terminate the interview. By now you have been listening for anywhere from one to four hours, and it will probably be quite clear to you when the point is reached where S has said all he wants to say, and would like to stop. Obviously, after such a lengthy and frank experience in communication, it would be a bit gross simply to pick up your equipment and abruptly depart. So, you first ask a question something like, "Anything else you'd like to say?" or "Does that wrap it up?" At this point S might indeed have something more to say, and if he does, you handle it as part of the interview. Or, S might say, "That's all."

At such a point, as you begin to reassemble your equipment, an appropriate rejoinder would be something like, Nell, that's quite a bit, and I really enjoyed listening. Did you enjoy it?" Here, your purpose is to begin to re-humanize the relationship, as it were, to bring it back to a more conversational node, and to help S release any tensions that might have built up during the interview. S will probably tell you how he feels about the experience of being interviewed, and perhaps also about his broader or deeper emotional concerns for the future -- his own, his community's, his country's, the world's, etc. It is my belief that a properly conducted EFR interview will leave S more integrated emotionally, more "together," as it were, and less anxious, than S was before the interview. Whether or not this is true in every case, this last element of the interview should serve to cement a relationship of warmth and trust between you and S, and set the stage for possible further interaction. I find that having a beer or coffee, etc., together at this point is quite natural.

If the interview has taken place at S's residence, he will often suggest refreshments; alternatively, you can suggest a nearby coffee house, tavern, or the like. I personally enjoy this abreactive phase very much, not only because it permits both of us to relax and unwind, but also because it becomes a sort of acknowledgment that I have gotten to know another human being rather well, and am now letting him get to know me. Both of us are now able to relax more, the only constraint upon me being that I must still refrain from expressing any kind of judgment of S's protocol, for he still must edit it, and I must not, directly or indirectly, suggest to him how this should be done.

Before taking your leave, you should reassure S once again that the
interview will be permanently treated as confidential (in whatever respects you earlier outlined) and that within a few days he will receive a transcribed copy of the protocol, which you hope he will correct, in total privacy, as freely and extensively as he wishes, and return to you (2.75). After you incorporate his revisions, you will then send him back a corrected copy for his file. Occasionally, an interviewee might express a preference that he not see his protocol again, and if this preference is a firm one, you should, of course, respect it.

2.60 FURTHER FLEXIBILITY AND FOCUS

One of the advantages of ethnography as a general approach is its flexibility and adaptability to a wide variety of special research needs. The same can, I trust, be said for EFR.

To illustrate, let us imagine that you have drawn a sample of interviewees from the U.S. microprocessor industry, in order to understand their images of the U.S., in a global context, as of the horizon year A.D. 2005. The following are some of the special adaptations you might build into your format.

In the Biographical Sketch: Ascertain the length and nature of S's involvement with the development of microprocessors and related technology.

In the Optimistic, Pessimistic, and Most Probable Scenarios: Establish subject probes (2.6212) dealing with the handling and transmission of information.

In the Interviewee's Change ?del Establish theme probes (2.6213) designed to get at S's perceptions as to the role of micro-processed information in making this or that type of culture change, or other change, possible or more probable.

Among the Optional Elements A special element might be created in order to explore S's perceptions as to the possibility, probability, and desirability of this or that policy on the part of the microprocessor industry, the public, the government, the UN, etc., concerning this or that specified aspect of microprocessor development and usage (2.581). Another special element might be created in order to explore S's perceptions as to the possibility, probability, or desirability of his own company or group, or of S himself, participating in the bringing about of a desired future (2.582).

The above hypothetical example could be expanded considerably, but will perhaps serve to suggest the degree of flexibility and focusability that is inherent in the EFR approach. It is n' hope that a number of readers will experiment with various deletions, combinations, and additions, so that EFR may evolve in a way that will satisfy a variety of needs.

2.6 STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN FREEDOM AND STRUCTUREDNESS

Few if any research methods are completely structured, and no research method can be completely unstructured, for this would mean that there would be no reliable basis for systematically comparing data obtained from Interviewee A with that obtained from Interviewee B. Some structuring, therefore, is always necessary.
Nonetheless, there can be little doubt but that ethnography — including EFR -- is loosely structured, relative to approaches used by most other disciplines most of the time. Like all research methodologies, ethnography asks questions in order to find out important answers. Unlike most other research methodologies, however, ethnography also emphasizes the asking of questions in order to find out what are the important questions. Generally, the ethnographer is less satisfied, in advance, that he knows what the crucial questions are, and more inclined to rely on the interviewee's view of the world as one important means of determining what these questions are. In other words, one aspect of ethnography that is unique, or virtually so, is that it attempts to describe the world in the cultural categories of the interviewee, in addition to the cultural categories of the international social science subculture. It is this sensitivity to the "emic" perspective, essentially, that renders ethnographic research "loosely structured" -- virtually by definition (3.5). Of course, to the extent that the ethnographer believes he already understands the interviewee's cultural categories, as the result of previous research, he is likely to feel that he can proceed in a more structured manner than would otherwise be the case. And it follows that ethnographers sometimes take a dim view of some researchers, especially those working in a culture alien to them, who proceed in a very structured fashion from the very beginning - as if they knew in advance what the interviewees' cultural categories were, or had decided in advance that these categories were not important. While of course the ethnographer, as he analyzes and interprets his data, eventually converts these data into the cultural categories of international social science, he is careful to avoid doing this prematurely or cavalierly (3.1). What the ethnographer sees as "normal caution" against premature closure, researchers of other disciplines are likely to perceive with some impatience as an unnecessarily slow and ponderous research approach. Ponderous or not, this tentativeness, this loose structure, is of the essence in the EFR approach.

Having said this, I hasten to add that there is, nonetheless, quite a bit of structuredness in the EFR interview format, as so far developed. The very fact that EFR asks the interviewee for cultural scenarios, rather than some other kind, is a form of structuring, as is the fact that EFR conceptualizes such scenarios along a 1-to-100 continuum in terms of desirability. The insistence on "realign" or possibility, and the firm distinction among impossibility, possibility, and relative probability, are other aspects of structuring.

Beyond this, the interviewer effectuates additional structuring by means of comments and questions that (1) reinforce S to proceed further along lines deemed productive, and that (2) probe S with respect to matters that are incomplete, unclear, or inconsistent. Such reinforcement and probing, however, are done as non-directively as possible, so that, to the extent possible, S never feels that he is being led, and never feels belittled or in any way uncomfortable.

2.61 THE USE OF NON-DIRECTIVE REINFORCEMENT

"Non-directive reinforcement" is one form, and perhaps the principal form, that your continuing efforts to build and maintain rapport throughout the interview, will take. The purpose of non-directive reinforcement is essentially to keep the EFR interview moving along, and to encourage S to be reasonably complete in the coverage he provides. Essentially, the message you should be conveying is:

"That's interesting; I'd like to hear more about it."
Each ethnographer has, of course, his own personal style. The style I personally use when interviewing in English -- for which I hold no particular brief -- is exemplified in the training videotape, A Guide to Ethnographic Futures Research (Textor 1979b). For the most part, I use short utterances like "Yah," "Uh-huh," "Interesting," etc. These terms are uttered in a context, and with a tone of voice, intended to suggest to S that I am listening to him and am hearing him, and that I want to hear more -- where "more" means more of what S wants to say, whether or not I agree with S, and even whether or not I in fact find the material interesting, although I usually do.

Granted, the very limited utterances I emit would hardly be considered brilliant parlor conversation -- but an EFR interview is not a conversation; it is more nearly a monologue: a communicational experience in which S is essentially in charge, and in which, for the time being, it matters very little what I think about the merits of what S has to say. Moreover, the success of the EFR interview depends to a considerable extent on S's understanding that it is a sort of monologue. This can be a problem, for in many cultures well-mannered people tend to feel that monologuing is not acceptable behavior. Your task is to help S understand, and emotionally apprehend, that not only is it acceptable to be zionologic, but that it is downright preferable, both from the standpoint of Ss maximizing his learning experience, and from the standpoint of maximizing the value of the research product.

Although the structure of an EFR interview is assuredly not similar to that of a conversation, the style is That is, S should feel that he is talking to a real, caring, listening human being - not a robot that occasionally churns out a phrase like "Uh-huh." Your participation need not, and usually should not, be limited simply to such brief utterances. There are all sorts of things you can say in order to vary the stimulus and come across as a really live listener, and you should feel quite free to do so, subject only to the over-riding need to remain non-directive and neutral. Your tone of voice is also important, as are your facial expression, body language, and other forms of non-verbal communication, all of which should communicate interest - but the interest should come across as interest in the subject matter S discusses, as distinct from approval (much less disapproval) of a particular theme he espouses concerning that subject matter. While this distinction is, admittedly, not always easy to draw, nonetheless experience suggests that, with a little guided practice, you can learn to avoid seeming judgmental. Experience to date also suggests, by the way, that most interviewer-trainees tend to talk too much rather than too little.

Another respect in which the EFR interview differs from an ordinary conversation or "bull session" is that part of your interviewer's discipline requires you to "bite your tongue" when S expresses some "outlandish" opinion, analysis, or value position For example, an interviewer who is sophisticated about ecology is likely to experience livid feelings when a Brazilian interviewee expresses an "obviously untenable" pronatalist position. Suppose S were to say that "We have millions of square kilometers of interior jungle where a hundred million additional Brazilians could easily settle and practice agriculture" while you "know" that this "would be sheer ecological idiocy." It might take real self-control to resist the temptation to turn the interview into an argument or lecture on demographic sanity -- but such self-control is precisely what is called for. Later, in the analysis, interpretation, and write-up stages, any "unrealistic" perceptions such as this can be dealt with, and in a much sounder, more professional fashion (3.3, 3.4, 7.2). See, for example, Aguirre et al. 1979.
So far, the discussion has concerned the use of reinforcement in the case of the interviewee who is diffident about monologuing. Reinforcement is also relevant, however, in the occasional case of the "natural monologuer" who finds it difficult to stop talking, and who goes on and on with great redundancy. While it is not normally appropriate to reinforce negatively, it is possible, by tapering off your positive reinforcement, gradually to convey to S the message that you have heard all you need to hear about a given domain or subject. In extreme cases, you can simply say something like, "I think we have enough on this now; let's see whether I can summarize what you have to say about energy" — after which you pick up your tape recorder and begin to dictate a summary of that segment (2.721). A final type of reinforcement, which sometimes verges upon probing or combines with it, is reminding S of the "rules of the game." For example, in shifting from the Fourth to the Fifth Element, that is, from the Pessimistic Scenario to the Most Probable Scenario, S might fail to understand adequately your statement introducing the Most Probable Scenario, in which you make it clear that desirability no longer matters; all that matters is degree of probability. This is a major transition, and one that S might well find quite difficult, for he has just spent, say, two hours talking about cultural scenarios in terms of their desirability. Hence it might be necessary for you to intervene tactfully with a comment such as "It sounds like you are still dealing partly with what is desirable, but what we need to look at now is what is most likely to occur, including things that you may or may not want to happen. Try to be a bit hard-headed and keep questions of desirability out of the Most Probable Scenario."

2.62 THE USE OF NON-DIRECTIVE PROBES

During scenario elicitation, the second major form of interaction you will have with S, after reinforcing, is probing. Probing is different from reinforcing in several ways. To begin with, a reinforcement message is essentially expressed in the form of a statement, while a probe is expressed in question form. When you reinforce, usually your essential message to S is "Tell me more about what you have been telling me about." When you probe, your essential message is "Tell me something that is different from what you have been telling me." Of course, if the "difference" is not great, then probing can also be reinforcing in its effect. There are also, however, cases in which the difference is quite great, and in which the effect might not be reinforcing, or indeed might actually threaten rapport somewhat -- yet probing is still necessary, in order to bring out the degree of completeness, clarity, or connectedness that, in your judgment, is necessary in order to produce an adequate protocol. In such cases, generally speaking, you should proceed to probe even though you perceive that there is some risk to rapport but be at great pains to handle your probing in such a way as to minimize this danger. And in typical cases it is remarkable how much probing is possible, with tact and considerateness, before rapport begins to be seriously endangered.

As with any loosely structured, non-directive research approach, a general rule is: Probe as much as you must, and as little as you dare. A second and related rule is: Reserve most of the probing for the latter part of each element of the interview. There are two reasons for this. First, the longer you wait, the more likely it will be that S will have had a chance to see that your purposes are scientifically bona fide and non-threatening; that is, the longer you wait, the better the rapport will be, and hence the smaller the likelihood that probing will undermine rapport seriously. Second, the longer you wait, the more likely it is that S will, of his own accord and in his own way, bring up material that covers a domain, subject, or theme in which you are interested.
There are basically two types of probes: "standard" and "free." A standard probe is one that you have "standardized" in advance, that is, a probe that you have decided in advance that you will use, under circumstances that you specify in advance. It is, in effect, a "promise to yourself" to raise a certain point in the event that that point is not raised by S. A "free" probe is not programmed in advance; it is one that you decide upon "on the spot," because you judge that it is appropriate. A standard probe is a probe that you have ready, and deals with matters that are readily anticipatable. A free probe is used to deal with problems that you have not anticipated, and is of a more ad hoc nature. Standard probes tend to be used in order to insure orderly comparison of the results of an interview with the results of all other interviews. Free probes can sometimes serve this same purpose, but are also used to examine peculiarities of a particular interview that might be rare or even unique. A free probe used in early interviews might prove so helpful that before long you might decide to standardize it for all subsequent interviews (2.6215).

2.621 STANDARD PROBES: For our purposes, we may divide standard probes into four main types: domain probes, subject probes, theme probes, and theory probes.

2.6211 Domain Probes: A "domain" is here defined as a broad aspect of a culture, roughly of the sort to which a chapter would be devoted in a conventional ethnographic monograph. For example, if S has had an adequate chance to bring up a particular domain -- say, religion -- in constructing his Optimistic Scenarios, yet does not, and if you have pre-determined that you wish every protocol to deal with religion, then you would probe by asking: "So far we haven't discussed religion. Optimistically but realistically, what would religion look like in the year 2005?" Or "Is there anything you'd like to say about religion in your Optimistic Scenario?"

2.6212 Subject Probes: A "subject" is here defined as a matter of less breadth than a domain. (Often, but not always, a subject is subsumable under a single domain, in which case it can be referred to as a "sub-domain.") An example of a subject that is not a sub-domain would be the political power of the church. Suppose you have decided that this is a subject that should be covered in all of your interviews. Accordingly, you wait until you are reasonably sure that S has said all he wishes to say about the domain of religion and about the domain of politics, and then at an opportune point you ask something like: "Under this scenario, would the political power of the church be about the same, or would it change?"

2.6213 Theme Probes: It might be that you have pre-determined that your particular definition of your problem requires that every interview examine a particular analytical theme that cuts across several domains or subjects. Again, the principle is the same: Give S plenty of opportunity to bring up material relevant to the selected theme, and if it finally looks quite likely that he will not, then probe. Your probe might take a form something like this: "I'm interested in whether you see these reforms coming about primarily because the national leadership will see them as good in and of themselves, or because the national leadership will see them simply as necessary in order to preserve their power position - or what?" The "...or what?" at the end of the probe is deliberately intended to keep Ss options as widely open as possible.

2.6214 Theory Probes: A theory probe is essentially a complex variant of a theme probe. EFR, like conventional ethnography, usually works best if you define your research problem in a way that
permits the gathering, analysis, and interpretation of your data in terms of a particular theoretical orientation or analytical model. For example, let us assume that you have decided, in advance, that a particular model taken from the general body of cultural ecology theory will be your guiding model, and that crucial to this guiding model is society's capacity, through social arrangements and cultural standards, to be sensitive and responsive to feedback concerning shifts in the carrying capacity and polluting potential of the environment. In such an instance, you would assign to yourself in advance the standard responsibility to probe, where necessary, as S scenerizes about how a given society will, or will not, maintain this sort of responsiveness as a means of ecological adaptation.

2.6215 Expanding the List of Standard Probes: When you start out, you will have a list of standard probes, especially domain probes. For example, it would be difficult to imagine an initial domain probe list that does not include something like the following standard probe items: population and demography, environment and ecology, politics and government, the economy, social structure and organization, education, and religion. Such rubrics are like the chapter headings found in a typical ethnographic monograph, and it is reasonable to anticipate that they will prove as useful in writing an article or monograph on possible future versions of Culture X, as in describing the extant version of Culture X.

This list may be expanded at any time. For example, suppose that in your third interview S provides a particularly rich and interesting coverage of sexual behavior standards, relations between the sexes, and women's rights. Perhaps you had previously anticipated that this would be a subject that S would probably more or less spontaneously bring up under the domain of "social structure and organization," but now you decide (1) that this subject, when developed reasonably richly, is highly interesting and relevant to your research goals; (2) that the first two interviewees did not deal with this matter adequately; and that (3) probably the only way to insure that subsequent interviewees will deal adequately with this matter is to make it a standard probe. You would therefore do just that. As new domains, subjects, or themes arise in a particular interview, you keep deciding whether they are important and basic enough to standardize for all subsequent interviews, and if so, you add them to your standard probe list.

There will probably be a fairly considerable increase in your list of standard domain and subject probes during the first several interviews, as interviewees bring up matters that strike you as being too important to remain unstandardized. The number of standard probes will probably take another jump as you recommence interviewing just after writing your trial draft (3.22), since these latter interviews will have, as a primary purpose, the goal of verifying or rejecting tentative conclusions included in the trial draft based on the earlier interviews.

Up to a point, it is highly appropriate to keep adding standard probes to your list. This must be done, however, with good judgment and a sense of proportion. Compulsively adding a large number of domain, and especially detailed sub-domain, probes to the list would result in an interview in which S would feel constrained, fatigued, and unable to be spontaneous, and would tend to sacrifice the advantages of the ethnographic approach in promoting spontaneity and creativity.
It is also possible that a particular standard probe will prove unproductive, either because interviewees are not stimulated by it, or because some other probe picks up the same material. This would seem most likely to occur with respect to subject probes. If it does occur, you would probably do well to drop this probe from your standard probe list. As you amend your standard probe list, either by adding or dropping probes, you should indicate on the list the first and last interview, by serial number, in which each standard probe was used. This information will be useful later, when you proceed to form conclusions across protocols (3.1).

In summary, it should be observed that constant judgment must be exercised to insure a reasonable trade-off between a probe list thorough enough to insure adequate coverage, and loose enough to permit and encourage considerable spontaneity, hence hopefully creativity, on the part of the interviewee. Ibro much emphasis on one side of the trade-off inevitably endangers the other side, and one must face this fact My personal inclination, in situations of doubt, is to lean toward the "spontaneity" side of the trade-off, knowing that I can always later construct a survey schedule based upon the findings of the EFR study, and then have the opportunity to ask a large number of structured questions of a large sample of respondents.

The fact that such a subsequent survey will lack a strong emphasis upon spontaneity and creativity will by then have become a much less serious consideration, because the earlier EFR study will already have captured these qualities from a similar sample of interviewees (5.22).

2.622 FREE PROBES: Free probes may be classified in a variety of ways. For present purposes, we may divide them into probes to expand S's coverage of subject matter, probes to improve the clarity of S's scenarios, and probes to throw light on the degree of consistency between two or more aspects or themes that have emerged in S's scenarios.

2.6221 Probes to Expand Coverage: An example of this type of probe would occur in a case where S scenarizes a population for Thailand in the year 2000 of 80 million, but says nothing with respect to his expectations concerning the projected population of the primate city of Bangkok or of various other cities, or of the urban proportion of the total population. Let us assume that general background in modernization theory leads you to be curious as to how "urban" this population is projected to be, and that previous interviewees have tended to deal explicitly with this matter. In the interest, then, both of intellectual tidiness and of cross-interview generalizing, you decide to probe by asking a question such as: "What percentage of the Thais, in this scenario, will live in Bangkok-Thonburi?" or the percentage of the population living in Bangkok-Thonburi go up, go down, or remain about the same?"

An incidental advantage of this type of question is that it might also throw some light on the extent of S's knowledge of present realities. For example, if S were to reply, "About one in twenty -- a higher percentage than now," you could conclude to yourself that S is not particularly well informed on demographic matters, since at present about one Thai in ten lives in the Bangkok-Thonburi metropolitan area. (Of course, the EFR interview is not a test, and you should carefully avoid giving the impression that it is; on the other hand, it is helpful to you, in the analysis and interpretation phases of your research, to have some notion as to how well informed your interviewees are, with respect to the extant realities of the subjects they are discussing.) If S were to realize his lack of information and ask you what proportion of the present population lives in...
Bangkok, you should tell him in a neutral, non-condescending way; your willingness, within reason, to provide information helps reinforce the impression that there is nothing test-like about the EFR interview.

2.6222 Probes to Improve Clarity: An example of this type of probe would occur in a case in which S discusses the relatively apolitical role of the Thai monkhood in the present, and pessimistically forecasts a considerably more political role in the year 2000 -- but gives no examples of the ways in which monks would become more political. Since you are aware of their present virtually total apoliticality, and are aware of no recent events or trends that would provide any basis for your intuiting the particular respects in which their politiciality would expand, and since you know from modernization and political theory that there are many plausible ways in which the sacerdotal role could become politicized, you decide to probe. Your probe might be something like: "What are some of the main ways in which, pessimistically but realistically, the role of the monkhood will become politicized?" As S begins to unfold his answer, you might need to use further, more detailed probes, until you secure a picture that you judge to be adequately clear.

2.6224 Probes to Examine Consistency: This type of free probe is the most difficult, because it involves not just the scope of S's protocol, but also the reasoning that S uses. No interviewee who presents scenarios of any length and complexity is likely to do so with total internal consistency -- any more than anyone's personal philosophy, or indeed the ideological content of any culture, would prove to be totally internally consistent (assuming, for the moment, that there exists a set of metacultural standards that could be used as a touchstone to determine total consistency).

Sometimes, however, S will scenarize in a fashion that is glaringly inconsistent when viewed from a variety of transcultural CT theoretical perspectives, and when this happens, the ethnographer is, I believe, under obligation to probe -- just as he would be if he were practicing conventional ethnography.

For example, a minority of the Thai interviewees scenarized optimistically that there would be a socialist Thailand of sorts by the year 2000. This socialist Thailand would be one where individuals would enjoy greater personal freedom than now, but where they would also engage in numerous new economic and political activities as active members of communes of a type that bore considerable resemblance to those now existing in the People's Republic of China. My probe took this form: "Judging from my experience of having lived for some years in Thai villages, 'freedom' to most Thai farmers means such things as deciding whether to do heavy farm work on a particular day, or to take it easy until tomorrow. It also means having the choice of becoming politically involved, or remaining uninvolved -- and most of them usually remained uninvolved. I wonder if you could clarify whether these sorts of individual freedom will continue to exist, under your Optimistic Scenario, or not, among the farmers who will belong to these communes?" The responses to this probe were not logically satisfying to me, and indeed were essentially demurrals, suggesting that these interviewees were projecting rather naively about rural folk whose subculture they in fact understood very little about, since they were of urban background. I then dictated S's responses appropriately, indicating in the dictation that the responses were the result of a probe on my part -- and that was the end of the matter. I did not argue with S, or try to "educate" him, even though I might have wanted to. My purpose was not to "straighten out" S's thinking, but simply to ascertain what it was.

2.623. LIMITATIONS ON PROBING: So far, nothing has been said about when not to probe. In theory, assuming the best possible situation, with the best possible rapport, you would engage in
extensive probing of all the types described above, whenever necessary, for as long as necessary, in order to obtain a "complete" protocol. In practice, however, the situation is often quite imperfect, rapport is less than ideal, and the interviewee's energy and time are limited. No protocol is ever perfectly "complete." There will always be additional probes that might have been used in order to obtain additional detail. You must judge, in each instance, whether additional probing would be productive or counter-productive. If the Optimistic Scenario has already taken two hours to complete, and S is evidently somewhat fatigued, you will probably weigh carefully just how much probing is appropriate in the Pessimistic and Most Probable Scenarios, essentially deciding whether, in each instance, the additional information you are likely to receive is worth the fatigue and impatience it is likely to engender. In weighing this, you need also to consider the fact that probing does not always produce fatigue, and in some cases can produce the sort of change of pace which S might find diverting and even invigorating.

On the whole, however, once S gives signs of fatigue or impatience, you would do well to probe less, reserving your probes for what you judge to be the more vital matters. It is also important to be able to anticipate such problems to some extent, so that your probes during the Optimistic Scenario do not use up so much time and energy as to unduly limit you in asking needed probe questions during subsequent elements of the interview. Another possibility is that you might continue to probe quite freely, but arrange with S to complete the interview at a subsequent sitting.

If you do this, however, bear in mind that the next sitting should be soon -- for the EFR interview format assumes that each scenario will be conditioned by S's fresh memory of the scenario(s) that preceded it. For this reason, as well as for reasons of logistical convenience, it is usually best to plan on completing the entire interview in one sitting.

2.7 GENERATING TBE PROTOCOL BY CUMULATIVE SUMMARIZATION

We come now to a major departure of EFR from conventional ethnography. Unlike conventional ethnography, EFR necessitates no arduous, lengthy effort by the ethnographer after the interview, in order to generate the ethnographic record out of raw notes. By means of the Cumulative Summarization Technique, EFR enables you to generate the ethnographic record during the interview itself. This record (which I call a "protocol" to distinguish it from the conventional ethnographic record) is generated by your dictation, segment by segment throughout the interview, into a tape recorder or other dictating machine, of summaries of what S has told you -- while S listens intently and immediately corrects the dictation in whatever way is required in order to insure that the dictated material faithfully summarizes the immediately previous segment of the interview, and is also consistent (as he perceives consistency) with all previous segments of the interview.

Thus, your dictation in the presence of the interviewee is a form of feedback to him, and his correction of your dictated summary (or lack of correction) is a form of feedback to you. It must be stressed that the protocol is a summarization of what has been said by the interviewee in the previous segment of the interview, not a complete rendition of what has been said. If you wish to obtain a complete rendition, this can easily be done by taking with you two tape recorders. One can be used continuously to record the entire interview.
The second can be used selectively in order to dictate the protocol. I personally have nothing against the 'complete tape recording of an interview, and indeed I believe that from time to time the two-tape recorder approach would be a good training exercise or methodological precaution, for it enables you to check upon the accuracy and adequacy of your students', or your own, aunnarizing habits. However, I do not recommend total tape recording of EFR interviews as a routine approach, for it must be remembered that if a two and one-half hour interview is totally tape-recorded, then it will take two and one-half hours of your time to listen to that tape recording, and many additional hours of your typist’s time to transcribe the verbatim record. Except perhaps under unusual circumstances, this would hardly seem to be an economical use of either your time or your budget.

Quite apart from economics, however, experience to date suggests that there are great advantages in the Cumulative Summarization Technique precisely because it does require you to summarize. By requiring you to be ready to encapsulate the essence of what S has said, the use of this technique forces you to remain at all times highly attentive, and serves as a powerful goad upon you to really learn, in a holistic, contextual way, what S's positions are, vis-a-vis alternative futures. You become an "active listener." Moreover, S derives a related benefit: 'experience to date clearly indicates that your high degree of attentiveness in turn becomes an unusually effective -- yet non-directive -- stimulus for him, partly because S is not accustomed to being listened to this attentively, especially about an interesting and important subject, and finds the experience flattering and stimulating. In short, intense attention begets intense attention, and the interactive effect of the cumulative summarization feature of the EFR interview is that the resulting protocol becomes more complete, and richer, than would probably otherwise be the case.

Because the dictation of this kind of protocol requires skills that are new to most people, the discussion below will lean toward being rather detailed and concrete.

2.71 TAKING RAW NOTES

As in regular ethnography (or journalism), in EFR as you listen intently to S, you take very brief memory-jogging notes on your clipper board of each point S makes. These notes are brief enough - sometimes just a word or two on a point -- so that you can keep up with S need not ask him to pause while you catch up. If S wanders from one domain to another, or from one subdomain to another within the same domain, it is advisable to skip to the next sheet on your clipperboard and make your notes about the second domain or sub-domain there. Thus, all raw notes relevant to a given domain (or perhaps sub-domain) are recorded on the same sheet on your clipperboard. In some interviews a considerable amount of skipping back and forth between sheets is required, as well as occasional re-ordering of sheets -- and so it is advisable to have an ample supply of paper on your clipperboard.

2.72 DICTATING THE PROTOCOL

After a short while, perhaps five to ten minutes, you will be ready to dictate the first segment of the protocol. All else equal, it is wise not to wait too long before dictating this first segment; this will have the advantage of quickly demonstrating to S what a segment of the dictated protocol sounds like, and thus, hopefully, promptly reassuring him that he has nothing to fear from having his remarks summarized. As you dictate the first segment, it is important to bear in mind the need to
make a good "first impression" by exerting an effort to be even-toned, factual, nonjudgmental, and non-threatening.

2.721 DECIDING WHEN TD DICTATE: As the interview moves along, and rapport is better established, your decisions as to when to dictate can be governed more and more by the content of the interview, rather than by rapport considerations. The general guiding principle is that you should wait until there is a natural lapse in S's presentation, or until he gives some other indication that he has said all he wishes to say about the domain or sub-domain of culture under consideration. As the interview progresses, it is likely that S will get into the spirit of it, and actually help you by remarks such as, "Well, I guess that's all I have to say about religion." In any case, the intervals between dictation should be short enough so that you do not need to hold too much material in your memory, but long enough so that you do not become obtrusive to S as he unfolds his own scenarios in his own way.

2.722 RESPONSIVENESS TD VERBAL AND NON-VERBAL FEEDBACK: As you dictate, your policy should be to stop immediately whenever S gives verbal or non-verbal signs that he feels dissatisfied with something that you have just dictated. Especially in the early part of the interview, when S may not yet fully appreciate how much "in charge" of the interview he is (2.721), it is important that you show a readiness to stop -- even in mid-sentence, if that seems appropriate -- when S asks you to, or indicates by facial expression or other non-verbal sign that some sort of correction is needed. Your readiness to do this, any number of times, without display of impatience, is crucial to the creation of the proper atmosphere of rapport (2.21, 2.274). Sometimes an expression like, "Whoops, I don't think got that right..." will help put S at ease and not let him feel that he is being burdensomely picayune in insisting on your dictating the summary the way he thinks is right. There is, to be sure, a bit of a knack to avoiding a display of impatience when one is in fact feeling somewhat impatient -- but that is the knack that is called for. But there is consolation in knowing that some of the interviewees who seem a bit compulsive in this respect in the early part of the interview, turn out to be among the most conscientious, and interesting, interviewees later on.

Occasionally, especially in the early part of an interview, it might be effective to put your tape recorder down (that is, symbolize that it is turned off) for a moment, and "trial-dictate" the next sentence of your summary, so that S can hear and approve it before you then repeat that sentence for recording. Of course, too much use of this tactic would become boring, but now and then, on difficult-to-summarize points, it can be useful.

One necessary habit to develop is that, as you dictate a segment of the protocol, you maintain eye contact with the interviewee throughout, as naturally as possible, except as necessary to follow your notes. Many beginners concentrate their gaze SD avidly on their notes -- or even on the tape recorder! -- that they all but lose visual contact with S. This must be avoided at all costs, not only because it mechanizes and "dehumanizes" the relationship with S, but also because it denies the researcher the opportunity to observe S's facial expressions for indications as to whether he is satisfied with the summary he is hearing. Especially if S comes from a culture where smoothness of face-to-face interaction is highly valued, and/or if S is a person who perceives his social status to be lower than yours, you vitally need these non-verbal clues as to S's possible dissatisfaction with your summarizations.
2.723 EMPHASIS Ct BREVITY: The guideline that what is dictated should be a summary, and a brief one at that, obviously implies that a great deal of what S says is "left out" of the dictated material in any explicit sense. The key to good EER summarizing, like good literary or journalistic summarizing, is not the ignoring of detail, but the controlling of it. A good protocol is one that, although relatively brief, controls detail in such a fashion that, when you later proceed to delineate patterns across your protocols, and to analyze and interpret them (3.1), you will be reminded of IrRich patterned richness of detail that might not be explicitly included in that particular protocol, or perhaps even in any of them. The better ethnographic familiarity you have with the culture under examination before you start your EFR work, the truer this will be.

Although brevity is desirable, it should not be emphasized to the point of failing to include or embrace the "spirit" of S's remarks. This is best done by occasionally including not just the bare skeleton of a segment of a scenario, but also, selectively, some of the examples that S gives, surrounded by quotation marks where appropriate. The most effective examples would be, of course, those which S volunteered, rather than those provoked by a free probe on your part. (In the latter case, the protocol must always make clear that the material was provoked by a probe, rather than volunteered by S, as is further discussed in 2.727.)

The EFR protocol, incidentally, consists only of these summaries, and does not include any ethnographer's interpretive "notes to myself," of the type often found, and properly so, in a conventional ethnographic record. Note 2.6 comments on this.

2.724 USE OF A NEUTRAL STYLE: It is essential to strive for a summarizing style that is "neutral" in the sense that you make a scrupulous attempt to avoid "editorializing." Rapport is fostered if S perceives you, right from the start, as being scrupulous in this sense. It is important to bear in mind that S might perceive you as editorializing not only by what you say, but also by how you say it. Even where the substance and choice of words of your summary are neutral, it is conceivable that your tone of voice or facial expressions or "body language" might betray disagreement or disapproval. As much as possible, S must not feel that you are "putting down" his ideas, or reluctantly tolerating them. Even when he senses that you might disagree intellectually with some point he has made, it is important that S not feel that such disagreement carries with it any disapproval of S's intellect, or of S as a person.

Of course, from time to time you might wish to introduce an analytical commentary of your own, perhaps as a result of free probing to improve clarity or examine consistency (2.622, 2.6223). Subject to considerations of maintaining rapport, the inclusion of such analytical commentaries can be helpful, and make for a more useful protocol. Such commentaries should, of course, be clearly marked, such as by setting them off between square brackets or double parentheses.

A good test of the extent to which you have maintained neutrality is found in the reading of the protocol that results. S, in later editing his draft protocol (2.75) will, of course, have the opportunity to discover lapses of neutrality, and you should encourage him to look for them, and to correct them. Another test would be to ask a knowledgeable but independent third person (with S's permission) to read the finished protocol; such a reader should not be able to guess or intuit what
your ideological bias is While the interviewee's ideological orientation, if he has a clear one, might well be reflected in, or inferrable from, the protocol, your orientation should not be.

2.725 USE OF HEADINGS: An orderly protocol, like an orderly conventional ethnography, requires the use of headings. Personally, I like to use No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3 type headings. These are exemplified in Appendix Three, and throughout the Handbook you are now reading. Thus, you are now reading under a No. 3 heading, "Use of Headings," which is subsumed under a No. 2 heading, "Dictating a Segment," which in turn is subsumed under a No. 1 heading, "Generating the Protocol by Cumulative Summarization."

As you take your memory-jogging notes, S may from time to time suggest titles for headings or sub-headings, and wherever possible, you should use these in dictating the protocol. Situations will probably arise, however, in which S supplies no heading for a segment that obviously calls for such, and in such situations it is less distortive, generally, for you to supply the heading, than for the material to appear in the protocol without any heading at all.

In some cases, S will suggest at one time a whole series of headings which he intends to use in his scenario. Where this occurs, you should write down each heading on the top of a separate sheet of paper on your clipper-board, and treat each of these headings as a free probe to be introduced later in the interview, in the event that S forgets to return to that domain or subject himself.

2.726 STANDARDIZING CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF STYLE: As you develop experience and expertise, you will naturally find yourself devising and adopting certain standard usages with respect to style. A reading of Appendix Three will serve to indicate a number of usages that are standard in my own dictating style. Such standardization, up to a point, serves effectively to improve rapport by providing, in effect, a certain assurance to S that you are an even-handed, conscientious, and reliable summarizer. Aside from rapport considerations, the need for the ethnographer to be self-aware concerning the style he uses is at least equally important for another reason: style is a form of stimulus, and the style that you use in dictating segments of the protocol helps shape the mood and cognitive approach of the remainder of the interview. Since ER is an explicitly interactive research mode, this could hardly be otherwise. Among the stylistic conventions that I have found useful, and which you might also, are the following.

I use verbs in the past tense to refer to events and situations in the year of the interview, and in any previous years. I use verbs in the future, or future perfect, tense to refer to events or situations that S scenerizes will occur anytime between the year of interview and the horizon year. I choose tenses so as to distinguish between events, situations, or processes that are ongoing, and those that are completed.

A hypothetical example might be as follows:

By A.D. 2000 the political movement toward social equity will have gained considerable momentum, and the unequal reward and opportunity structure that characterized 1980 will have become a thing of the past. Thailand will have a drastically different minimum wage law by then.
The purpose behind using these particular verb forms in these particular ways is, of course, to provide a set of mutually consistent stimuli what will help S project himself into the future, as it were, and help create a mood of looking back upon the present.

Generally speaking, I lean toward the use of the indicative mood, and away from the use of the subjunctive mood, because I judge the former to be more effective in stimulating S to overcome his tempocentrism, and to take a somewhat bold plunge, as it were, into the future. There is, however, one important exception to this, and that is when S himself is clearly thinking in explicitly subjunctive, or conditional terms -- such as, "If Pi, then B; but if no A4 then no B," _etc. In some interviews, this might occur quite frequently. A hypothetical example is the following.

The Thai political regime will, optimistically, be able to avert civil war by timely, adequate, and visible wealth-redistribution schemes. However, in the event of Vietnamese military invasion the regime, though it would resist, would not be able to do so successfully, and a Communist Thailand would be the result.

Here, S is quite sure that the regime can handle the problem of insurgency if allowed to do so by absence of invasion from the outside, not sure whether such an invasion will occur, but quite sure that if it were to occur, (1) resistance would then ensue, but that (2) this resistance would not be successful, and (3) a Communist Thailand would be the result. If the English language had a richer supply of auxiliary verbs, a better job of summarizing could be done, but this is the best arrangement I have been able to devise, under the circumstances.

I standardly include all punctuation as I dictate., rather than relying on the typist to supply punctuation, which would risk distortion. However, since including the punctuation along with the content might be disconcerting for some interviewees, I have adopted the practice of dictating the actual content at regular conversational voice volume, and the punctuation instructions ("comma," "period," etc.) in a softer, less obtrusive voice.

From time to time during the interview, situations will arise which call for special ad hoc instructions to the typist. So as not to confuse the typist, I find it helpful to say, "Break," then give the instruction, and then say, "End of break," to indicate the resumption of material to be transcribed.

2.727 SPECIFICATION OF THE DEGREE OF SPONTANEITY: The use of a certain amount of standardization can also help to make the protocol clear as to the degree and nature of the spontaneity of a given remark or paragraph. Whatever standard usage you adopt, it should be such as to insure that when you reread the protocol, even some years later, it will be clear which portions thereof represent volunteered and spontaneous content, and which represent content that was elicited by you as the result of a standard or a free probe. One way to do this is through such terminology as: "S replied to my question that...... or "I raised the matter of demography and S volunteered that....". Another possibility would be to include in parentheses, as necessary, such abbreviations as "(SP)" or "(FP)" to indicate that the material immediately following is, respectively, the result of a standard probe or a free probe.
There are many ways of achieving the above-mentioned goal, without using procedures that are so distorting and rigidifying as to render the dictation unpleasant listening, or the protocol unpleasant reading. The precise conventions which you adopt should be ones with which you feel comfortable.

2.728 ALERTNESS 'ID CXJMULATIVENESS AND COHERENCE: As you dictate a summary of a given segment of S's scenario, the content of your remarks will, of course, deal primarily with the segment that has just transpired. However, the manner in which you dictate your summary of that segment is also "cumulative" - in the sense that it takes into account all of the material that S has given you in previous segments. In short, you should be alert to the overall coherence and flow of the scenario. As indicated in 2.6223, in cases where there are gaps in continuity or coherence that strike your attention, it is appropriate to do a non-directive free probe in order to elicit further material that will fill the gap.

2.729 PROVIDING FOR FLEXIBILITY IN PARAGRAPH ORDERING The basic unit of the EFR protocol is, for practical purposes, the paragraph As will be discussed in 2.73, the transcription typist will transcribe each paragraph on a separate page. This arrangement affords great flexibility for shifting the order of presentation of S's ideas.

This flexibility can be very useful, for quite often the following kind of episode will occur. S will, let us suppose, start his Optimistic Scenario with a lengthy coverage of ecology, then move to economics, politics, religion, and social structure. Somewhere in the middle of social structure, S will have an afterthought, and he will ask something like, "Can I go back to where I was talking about economics and add a forecast on wage levels and minimum wage standards?" When this type of situation arises, my policy is to reply, casually and without impatience, something like: "Of course; no problem; you can always go back and add something to an earlier section." Experience suggests strongly that interviewees quickly catch the spirit of this flexibility, and seem to take advantage of it whenever they feel the need. This flexibility is simply one more aspect of the general EFR strategy of putting S in charge of the interview, and then helping him to see that he is in charge -- which in turn improves rapport and results in a richer protocol.

After S has given me his paragraph or paragraphs on the subject of wages, and I am ready to dictate, I start by saying, "Break. Please go back and interleave this page right after the place where S talks about income, which is in the 'Economics' section. It you can't find the place you think is proper, just interleave it at the end of the 'Economics' section. End of break." Thus, S has the satisfaction of getting this afterthought "off his chest" right away, and can rest assured that it will appear in the protocol at the point where he thinks it ought to appear.

2.73 TRANSCRIPTION THE DICTATED PROTOCOL

In the interest of efficiency, I recommend that you prepare a list of guidelines and instructions and give it to your typist at the outset.

This list of standard procedures can be amended as time goes on and experience accumulates. Even if you decide, for reasons of economy, to serve as your own typist, such a list will still be useful. An example of such a set of instructions that I have found useful is found in Appendix L.
If you decide to use it you should, of course, adapt it to your own research problem and intellectual style.

2.731 TYPING EACH NEW PARAGRAPH ON A NEW SHEET: It is essential that you instruct the typist to start a new page each time he hears you say, "Paragraph." Although at first consideration this practice may seem "wasteful," it is actually economical because it greatly facilitates the re-ordering of paragraphs, so that in the final protocol they will be arranged in the best possible order. This reordering can occur at any of three points in the overall EFR process:

During the interview itself, because S has an afterthought, and wants a paragraph interleaved at some earlier point in the interview (2.729). A variant of this type of situation is that in which you develop doubts as to where S wants a particular paragraph to go, so you ask him, and he decides. This type of situation is discussed further immediately below.

During your subsequent editing of the protocol. This is discussed further in 2.743.

During S's final editing of the protocol after you have edited it. This is discussed further in 2.75.

2.732 PRESERVING THE ORIGINAL PARAGRAPH ORDER: The pagination system used in transcribing an EFR tape is designed to record both the original temporal order of paragraphs as they were dictated during the interview, and the final paragraph order that emerges. This is done by typing the original or "raw" page numbers in the upper left corners, and later by entering the final page numbers (if they differ from the raw numbers) in the upper right corners.

To insure that the raw page numbers are properly inserted in the upper left corners of each sheet, it is wise to instruct the typist to do this in advance. To start with, the typist will take, say, 25 sheets, and number them consecutively, for example, "1006-1" through "1006-25," meaning "Thailand Study, Interviewee No 6, Raw Paragraph 1," through "Thailand Study, Interviewee No. 6, Raw Paragraph 25." This standard inclusion of the abbreviated name of the research study, and the identification number of the interviewee, is useful in preventing later misfiling.

The typist now types the first paragraph of the tape onto the sheet numbered "T006-1." Each time he hears you say, "Paragraph," he shifts to the next consecutive page. Thus, the upper left page numbers provide a permanent record of the actual temporal order in which S supplied his ideas to you during the interview. No matter how much revision of paragraph order might occur, it will always be a simple matter to reassemble the paragraphs in their original temporal order, should this ever be desired for any purpose, such as the conducting of various kinds of methodological checks on interviewer-induced bias.

2.733 INDICATING THE REVISED PARAGRAPH ORDER: Now let us return to the example given in 2.729, in which S had an afterthought during the "Social Structure" domain, and wished to scenarize about wage levels and standards and insert that material back in the "Economics" section. Let us assume that this occurs right after the 29th raw paragraph of dictated material. The typist has inserted raw page T006-30 into his typewriter, when he hears your instruction, "Break. Please go back and interleave this page right after the place where S talks about income, which is in the
"Economics" section...". The typist proceeds to find this place, and notes that it is right after raw page 17. He then types a second raw page number just below "T006-30," namely, "1006-17.1." This translates to:

"This is the 30th paragraph of the protocol temporally, but has become the 17.1-th paragraph by S's instruction." This decimal system is quite flexible, and also has other technical advantages, which are discussed in Note 2.7.

Of course, in some interviews, perhaps even in many, it might turn out that there will be no re-ordering of paragraphs, because neither S nor you felt that any re-ordering was necessary. In such a case, the page numbers in the upper left corner of all pages of the protocol become both the raw and the final page numbers for that protocol. However, in cases where some re-ordering does occur, it is necessary to make a distinction between the raw page order and the final page order. This is done by entering the revised page number in the upper right corner of each page. Such changes in final page order could occur during your editing of the protocol (2.743) or possibly also after the subsequent final editing of the protocol by S (2.75).

2.74 EDITING THE RAW PROTOCOL

The sooner you can arrange to obtain the transcribed protocol, the better, because the editing of the protocol should be done while your memory of the interview and all of its nuances is still fresh. I always attempt to get my transcribed protocols back from the typist within three days of the interview, and to waste no time in doing the editing. Generally speaking, I find that editing is easy, and that few if any substantively significant changes in phrasing or ordering are needed. In any case, I do with the transcript whatever is needed in order to render it into as clear and as faithful a summary of the interviewee's scenarios, as possible.

2.741 INSURING CONFIDENTIALITY: Occasionally, I need to edit out some bit of transcribed content which might possibly reveal the identity of the interviewee. Since I have pledged implicitly to S to protect his or her privacy, it is important to be intensely alert to the need for this type of editing.

2.742 INSURING CLARITY AND BALANCE: In editing, I try to be alert to the possible need for a certain amount of terminological standardization, and for an adequate number of cross-references, in order to insure that the protocol is maximally clear and balanced.

2.743 RE-ORDERING SECTIONS AS APPROPRIATE: The various sections, sub-sections, etc., of the protocol in raw dictated form might also require a certain amount of re-ordering. In doing such re-ordering, I am careful not to distort what I perceive to be the preferred and natural bent of the interviewee, but short of such distortion it is appropriate, in my view, to re-order the sections or paragraphs in whatever way makes for the smoothest and most readily understood protocol. In my experience to date, I have found myself reordering one or more sections or paragraphs in perhaps half to two-thirds of the protocols I have edited. Where such re-ordering has occurred, it usually only involves just one or two or perhaps three sections or paragraphs. In all cases where I have any substantial doubt as to whether or not to re-order, I refrain from doing so.1 2.8]
2.75 SECURING AND INCORPORATING THE INTERVIEWEE'S EDITORIAL FEEDBACK

As quickly as possible after you have edited the draft protocol to your satisfaction, you should duplicate a copy of it and send or deliver it to the interviewee so that he may review it in its entirety -- this time in privacy -- critically and holistically. S's copy should be accompanied by a friendly visit, phone call, and/or note urging him to be as critical and as frank as he wishes, and to straighten out any distortions, inconsistencies, lapses in coverage, and the like, which have crept into the protocol. You should reiterate as emphatically as possible the idea that the protocol is his protocol, not yours. You should urge S to consider whether the draft protocol in its present form represents his true thoughts and values. Is it balanced? Does S truly believe the things that are attributed to him in the transcript? Is there anything S would like to add -- a word here or a sentence there, or even a major addition? If there are particular words or phrases that are unrepresentative of S's thinking, or in any way misleading, then S is encouraged to change them. And so forth.

The degree to which S will accept this further invitation to participate will doubtless depend on how literate and articulate S is. One of the deficiencies in my experience with EFR to date is that my interviews have largely been with intellectuals. On the whole, it seems reasonable to expect that an intellectual will be fairly willing to correct his draft protocol. Whether, and under what circumstances, less intellectual interviewees would be willing to do this, remains to be seen. Certainly the problem will be different when attempts are made to do EFR with a sample of peasants, for example. In cases where S is not very literate, or not literate at all, there must obviously be some third person who will read S's draft protocol to him and enter the corrections S desires. Such a person should, of course, be someone either chosen by S, or at least acceptable to him -- perhaps a trusted friend, but not a person to whom S is in any way subordinated or beholden, and not a person whose knowledge of the protocol would cause embarrassment to S.

The above considerations should make it clear that wherever the involvement of such a third person can be avoided, it should be, for there are obvious advantages to total privacy. Even where a third person must be used, however, you will be able to rest at least somewhat more assured that S's second look at his protocol will help to correct whatever distortive effect your own presence in the initial interview, or your editing of the protocol, might have had.

As soon as possible, you should collect from S his corrected protocol. Sometimes, of course, there will be no corrections, and in such instances you should simply make a gift of that copy of the protocol to S. In other instances, there will be corrections, and you should incorporate these in a way faithful to both the content and the spirit of the correction, re-typing particular pages as needed, and then mail or deliver, with your thanks, a copy of the final, corrected protocol to S, for him to retain and use as he wishes.

Experience suggests that occasionally S might express the wish not to receive a copy of his protocol, and such a wish should, of course, be respected.

2.8 ADVANTAGES CT THE CUMULATIVE SUMMARIZATION TECHNIQUE

Although all ethnographers probably engage in some forms of cumulative summarization, repeating aloud, or other feedback, from time to time, the systematic use of cumulative summarization as set
forth in the foregoing pages appears to be new to ethnography. Since the Cumulative
Summarization Technique is a feature quite central to the general EFR approach, this chapter may
properly be concluded by briefly summarizing what I see to be the advantages of the technique, in
the context of an EFR interview, as compared with more conventional ethnographic approaches of
the type which, I would guess, are generally used by ethnographers studying extant cultures. I say,
"I would guess" advisedly, because ethnographers in fact generally know rather little about the
details of how other ethnographers go about their work. The possible advantages of cumulative
mimrnarization in conventional ethnographic work are discussed in Note 2.9; the possible
advantages in EFR itself are summarized below.

2.81 ENHANCED MOTIVATION FOR BOTH INTERVIEWEE AND ETHNOGRAPHER
Although it is difficult or impossible to conclusively "prove" such matters, it is my belief that the
Cumulative Summarization Technique substantially enhances the motivation of both the
interviewee and the ethnographer to cooperate in the production of a protocol of high quality.

The ethnographer knows that in at most a few minutes he must summarize a segment of the
interview, to the satisfaction of the interviewee. This virtually forces him to remain alert. The
interviewee, seeing from the very beginning that he is being sincerely, thoroughly, and accurately
listened to, is likely to make an extra effort to express clearly and completely the scenario he has in
mind, in hopes that the summary that he knows he will hear in at most a few minutes, will be one
which is clear, complete, and satisfying.

The foregoing comments reflect not only nr own personal experience with the Cumulative
Summarization Technique, but also the comments, volunteered or non-directively elicited, of a
substantial number of my EFR interviewees to date, and of some tens of students to whom I have
taught the EFR method.

2.82 CREATIVE STIMULUS FOR THE INTERVIEWEE
Cumulative Summarization can also serve, I believe, to stimulate S's creativity. That is, it seems
clear from experience to date that S's simply hearing his ideas fed back to him constitutes, in itself,
an additional source of creative stimulus -- often a quite powerful source, if we may believe the
reports of some interviewees as to what has happened to them during the EFR interview. In other
words, the raising to full conscious level of one domain or aspect of S's expections or values seems
to stimulate a similar raising of other domains or aspects.

2.83 ENHANCED COHERENCY OF PROTOCOL
One of the guidelines for dictating the summary of a segment of the interview is that the researcher
should do this in such a way as to take into account all that S has said up to that point in the
interview. The ethnographer, in other words, attempts to "get with" the essential "spirit" of the
interview, so that the protocol will be characterized by a coherence and continuity that will seem
natural to S, when he reads it CT has it read to him (2.728). While the ethnographer tries to avoid
imposing his own notions or standards of continuity upon the interview, he does, at the same time,
remain alert for possible sharp breaks in continuity or consistency, and feels some obligation to use
a free probe if such breaks Should occur (2.6223). Experience to date suggests that this kind of
emphasis upon coherency is useful in producing a reasonably consistent scenario, while at the same
time stopping short of constraining S from feeling spontaneous and being creative.
2.84 IMPROVED RELIABILITY AND BALANCE OF PROMICOL

When I compare my own work in conventional ethnography without, and later with, the use of cumulative summarization (Note 2.9), it is clear to me that the reliability and balance of the ethnographic record increased substantially after I began using such feedback. By the same token, I believe that if I attempted to do EFR interviews without cumulative summarization (taking memory-jogging notes for two to four hours, then sitting down by myself and writing them up, without S having any opportunity to hear or see what I said he said) the reliability and balance would have been much lower. Moreover, in EFR, S has a second chance to review the protocol in private and as a whole (2.75), and this procedure, I believe, substantially improves balance and reliability.

2.85 ECONOMY AND EFFICIENCY

It is often said that one hour of conventional ethnographic interviewing necessitates three hours of subsequent solitary work by the ethnographer in order to convert his raw notes into an ethnographic record. This is in accord with my own experience in conventional ethnography. Whether the same three-to-one ratio would apply if we used traditional write-up methods for an EFR interview is not clear. Lean heavily on the conservative side, let us arbitrarily cut this figure in half, and assume that one hour of EFR interviewing would necessitate one and one-half hours of write-up. It is instructive to compare this with the efficiency of using the Cumulative Summarization Technique, which, I would estimate, seldom if ever involves more than one-eighth of the duration of the entire interview for dictation.

Let us assume two hypothetical situations, in both of which the actual time required for the interview proper is 160 minutes. In Situation A, you use traditional write-up techniques, which means that you bid S adieu and repair to your typewriter, where you spend 1.5 X 160 minutes, or 240 minutes, writing up the interview record. In Situation B, you use the Cumulative Summarization Technique, which simply adds an additional .125 X 160, or 20 minutes, to the actual time you are with S. In Situation B, you use 20/240, or one-twelfth, as much time to write up.

Of course, the comparison is not yet quite fair, since in Situation B you must also devote some time to (1) editing the draft protocol once it comes back to you from the typist, (2) talking or writing to S and urging him to edit your edited version and make it his own (2.75); and (3) checking and incorporating any changes he makes in the protocol. A liberal estimate of how long these tasks would take, on the average, would be 60 minutes.

Adding this to the 20 minutes it took you to do the dictating during the interview, we get 80 minutes as a liberal estimate of time it costs you to "write up" using Cumulative Summarization.

Thus, the total time-cost to you is no more than 80/240, or one-third, of what it would cost you using more traditional methods. Especially since I have estimated time costs conservatively in Situation A and liberally in Situation B, it would seem that, from an efficiency standpoint, there are
good grounds for using the Cumulative Summarization Technique in conducting an EFR project.[2.10]

2.86 PROVISION OF A BASIS FOR THE INTERVIEWEE'S CONTINUED GROWTH

So far, our summary of the advantages of a properly conducted EFR interview has focused primarily on obtaining a better research product: that is, on producing a more reliable, better balanced, richer protocol -- more effectively and efficiently. It should also be noted briefly at this point that the better the protocol produced, the better will be the heuristic and educational stimulus that S will receive as a quid pro quo for his participation, since the protocol is a form of permanent baseline feedback to S, which he may file and reread from time to time in years to come, in order to refresh his awareness of what his perceptions and preferences concerning possible or probable alternative futures for his culture were, as of the date on which he was interviewed. Even the illiterate interviewee can benefit in this way, by having a trusted friend read the protocol to him. Thus, in the EFR situation the protocol becomes a permanent basis for further creative thinking on the part of the interviewee. There is, of course, no comparable feedback which the typical informant in a conventional ethnographic situation receives.

The various follow-up uses of the EFR protocol, involving or not involving the participation of the ethnographer, are discussed in 3.62 and Chapter 7, and need not detain us here. Suffice to say here that there are numerous and attractive ways in which the protocol can be used by former interviewees, to pursue problems and interests that they consider worthwhile. This is, I think, a not inconsiderable advantage of EFR, especially in an era when ethnography, and social science generally, are increasingly caning under fire, especially in the Third World, for "taking the data and giving nothing in return."
CHAPTER THREE: THE FORMING OF CONCLUSIONS AND THE WRITING-UP OF RESULTS

When a suitable number of interviews have been conducted, summarized, and recorded in protocol form, and when the protocols have been checked by the interviewees and their corrections incorporated, the next step is, of course, to form conclusions that apply to the corpus of protocols as a whole, and to write up the results. The purpose of this chapter is to present the various methodological steps that lead from a set of finished protocols to the final written product.

3.1 THE PROCESS OF CONCLUSION FORMATION

The sections that follow deal with the strategy of moving toward write-up through a cumulative process of conclusion formation, which is dealt with under three somewhat arbitrary rubrics, namely "pattern delineation," ""," and "interpretation." "Pattern delineation" usually dominates the strategy in the beginning, and by this term I mean a broad, often quite intuitive, descriptive summing up of the main themes or patterns of content in the protocols -- which means, of course, the shared patterns of hypothetical culture scenarized in those protocols. As the process moves along, "analysis" usually next becomes dominant, and here the strategy becomes less intuitive and more formal and logical, as well as more theoretically and comparatively oriented. Toward the end, "interpretation" usually becomes dominant, and here the researcher looks primarily outside the protocols themselves, and draws on other sources, and on his own outside knowledge of the extant culture or subculture under examination, as well as his theoretical and professional training. This order makes good sense, I believe, for one can hardly do any very thorough analyzing until one has first fairly well identified and described that which one wishes to analyze; and one can hardly be very definitive in interpreting, or pointing to the broader significance of, one's results, until one has first fairly well done the analysis.

Even so, however, one must not conceive of these three subprocesses of conclusion formation as being water-tight and mutually exclusive. In my own experience, as I proceed to delineate descriptive patterns, I certainly have in the back of my mind, at least, the types of analyses that these patterns might lead to; and any consideration of how to proceed with analysis must certainly be done while simultaneously attending to the possible broader implications of the analysis, either in the sense of comparing the culture under study with other cultures, or of comparing the extant culture with possible or probable future versions thereof. Thus, the three sub-processes intergrade with each other, and the final report will reflect all three.

The strategy of conclusion formation presented in this chapter borrows and adapts, of course, from conventional ethnography. It should be noted in passing that most conventional ethnographies do not make very clear just what intellectual procedures the ethnographer used as he moved from ethnographic field record to final publication. This is regrettable, but doubtless is explained by the complexity and variety of data which the conventional ethnographer must somehow find ways of summarizing, analyzing, and interpreting. However that may be, I do feel that in the case of a new approach like EFR, it is especially important to try to be quite explicit about such procedures, and hence this chapter goes into considerable detail about approaches that I have found useful in my work so far. This is not at all to imply, however, any claim on my part that the approaches
presented are the only way, or even the best way, to proceed. Quite to the contrary, you should regard this chapter as a request for suggestions for better procedures.

3.2 THE PROCEDURE OF PATTERN DELINEATION

By "pattern delineation" is meant a process by which you discern and describe the regularities that emerge in your set of protocols. Just as the conventional ethnographer seeks and identifies regularities in an extant culture, so you are now seeking such regularities derivable from your corpus of protocols, as these apply to an optimistically conceived future culture, a pessimistically conceived one, and a most probably conceived one. The term "pattern" is often used by ethnographers to refer to such regularities, especially those that take the form of pervasive themes that transcend more than one domain of a culture (2.6211).

In looking for patterns that render understandable the possible or probable future cultures projected in the protocols, the ethnographer is, of course, alert to similarities and differences between such projected patterns, and patterns in the extant culture. Essentially, the interviewees will project either that patterns in the extant culture will persist or that they will change, and if change is projected, the projected process of change itself may well be conceived by S in rather clearly patterned terms. The notion of patterning thus serves to some degree to help the ethnographer link up his knowledge of the extant culture to his understanding of how his interviewees project that this culture can, might, will, or should change. For example, in the Thailand Study, the interviewees tended in their Optimistic Scenarios to project persistence in the practice of Thai Buddhism, but to project patterned change in the realm of political economy -- "patterned" change in the sense that the system was projected to become more fair, egalitarian, and redistributive in a number of domains and sub-domains.

The procedure of pattern delineation is cumulative and iterative, in the sense that it deals with protocols not only from a "First Sample" (3.22) of interviewees, but also from as many additional samples as might prove necessary in order to arrive at a satisfactory degree of closure and confidence.

The first step in pattern delineation is simply to take the complete set of finished protocols from the First Sample, and read and reread them with a view to identifying common, modal, or widely shared cognitive CT evaluative positions taken by all or most of the interviewees. It is important to steep yourself in the protocols to the point where they become quite deeply a part of your awareness, so that you intuitively as well as intellectually apprehend, and "get a feel for," the patterning that is in them. As you do this, you should feel free to make marginal notes in pencil, or to interleave pages of your own comments, on particular points that strike you as especially interesting or important -- or troublesome. It is helpful to read all the protocols at a single sitting, so that you can apprehend them in their totality, as it were It is also helpful to vary the order of the protocols from one reading to the next, as a hedge against bias stemming from the particular order in which the interviews were conducted.

The next step is to prepare a First Draft of the intended publication, which might be an article, a special chapter to be included in a conventional ethnographic monograph, or whatever. Writing the First Draft will make quite clear the "gaps" in the data, and which conclusions are relatively "soft"
and in need of further checking. It is the purpose of the next iteration to fill these gaps and firm up these soft conclusions.

A "Second Sample" of interviewees is now interviewed, which is similar in composition, though smaller. In interviewing this sample, you use all of the standard probes used in interviewing the First Sample, plus additional standard probes designed to check all points that remain doubtful after the write-up of the First Draft, or that otherwise require checking.

Thus, the Second Sample generates a second set of protocols which will further insure that the conclusions ultimately reached are based on adequate data.

3.21 THE IMPORTANCE OF REDUNDANCY

In EFR, as in conventional ethnography, redundancy plays an important role. In conventional ethnography, the researcher typically uses a variety of types of informants, some of whom he interviews intensively and systematically, others less so. From interviews with such people, the ethnographer gradually discovers redundancy. That is, he discovers, with respect to a particular topic, that he is getting essentially the same story over and over from appropriately selected people whom he has reason to trust. Once this redundancy reaches a certain level, the ethnographer begins to conclude that, with respect to this topic, he has indeed discovered a patterned regularity, and does not need to do further interviewing on this particular topic. In a sense, it can be said that the good ethnographer must go "too far" in order to be sure that he has gone "far enough" - that he interviews more people than eventually prove necessary, about a given topic, in order to be sure that he has interviewed enough of them to insure reliability.

While EFR in some ways treats the interviewee quite differently than does conventional ethnography (Note 2.2), both approaches utilize redundancy in essentially the same manner. In the case of the 1977 Thailand Study, by about the twelfth interview I was beginning to be a little bored with certain aspects of the interviews, because more and more areas of redundancy were emerging. Well before the twelfth interview, like any ethnographer, I had begun to formulate tentative hypotheses as to the patterning that was likely to emerge across the corpus of protocols as this corpus grew. I was also beginning to formulate analytical propositions and interpretive perspectives.

3.22 WRITE-UP OF THE TRIAL DRAFT

It was at this point in the process of conclusion formation that I adapted to the needs of EFR a strategy that is common in conventional ethnography, namely, the write-up of a trial draft I decided that I would continue to interview until I had noted the 17th interview, and regard these 17 as my First Sample I would then write a First Draft based on this set of 17 protocols, being careful to note areas of concern where agreement was substantially less than conclusive, and other such areas about which a substantial percentage of the interviewees had simply not volunteered any coverage at all I would then interview a Second Sample of approximately half the size of the First Sample -- eight more - bringing my "N" to 25 I would ask each interviewee in the Second Sample a series of new standard probes (in addition to the standard probes used on the First Sample) so that all key conclusions that emerged in the First Draft -- especially those that seemed somewhat shaky -- would be specifically checked, as part of the process of converting the First Draft into a Second
Draft. If there still remained gaps that I judged to be serious, my plan was to take a Third Sample, and so on, until I was satisfied with the completeness and solidity of my conclusions.

In the actual event, I was pleased to discover that the material elicited in the Second Sample provided confirmation for all of the major initial conclusions reached in the First Draft. In no case was an initial conclusion substantively upset, although new material was generated that was helpful in more effectively presenting these conclusions. I had no misgivings about concluding that no Third Sample was necessary.

3.221 THE CONSTRUCTION OF COMPOSITE SCENARIOS: The simplest way to initiate the descriptive write-up process is simply to write out what seems to you to be the essential shared, or composite, content of the First Sample's protocols regarding Optimistic, Pessimistic and Most Probable Scenarios (the last also including the composite or shared model for change, if any). In organizing this trial draft, you have a choice of (1) dealing with each domain or subject in turn, and indicating under each the shared optimistic, pessimistic, and most probable positions; or (2) completing the composite scenarios one at a time, with the various domains and subjects subsumed under each composite scenario, as relevant. I tend to favor the second approach, on the basis of experience to date. For an example, see Appendix Five.

In some cases, this is both the initial and the final structure that the final write-up will assume, in which case the more formal and logical type of analysis described in 3.3 is not included. When this is so, the final product will possibly be quite adequately descriptive and perhaps also interpretive, but somewhat less analytically penetrating.

3.222 THE IDENTIFICATION OF COMMONALITY AND VARIABILITY: In preparing the First Draft, I arbitrarily adopted the generalizing rule that whenever a substantial portion of the interviewees took a position on a matter that I regarded as important, and where 80% of them took a roughly similar position, I would regard this as the modal position and report it as such in the First Draft.

In cases where 80% of those who mentioned a particular matter mentioned it in one way, and all or most of the remaining 20% mentioned it in a particular significantly different way, I assigned to myself the added responsibility of conveying the "minority position," as it were.

Of course, judgment is required on the part of the ethnographer in deciding what to regard as a plurality of positions. Similarly, judgment is required in deciding whether all of the minority positions have sufficient commonality to justify regarding them as "a" minority position, rather than a plurality of minority positions. I know of no a priori way in which I or anyone could standardize a procedure for making such decisions.

I invite anyone who is intrigued by this problem to work on it further, and perhaps some additional and useful guidelines can be devised. Meanwhile, suffice to say that in my own First Draft, I leaned over backwards to present variations of positions, in an attempt to insure against prematurely concluding that a particular position was characterized by commonality. If the reader is disturbed by the judgmentality of this procedure, I can only add that it would be my guess that most write-up situations faced by the conventional ethnographer are probably handled at least as judgmentally,
and perhaps more so. And I might add, incidentally, that the fact that ethnography involves this judgmental aspect does not, as a matter of scientific principle, disturb me unduly, for the great complexity and broad comprehensiveness of ethnographic data virtually require it, and, moreover, a method that permits this degree of latitude to the researcher makes possible truly creative insights and conclusions.

3.223 THE IDENTIFICATION OF GAPS: In going through the first 17 protocols of the Thailand Study, it was clear to me that certain domains or subjects that interested me were not adequately covered by the protocols. What would happen, for example, if only 10 out of the first 17 interviewees mentioned demography of their own accord (assuming that demography was not initially a standard domain probe)? For illustration, let us assume that this is so, that 80% of these 10 individuals, or eight of them, took an antinatalist position, and that the other two took a pronatalist position. Using the "80% rule," I would tentatively conclude that there was an emerging antinatalist pattern in the corpus, and would treat "Demography" accordingly in my First Draft. Yet, it is quite conceivable that the seven individuals who happened not to raise the subject of demography of their own accord, might all, if they had been probed, have come up with - natalist position. (One can, after all, imagine a culture or subculture where pronatalism would be such a standardized value position that many interviewees would not even think to raise the subject.) If one accepts this kind of reasoning, then it follows that I was at that point not yet ready to say anything in print about my interviewees' shared or patterned cognitive or evaluative positions with respect to demography.

3.224 THE CREATION OF NEW STANDARD PROBES: In the above example, the proper remedy, clearly, would be to designate "Demography" as a new, standard domain probe for the interviewing of the Second Sample of interviewees. In the actual Thailand case, this was in fact done, and an additional eight interviewees were thus asked nondirectively about demography in the event that they did not spontaneously broach it. All eight took antinatalist positions, and the overall redundancy with respect to demography was sufficient to persuade me that there were probably relatively few, if any, pronatalists among my 25 interviewees. (In the First Sample, there had been none in fact.)

Similarly, for all other doubtful matters and for all tentative key conclusions reached in the First Draft (including those that did not seem doubtful), new standard probes are created. These might be domain probes, subject probes, or theme probes (2.621).

3.23 ITERATION OF THE PROCEDURE

The procedure for the formation of conclusions calls, in theory, for iteration of the above procedure as many times as are needed in order to obtain conclusions that the ethnographer judges to be tenable. In the case of the Thailand Futures Study, given my decision to focus upon broad culture patterns rather than more finely grained variables, 25 interviews were, in my judgment, more than sufficient. However, if I had been attempting to get at more specialized, detailed, or precisely-conceptualized variables, I might have ended up deciding to iterate the procedure beyond the Second Sample.
Obviously, the decision as to whether one iteration or more than one is needed depends also on how many "indeterminate," "problematic," or "ambiguous" domains or subjects the investigator is willing to tolerate in his final report. In my own final report (see Textor 1978 and Appendix Four), for example, there were a number of such areas, some of which I mentioned explicitly, and others of which I left implicit. An example of an area where no discernible redundancy or consensus emerged was the area of the ownership of basic industry and basic commercial institutions. There was consensus across the 25 interviewees in their Optimistic Scenarios that a desirable culture for Thailand in the year 2000 ought to include very firm governmental controls on basic industry and on the major commercial institutions -- but whether those controls should assume the form of government ownership was simply not a matter on which anything like consensus emerged.

In my view, the sheer fact that no consensus on an important subject like this emerged, even after 25 highly detailed interviews, can sometimes be, in itself, an important datum. I decided to regard this particular subject as one on which consensus among Thai intellectuals, of the type who would be available to me in California, probably did not exist. In making this decision, I was, of course, bringing to bear more than just the actual result of this particular research endeavor. I was also engaging in interpretation, that is, using background knowledge of Thailand gained over 25 years of research on that country. In other words, the notion that there may well be no consensus on this matter among Thai intellectuals generally, was consistent with my knowledge or impressions about this subject gained by other means, such as conventional ethnography, and friendship with Thai intellectuals. More will be said about interpretation in Section 3.4.

3.3 TO STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURE OF ANALYSIS

As the ethnographer moves farther along in delineating descriptive patterns that apply across the first set of protocols, he finds himself moving intergradingly toward more analysis, toward the use of logical, formal, and theoretical categories. Whereas, in the earlier stages of pattern delineation, the ethnographer is perhaps more concerned with getting to the point where the data make sense to him, in analysis the concern shifts toward finding a way by which the data will make sense to his reader, especially the reader who is from a culture or subculture other than that under study. Whereas, in pattern delineation there is an emphasis on summarizing descriptively what exists in the protocols, in analysis this emphasis shifts to a more disciplined consideration of what could have emerged in the protocols, but did not, and why. The categories used in analysis lend themselves, then, to cross-cultural comparison, and hence to theorizing. In this section we shall look briefly at some of the ways I have found useful to conduct an analysis of EFR protocols, looking first at the analysis of consensus, then dissensus.

In seeking analytical "handles," I found myself confronting what must be an extremely common realization in all types of Futures Research, namely that there is an unavoidable ultimate distinction that must be made between the possible-or-probable on the one hand, and the desirable on the other -- the first being cognitive, the second, evaluative. The Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios, it will be recalled, stress desirability within the limits of possibility, and ignore relative probability (2.54-2.55). The Most Probable Scenario, on the other hand, focuses on relative probability, and suspends a consideration of desirability (2.56). These built-in crosscutting emphases in the structure of the EFR interview necessarily lead to similar distinctions when it comes to writing up the results of a set of interviews, and in particular to four analytical constructs that should here be introduced,
namely the "basic cognitive framework," the "cognitive proposition," the "evaluative proposition," and the "value trade-off." These four constructs are discussed below, and exemplified in Appendix Four.

3.31 THE BASIC COGNITIVE FRAMEWORK

The notion of "basic cognitive framework" derives both from my own work, and from conceptual development work done by Harold D. Lasswell (1966). By "basic cognitive framework" I mean a set of assumptions as to what the "givens" are with respect to the future of a particular culture. In effect, a "given" feature of a sociocultural system is a feature that is seen by the interviewees as being virtually certain to persist or exist in a particular way. For example, the Thai interviewees tended quite overwhelmingly to regard civil war or prolonged civil disruption as virtually unavoidable. In other words, they cognized perduring civil war or disruption as being, in effect, not a variable, but a given. Within the given limits of this framework, interviewees could consider numerous potential variables in terms of relative probability.

3.32 COGNITIVE PROPOSITIONS

A "cognitive proposition" deals with a variable within the context of a declared or implied basic cognitive framework. It is a proposition, in sentence form, which seems satisfactorily to express the consensual position with respect to relative probability. A cognitive proposition can be expressed in either the indicative or subjunctive mood (2.726). An example of the first mood is that the interviewees considered it unlikely that the nonviolent "Middle Way" of canonical Buddhism could, over the middle run, provide a viable ideological basis for resolution of inter-class and urban-rural conflict. An example of the second mood is that the interviewees took the position that unless there is steady, substantial, and visible progress through the next several years toward greater economic equity, the political system will collapse.

It is, finally, well to keep in mind that a cognitive proposition is a perceptual, cognitive, or expectational position which, as a matter of definition, has no necessary connection whatever to propositions about evaluative positions, which we will now examine.

3.33 EVALUATIVE PROPOSITIONS

Evaluative propositions are defined as declarative statements indicating what is considered desirable or socially valuable by all or most of the interviewees. Such statements, as a matter of practical fact, also focus on matters perceived as realistic or possible, for the reason that the ground rules for eliciting the Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios call for discouraging utopian or dystopian fantasizing (2.54-2.55).

Examples of evaluative propositions are that the government of Thailand should take firm and stringent measures to control the economy, and that the influence of the military in political matters should decrease drastically.

Despite the definitional differences between a cognitive and an evaluational proposition, it often happens that they will deal with the same subject matter. At least for present practical purposes, we
are safe in assuming that an interviewee must, in some sense, cognize a matter before he can have a value position about it. Of course, he probably will not have a value position about every subject that he cognizes -- but he will about many such subjects. Further, the interviewee's value position about a particular phenomenon will often be based on his cognizing of possible or probable outcomes flowing therefrom, which outcomes are seen as having further possible or probable outcomes, and so forth, until a point is reached in the chain of outcomes where there is a situation that he distinctly values or disvalues. Thus, the Thai interviewees valued firm governmental controls over the economy because they cognized that without some such control, continued economic inequity (a disvalued result) would ensue. Indeed, it seems clear to me that what they ultimately valued was not governmental controls as such, but greater equity.

3.34 VALUE TRADE-OFFS

The identification and formulation of evaluative propositions is an analytical operation at a fairly low level of abstraction. It is often helpful to move to a higher level by identifying more abstractly conceptualized value clusters, and then phrasing the analysis in terms of value tradeoffs. For example, in the Thailand Study it seemed clear to me that there were at least four value clusters evident in the data, four master rubrics subsuming many other expressed or implicit value commitments, namely: order, freedom, growth, and equity. Virtually all of the interviewees were in favor of some form of order, some form of growth, some form of freedom, and some form of equity. The problem is, however, in Thailand or in any society, that it is not possible to maximize across all four of these major value considerations simultaneously. In the Thai situation, my judgment is that if the system maximizes economic growth, it will almost inevitably sacrifice considerable freedom and equity. Accordingly, in writing the Thailand article (see Appendix Four), I included a certain amount of value trade-off analysis, in which some of the implications of optimizing across all four value clusters are explored.

Incidentally, this analysis in terms of value trade-offs has clear conceptual linkages with the Cross-Impact Method of Futures Research (Stover and Gordon 1978)

3.35 THE ANALYSIS OF INRNAL VARIABILITY

So far, in dealing with analysis, we have been concerned primarily with handling those parts or aspects of the content of the protocols where there is consensus among interviewees. It remains to discuss another kind of analysis, namely that which becomes necessary, as suggested in 3.222, where there is disensus or variability. Instead of one modal cognitive or evaluative position, there might be two essential positions, and our analysis would then ask why this variability exists, or, at least, what it is associated with. For example, in the Thailand Study, there were two modal positions taken with respect to government ownership of the basic economic resources of Thailand. The majority position was that there must be strong governmental control of the economy, but left the question of government ownership indeterminate. The minority position outrightly called for government ownership and tight socialist control, including the organization of farmers into communes. In analyzing this minority position, I asked myself the questions: (1) What other positions tend to be taken by those who take this position? and (2) Do the minority advocates stem from a common intellectual or experiential background? Regarding the first question, an examination of the protocols revealed that minority advocates tended to give vague answers when
free-probed as to the apparent inconsistency (2.6223) between their valuing of drastic measures to
insure economic equity, and their valuing of individual human rights and political freedoms.

It was my judgment, based on this free probing, that they themselves were
unclear or undecided with respect to the equity-freedom trade-off. Regarding the second question,
an examination of the Biographical Sketches (2.52) revealed that every such advocate was a social
scientist (though the converse was far from true). This type of deviant case analysis can, I believe,
often improve the quality and credibility of the overall analytical effort.

It is worth a brief digression to note that ER is inherently capable of carrying out considerably less
of this kind of analysis of dis sensus than could typically be carried out by a sociological survey
approach, for the obvious reasons that in EFR the biographical data are sparse and not highly
structured, and samples are small. That is, if the Biographical Sketch had included 30 or 40 items
with respect to the biographical background of a considerably larger sample of interviewees, it
would have been possible to do a much more sensitive analysis of cognitive or evaluative positions,
by biographical background variables. What we confront here is simply a built-in limitation of
EFR, and indeed of most ethnographic approaches. It may well be that EFR could and should lead,
in many cases, to some kind of follow-up research of a survey nature which would afford this richer
analytical opportunity, and others like it, and indeed I am contemplating various efforts in this
direction (5.22).

3.4 THE PROCEDURE OF INTERPRETATION

Just as generalization intergrades with analysis, so analysis intergrades with interpretation. The
essential difference between the two is that analysis concentrates upon what is inside the corpus of
protocols, while interpretation brings to bear everything else, beyond the protocols, that the
researcher knows about the culture and problem under study. Thus, my interpretation of the
Thailand protocols attempts to tell the reader what I think the descriptive patterns and analyses
mean, in terms of what I otherwise know, or think I know, about Thai culture, Thai history, Thai
politics, Thai international relations, Thai economic development patterns, and the like.

The context of interpretation is not, however, limited just to what else is known about the unique or
peculiar qualities of the particular culture under study. The context also includes what is known
about that culture in a broader comparative and theoretical way. In proceeding with my
interpretation of the Thailand material, for example, I tried to be alert to various attributes of the
Thai extant culture as a type of culture, contrastable with other types. Since Thai culture and
society can be characterized as a peasant-based, mixed capitalist, “development-oriented” system,
interpretation of the corpus of protocols can readily draw upon various theories of modernization.
The growth-equity and freedom-equity trade-offs noted in 3.34 are immediately suggested to the
modernization theorist, since modernization theory stresses these trade-offs.

As EER is applied to various cultures by researchers with varying degrees of previous background
on the culture they are studying, it will become increasingly clear that it is to have such a
background before undertaking an EFR study. I urge anyone attempting to teach himself how to do
ER to start, if at all possible, by examining alternative futures for a culture he already knows
something about. This is another way of saying that the most appropriate way to regard EFR is as a
supplement to, rather than a substitute for, standard ethnographic and other social science approaches (6.23). Another aspect of interpretation is what might be referred to as "diagnosis."

Interviewees enculturated in a particular culture or subculture may tend to take certain characteristic positions, or tend to approach the future with a certain characteristic style, etc. If the researcher is concerned with attempting to diagnose these cultural peculiarities with a view to identifying biases, "blind spots," or educational needs, a corpus of EFR protocols might serve as a reasonable data base, at least initially. This diagnostic aspect of interpretation is further discussed in 7.2.

Another aspect of interpretation that is likely to become more important and useful has to do with comparing and contrasting the way interviewees enculturated in by Culture A, as opposed to Culture B, "handle" the future. My students have so far interviewed intellectuals and professionals from Brazil, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, Venezuela, and West Germany -- and even though their samples have been small, the results suggest quite strongly that there are striking differences in the ways these different cultural groups approach the future: differences in their readiness to entertain broadly or narrowly varying possibilities, in their average level of confidence that the future can be managed, and so on. Some of these differences reflect real differences in national situation, resource base, and the like, of course. But other differences cannot be explained, I feel, without reference to the differing enculturation processes through which the different groups have come.

A final comment on interpretation is in order. One of the somewhat unusual aspects of EFR is that it will often be used with samples that include interviewees who are intellectuals end/or experts in various relevant subject matter areas. During the interview, some of these interviewees might volunteer their own notions as to what a given trend or projection means, or could mean, or would mean, in cultural or theoretical terms. For example, in the Thailand Sample, my interviewees included some who knew at least as much as I, and probably more, about such subjects as Thai cultural history and patterns of change, or about theories of economic development or political modernization. While of course the final responsibility for sound interpretation must rest upon the shoulders of the researcher, nonetheless this source of interpretive assistance can be an important asset.

3.5 THE "ENIC" AND "ETTC" PERSPECTIVES

Throughout the process of conclusion formation, the ethnographer bears in mind the two fundamental perspectives of ethnography, namely the "emic" and the "etic." For the benefit of the non-anthropologist reader, and with some oversimplification, we may call the emic perspective that of the native, and the etic perspective that of the outsider, the comparativist. These terms were coined by Pike, who explained them thus: In contrast to the Etic approach, an Emic one is in essence valid for only one language (or one culture) at a time....It is an attempt to discover and to describe the pattern of that particular language or culture in reference to the way in which the various elements of that culture are related to each other in the functioning of the particular pattern, rather than an attempt to describe them in reference to a generalized classification derived in advance of the study of that culture. (154: 8).
The implications of the emic-etic distinction are quite profound, and the reader who wishes to pursue them further is referred to Pelto and Pelto (1978: 54-66) and the references they cite. Suffice to say here that good’ ethnography requires the constant and judicious use of both perspectives, and so, in my view, does good EFR. In EFR, the ethnographer’ s sensitivity to the emic perspective would appear to be especially important in pattern delineation, since this subprocess involves the writing up of summaries of patterns or regularities that appear in scenarized future cultures, and in some cases and to some extent the ethnographer will express these regularities in the terms that the interviewees themselves use. The delineation of such patterns in scenarized future cultures leads naturally to a consideration of the similarities and differences between such scenarized patterns, and the patterns that the researcher perceives as existent in the extant culture - and again, such extant patterns will in some cases be discerned and expressed in terms that these interviewees, or other informants in conventional ethnographic research on the same culture, have used. As the process of conclusion formation moves toward an emphasis upon analysis, the etic perspective will take on greater importance, since analysis tends to imply comparison among cultures And as conclusion formation moves further, toward an emphasis upon interpretation, there will be some tendency to relate the described-and-analyzed materials to both what else the researcher knows about the extant culture (including his emically-formulated knowledge) and what he knows about theory. However, it would be misleading to separate these three subprocesses of conclusion formation too sharply, and it is important to emphasize that in all three subprocesses the emic and etic perspectives should be kept in mind, and related to each other.

3.6 WRITE-UP OF THE PENULTIMATE DRAFT

After the Second Sample of interviews has been completed, the conclusion formation procedure calls for a rigorous inspection of the protocols resulting therefrom, with a view to discarding, altering, or or retaining the pattern delineations, analyses, and interpretations tentatively advanced in the First Draft This Draft is now revised, and becomes the Second Draft, which will normally be a more confidently and persuasively written document, more penetrating in its analysis and more resourceful in its interpretation. It is now time to decide whether you need to interview a Third Sample and write a Third Draft, and so forth. When you reach a point at which you decide that no further interviewing is needed, the draft then in hand is your Penultimate Draft.

3.61 SOLICITING FEEDBACK FROM A SUBSAMPLE OF INTERVIEWEES

Once the Penultimate Draft is written, I recommend that you then draw a small purposive subsample of your total sample (First Sample plus subsequent samples) of interviewees, and ask them to check the Penultimate Draft for balance, cogency, logic, and persuasiveness. In the Thailand Study, I selected about five interviewees for this purpose, being sure to include at least one woman, at least one social scientist, at least one natural scientist, at least one interviewee who favored social transformation as distinct from reform, etc., and spoke to each of them prior to asking for their assent in checking over the Penultimate Draft. I explained that I wanted their comments and criticisms as frankly as possible, and that I would be attentive to each and every criticism. I was pleased to note that almost all of them did convey their responses, and that these responses were conscientious and thorough -- yet on the whole highly supportive of the descriptions, analyses, and interpretations that appeared in the Penultimate Draft. In fact, no important substantive changes were recommended by any of these critic-readers, though a number
of suggestions with respect to presentational style were made, and I was able to accept and incorporate every one of these.

Of course, there was one important limitation on the ability of these critics to contribute at this point, namely that the critics had not, and under the circumstances could not have, read the protocols themselves.

Thus, they did not have access to the same detailed data base to which I had access. Of course this was unfortunate, but under the circumstances - it was unavoidable, for to have let these critic-readers examine the raw protocols would have violated the spirit, if not the letter, of my pledge to maintain absolute confidentiality. Even though the protocols were - rigorously anonymized (2.21, 2.741), there was always a chance that a critic-reader would have thought that he recognized a particular interviewee by the content of the latter's remarks -- or that the latter might hear - rumors that would lead him to fear or suspect that this had happened, etc., etc. -- and I was not about to take this risk. In other situations, however, with adequate planning it is possible to avoid this problem. Indeed, there are a number of rich alternatives available to the researcher who works with interviewees who are willing to share each other's protocols, as is discussed in 7.11 and 7.31, and exemplified in Appendix Five.

3.62 USE OF THE CONFERENCE TECHNIQUE

The conference technique involves the conduct of a conference of interviewees after the Penultimate Draft has been written. The researcher attends this conference as an observer, or, if SD invited, as a resource person and/or moderator. The researcher takes extensive notes on the interaction and discussion at the conference, and utilizes insights thus developed to further analyze and interpret the material in the Penultimate Draft. In the case of the Thailand Study, three such conferences occurred as a direct (and spontaneous) result of the fact that the organizers of the conferences had been given EFR interviews. I attended each such conference as an invited guest, and each experience helped me in improving and editing my Penultimate Draft. The conference technique is discussed further in 7.1.
CHAPTER FOUR: SAMPLING CONSIDERATIONS AND PROCEDURES

In Chapter Two we looked at the individual interview, and considered procedures for the appropriate and reliable summarization of that interview. The end-product of such summarization is the interview protocol.

In Chapter Three we widened our view, looked at an entire corpus of protocols, and considered procedures for the formation of appropriate and reliable conclusions that apply more or less uniformly across those protocols. These conclusions take the form of broad descriptive patterns; analyses in terms of basic cognitive frameworks, cognitive propositions, evaluative propositions, or value trade-offs; or interpretations.

In this chapter we widen our view further, look at the nature of our sample of interviewees, and consider the extent to which we are entitled to generalize the conclusions developed from the corpus of protocols resulting from interviews with this sample, to a specified larger population of people from which our sample has been drawn. In this chapter, I seek to incorporate into the EFR methodology a set of sampling principles and procedures that will insure that the results of an EFR study will be as representative as possible of the results that would have been obtained if it had been possible to interview all members of the total population from which the sample was drawn.

4.1 THE "100% SAMPLE" STRATEGY

The most straightforward strategy for insuring representativeness is, of course, the taking of a 100% sample, in which case the sample is identical with the population. Fortunately, in EFR it quite often can happen that a snail enough category of people can be defined as the total population, so that it is logistically and financially feasible for you, with or even without collaborators, to interview that population in its entirety. Examples of such 100% samples might be all members of the City Council of Palo Alto, California, all members of the Shop Stewards Council of Guadalajara, all tenured faculty members of the Tokyo University Faculty of Education, all cabinet members of the Republic of Tanzania; all members of the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation, etc. Wherever the situation permits you to take a 100% sample, you will have the luxury of feeling confident that the patterns you delineate, the analyses you make, and the interpretations you render, based upon a complete set of protocols, apply to all members of the population unambiguously. You need not worry about making allowances for sampling bias or sampling error. Both you and your readers may thus repose more confidence in the final research report.

In numerous other instances, however, the EFR researcher will find it impossible or unnecessary to design his research in such a way as to take a 100% sample, which is why this chapter is needed. In proceeding with my discussion of sampling, I shall make no pretense whatever to technical expertise in the field of sampling statistics, but will limit myself to illustrating the essential spirit of what I consider to be appropriate procedures for an EFR project, by showing how I would set up the sample for a hypothetical study of Thai university professors. I shall not attempt to provide a complete or elaborate rationale, much less to deal with the technical aspects of statistical inference. If you wish to pursue these more technical problems further, you should consult the literature on
4.2 THE DESIRABILITY OF A PROBABILITY SAMPLE

Where it is not possible to draw a 100% sample, the sample that is drawn should, if at all possible, be a probability sample, that is, one in which each member of a specified population has a known probability of being selected. This is well illustrated by the case of my 1977 Thailand Study. At that time, I was still in the process of developing the basic approach of EFR. I had my hands full conceptualizing and experimenting with procedures for interviewing, summarizing, delineating descriptive patterns, analyzing, and interpreting. In order not to complicate matters further, I opted for the convenience of drawing a "judgmental" and "opportunity" sample of Thai intellectuals available in the San Francisco Bay Area at that time.

Given the prior need to develop these internal aspects of EFR, this decision was, I think, appropriate. However, I am left with the problem that I have no objective basis for inferring or stating the extent to which these 25 interviewees represent all Thai intellectuals then available in the Bay Area, much less all Thai intellectuals in the U.S. at that time, and still much less all Thai intellectuals at that time, regardless of residence. While I do, as a matter of personal judgment, believe that the sample is not unrepresentative of Thai intellectuals available in the Bay Area at that time (subject to certain further qualifications), the design of this research project gives me no objective or rigorous grounds whatever for claiming that this judgment is correct.

As matters stand, I do not have the right, technically speaking, to attribute my findings to any category of people except those in the sample itself. While such a predicament is hardly unusual for ethnographers, it is certainly to be avoided if possible, and the way to avoid it is to use a probability sample, as I shall attempt to illustrate below.[4•1]

4.3 DEFINITION OF THE POPULATION

The first step toward constructing a proper sample is to define clearly the population from which the sample is to be drawn. In our hypothetical example, let us assume that the population of university professors is defined as "all regular, full-time, ethnically Thai professors at University X." Let us assume that University X is the largest, most diversified university in Thailand. Even though I would have liked to define my sample as "all regular full-time Thai professors at all universities in Thailand," let us suppose that for logistical and financial reasons I have decided to treat the professors at University X as a not unreasonable proxy for all Thai university professors, and that I have a satisfactory sociocultural rationale for doing so. Let us further suppose that the Thai tradition and administrative system are such that individuals can be unambiguously classified as belonging to, or not belonging to, this population.

4.4 ENUMERATION OF THE POPULATION

My next step is to obtain from the cognizant authorities a complete list of all regular full-time professors at University X, by rank, title, faculty, and department. Let us suppose that no difficulties are encountered in identifying expatriate or other non-Thai professors at University X, these are
then excluded from the enumeration list. I then check this list further, and confer with the relevant authorities as needed, in order to remove any other ambiguities, and to insure completeness.

4.5 DEFINITION OF STRATA AND CATEGORIES

The next task is to define the strata that will structure the sampling, and the categories that will facilitate the temporal ordering of the interviews, in the most productive fashion.

Let us assume that the status structure of Thai universities is such that, culturally speaking, certain ranks are clearly "senior," and others clearly "junior." Almost all "senior" rank-holders are over 45, let us say, and almost all "junior" rank-holders are younger. (If this proves not to be the case, then the actual age of the individual can be used instead, and culturally appropriate cut-off criteria established.) Let us assume that I have decided, on the basis of experience to date, that it usually matters considerably whether an individual is under 45 or over, in terms of how he or she perceives and preferentializes alternative futures -- with greater variability and imagination usually found among the juniors, and greater insistence on practicality and plausible causal process usually found among the seniors. I therefore decide to stratify the population into a "junior" and a "senior" stratum.

Experience to date further suggests strongly that a professor's discipline also has a great deal to do with the way he or she perceives and preferentializes alternative futures. A discipline is, after all, a kind of subculture, and it is not unreasonable to assume that such a subculture affects a person's world view and imaging style. I therefore decide to use a professor's faculty and department as the basis for arraying the names of all the professors prior to drawing my actual sample.

4.6 THE SAMPLING FRAME AND INTERVIEWING ORDER

Let us assume that University X has 720 regular full-time ethnically Thai professors, of whom 360 are "junior" and 360 are "senior." Let us also assume that I have reached an agreement with a Thai social scientist, Dr. Prasoed, that we will work together as co-investigators. We have decided that we will study matched samples in a somewhat autonomous manner, to see whether and how my American enculturation and his Thai enculturation will affect the results we produce. We need, then, to draw two samples that will be matched as to junior-senior characteristics, and also as to the disciplines represented.

First, Dr. Prasoed and I separate the 360 junior professors from the 360 senior professors. Then, we randomly order the faculties by drawing lots. Let us suppose that the order that emerges is Medicine, Humanities, Agriculture, Natural Sciences and Mathematics, Education, Engineering, Social Sciences, and Business. Next, we randomly order the departments within each faculty, again by drawing lots. In the case of the Faculty of Social Sciences, for example, let us suppose that the order that emerges is Sociology, Political Science, Linguistics, Economics, Communication, Anthropology, and Psychology. These random orders of faculties and departments will be the same for the Junior Stratum and the Senior Stratum.

Now Dr. Prasoed and I randomly order the professors within each department. Suppose, for example, that in the Junior Stratum there are 11 professors of sociology. These 11 names will be
ordered randomly. In the Senior Stratum there are 15 professors of sociology, these, too, will be ordered randomly. And so forth.

So far, then, we have now completed our enumerating and our ordering. We now have two lists, a Junior Stratum List and a Senior Stratum List. Each of the two lists has 360 names. Within each list, the faculties and departments are arrayed in exactly the same order, which has been determined randomly. On both lists, the individual names that appear within each department are ordered randomly.

Since Dr. Prasoed and I plan to work quasi-autonomously and later compare results, we now need to create a list of names for him, and a parallel one for me. By lot, we determine that he will get the odd-numbered names on each of our two lists, and I will get the even-numbered names.

He therefore gets the names numbered 1, 3, 5, and so forth up to 719, and I get the names numbered 2, 4, 6, and so forth up to 720.

Now, for simplicity's sake, suppose that Dr. Prasoed takes his 360 names and re-numbers them consecutively from 1 to 360, so that there are no gaps in numbering. I do the same. Then, each of us will mark brackets on his list indicating each faculty and, within faculty, each department.

Dr. Prasoed and I decide, on the basis of past experience plus a consideration of the immediate situation, that each of us will draw a 10% sample. Each of us now has a randomly-determined list of 360 names from which to draw this sample.

By lot, we determine a number between 1 and 10 to serve as our starting point for systematic sampling. Let us say that this number turns out to be 7. This means that Dr. Prasoed's Junior Sample consists of professors numbered 7, 17, 27, and so forth, up to 177, and his Senior Sample consists of professors numbered 187, 197, 207, and so forth, up to 357. This gives Dr. Prasoed 18 junior and 18 senior professors. My sample is exactly matched.

Dr. Prasoed and I agree that we will work closely enough together to achieve comparability of results, but autonomously enough so that he can make his own decisions as to how to proceed and how to reach conclusions, and I can make mine. Let us suppose that he and I agree that we will not be consulting on research strategy -- or will consult only minimally -- until each of us has had a chance to interview 18 professors and write a First Draft (3.22). In order to achieve comparability of results, we agree that our first 18 interviews will be with professors numbered 7, 27, 47, and so forth -- up to 347 -- that is, with every other professor in the sampling order. The purpose of this arrangement is to insure that each of us interviews nine junior and nine senior professors, and that the full gamut of disciplinary orientations is traversed.

We further agree that in drawing our Second Sample (3.23) we will each interview nine additional professors, and that these nine will be similarly numbered in such a way as to spread across the gamut once again. Let us assume that we determine, by lot, that the Second Sample will consist, in his case and in mine, of professors numbered 17, 57, 97, 137, 177, 217, 257, 297, and 337. And, if a Third Sample should be needed, it will consist of the remaining nine professors in the sample, namely professors numbered 37, 77, 117, 157, 197, 237, 277, 317, and 357.
Dr. Prasoed and I have now established our sampling frame. Each of us has a uniquely identified First, Second, and Third Sample, and Dr. Prasoed's frame is totally parallel with nine. All of this has been done on a totally probabilistic basis. And if it should turn out that more than a Third Sample is needed -- which would seem quite unlikely -- the same principles and procedures can be used once again.

4.61 THE INTERVIEWING ORDER

So far, nothing has been said about the order of interviewing those individuals who have fallen into our samples. One procedure would be simply to follow the numerical order, starting with 7, then 27, then 47, and so forth. However, it is most unlikely that Dr. Prasoed and I would commit ourselves in advance to any such rigid order, for such a commitment would vitiate the general ethnographic principle that, all else equal, one should cast the widest possible net early, and then gradually identify and more closely examine variables which are more and more clearly seen to be common or crucial. Consequently, in starting out, Dr. Prasoed and I are seeking the maximum diversity first, and attempting to gain, as soon as possible, an awareness of the full range of domains, subjects, and ideas that our interviewees wish to deal with spontaneously. Thus, it would make no sense to "finish up" the senior professors first, or the engineering professors first, etc. Rather, all else equal, both of us will choose our early interviewees so as to mix seniors with juniors, humanists with engineers, and so on.

Another advantage of a sampling frame that permits full freedom for the interviewer to choose the order in which he will interview designated interviewees, is that it enables him to devise tactics designed to minimize contamination, that is, bias that would occur if Interviewee A were to tell Interviewee B, before the latter is interviewed, about what the interview covers, and how A dealt with it. Contamination is always a potential problem that the researcher should consider, whenever he is interviewing a sample of interviewees drawn from a population of people who are in frequent communication with each other. This is dealt with in Note 4.2.

For these reasons, Dr. Prasoed and I agree that, as long as each of us stays within the formally-drawn First Sample of 18 names, the order in which each of us interviews his 18 professors is entirely up to our judgment, as well as to the vicissitudes as to which of the 18 professors is available when. As long as these 18 individuals (or their pre-determined substitutes, as we shall see in the next sub-section), are interviewed, the particular order in which they are interviewed does not matter, as far as the integrity of the probability sample is concerned.

4.62 SUBSTITUTIONS FOR UNAVAILABLE INTERVIEWEES:

We face now the problem of finding substitutes for professors whose names fall into the sample, but who prove to be unavailable due to absence, illness, or whatever; or who prove to be unwilling to be interviewed for whatever reason; or who prove to be otherwise uninterviewable. The substitution rule is that I must now take the next professor on my list. Thus, if my first interviewee was supposed to be Professor 17 but he proves to be unavailable, I must now take Professor 18. If 18 is not available, I must take 19. And so on This rule insures that the substitute will be from the same discipline as the unavailable selectee (except in the event that the latter was the last member of his department on my list — but this event will occur randomly, and thus will cause no problem
from a sampling point of view.) Rigid adherence to this rule insures against availability bias, as well as possible subjective selection bias on my part.

4.7 POSSIBLE VARIATIONS AND ADAPTATIONS

The example given above is one of many ways to proceed with sampling for an EFR study. Depending on the logical requirements of a particular research design, the shape and character of a particular population, and various logistical and financial constraints, there are any number of variations and adaptations that might legitimately be node. These variations and adaptations might be in substitution for the kind of approach outlined above, or in supplementation of it. In this section, an example of adaptation will be given, followed by an example of variation. Clearly, many other possibilities might also be mentioned, but these will perhaps serve as useful illustrations.

Before proceeding, it might be useful to restate two basic features of the research design presented in our hypothetical example, namely that the design is based on random principles, and that it is proportional. The randomness derives from selection by lot at every step of the design, and the proportionality derives from the fact that the sample is systematic, and designed to select every n-th member of the population. This means that the representation of each faculty and each department will be approximately proportional to its strength in the total population.

4.7.1 SUPPLEMENTARY PURPOSEFUL SAMPLING

Under some conditions, it might be advisable to supplement the above-described stratified-systematic-random design with the use of a certain amount of non-random, purposive sampling. Let us suppose, for example, that after all members of the regular sample at University X had been interviewed, and after the First Draft (3.22) and other drafts (3.23) had been written, it turns out that I find myself regretting the fact that, due to the vagaries of the draw, three or four professors widely known to be unusually seminal thinkers had failed to fall into my sample - which would hardly be surprising, considering the smallness of the sampling fraction. In such an event, I would not consider it inappropriate, at this stage, to interview these seminal thinkers -- especially if, in my judgment, they possess expert knowledge in areas that I now deem important for interpretive (3.4), as distinct from descriptive pattern delineation (3.2), purposes. I would not, however, consider myself in anyway obligated to interview such additional persons.

4.7.2 DIFFERENT SAMPLING FRACTIONS FDR DIFFERENT SUB-SAMPLES:

A word should be added about the question of sampling fractions and proportionality. Suppose now that Dr. Prasoed's and my initial purpose is different. Suppose that we want, flum the beginning, to study both university X and the Y Institute of Technology, and to compare shared perceptions and preferences found at X with those found at Y. One of the first questions we ask is whether we can expect equal variability of responses from the two universities. We then take note of the fact that University X has eight separate faculties, each with several departments, while Y Institute has no separate faculties, and only six departments, all in engineering, namely: aeronautical, chemical, civil, electrical, industrial, and mechanical. This prima facie lower variability at Y would probably lead Dr. Prasoed and ne to decide that, initially at least, we would take a smaller sample than 1 in 10 -- perhaps 1 in 20. Of course, if our expectation is upset and we discover what we consider to be
as much variability of perception and preference at Y as we earlier did at X, we always have the flexibility of enlarging the sampling fraction later, using stratified-systematic-random procedures of the type discussed above.

The essential point made here is simply that the sampling fraction depends on one's assumptions as to the degree of variability of response that one is likely to find, and this depends on the degree of subcultural, experiential, educational, or other relevant variability of the population under study. For example, the sampling fraction to be used in a Thai agricultural village might be considerably smaller than that used at Y Institute.

4.8 SUMMARY

Much more could be said about the various technical aspects of sampling, and about project administration. However, this brief presentation will perhaps suffice to indicate the general approach I favor. It is an approach that (1) randomizes and rigorizes selection of the sample, (2) systematically guarantees that the full gamut of subcultures or types of world view is represented; and (3) utilizes appropriate proportionality; while (4) permitting the use of judgment on the part of the researcher as to the order of interviewing, so that he can move from broad exploration of the full range of responses to a more careful focus on particular domains and subjects. The presentation has, finally, illustrated how EFR can be used cooperatively and interculturally, in such a fashion as to rigorize the study of how the differing enculturative backgrounds of two or more researchers can produce different -- or similar -- research results.[4.3]
CHAPTER FIVE: THE ARTICULATION OF E.F.R. WITH OTHER FUTURES RESEARCH METHODS

EFR, like its parent, conventional ethnography, is an inherently flexible research approach -- more so than most. Because of this flexibility, EFR is, I believe, rather readily adaptable for use jointly with other FR methods in the same research project. This chapter will explore a few types of situation in which the coupling of EFR with another method would seem possible, and likely to produce a research product superior to that which could be expected if either method were used alone -- superior in the sense that the product would be more comprehensive, plausible, reliable, precise, and/or usable. These explorations will necessarily be tentative and conjectural since, with only one exception known to me, these joint uses have not yet been tried in practice.

By the "joint" use of EFR with another FR method, I mean that EFR is used first, and then Method X; or vice versa. I do not have in mind any kind of blending of EFR with Method X into some new kind of hybrid Method Y. If such hybridization ever occurs, it will most likely occur only after the type of adjunctive use considered in this chapter has first been tried.

The spirit of inter-method comparison and cooperation in which this chapter is written is, by the way, very much in keeping with current methodological thinking in FR, as summarized in the Handbook of Futures Research, the methodological chapters of which provide a comprehensive and useful summarization of the state of this art (Fowles 1978: 141-448).

One notes in this compendium that author after author points to the limitations of any single method, and to the need for the use of more than one method to plumb the complex subject matter of Futures Research. This chapter will be loosely guided by Fowles' classification of research methods, though will make no effort to be exhaustive in its coverage.

5.1 APPROACHES WITH WHICH E.F.R. SHOULD NOT BE COUPLED

Perhaps the simplest way of starting our exploration is to indicate briefly some of the types of research methods with which EFR cannot, or should not, be coupled. The strengths of EFR are that it promotes a certain boldness and spontaneity of spirit, a searching breadth of scope, and an emphasis upon examining holistic interconnectedness among environmental, social, and cultural variables. The researcher whose method already possesses these advantages probably will not need to couple that method with EFR. And the researcher whose method lacks these advantages but who judges that he does not need them, also probably will not wish to consider coupling his method with EFR.

EFR, like conventional ethnography, is as oriented to discovering what the problem is --what the key questions are, that ought to be asked -- as it is to ascertaining answers. The researcher who has already clearly and firmly decided what his problem and his questions are, and what his guiding model is, and who is reasonably satisfied that he already has an adequate understanding of the context surrounding his problem, probably will not wish to consider coupling his method with EFR. Researchers in this category are bound to be quite numerous.
EFR is intended to accommodate those researchers who formulate problems in terms of systems - especially cultural and ecological systems, and in terms of "systems of systems." For some researchers, this systemic emphasis might not be congenial.

EFR is also characterized, at bottom, by a definite qualitative bias. While there is no reason why the EER format cannot be used to elicit S's quantitatively conceived responses as well - and indeed almost any scenario is bound to contain some quantitative forecasts -- nonetheless the researcher whose interests are primarily quantitative and who is not interested in learning more about the qualitative context of his quantitative analysis, will probably not see much advantage in coupling his approach with EFR. Such researchers are very numerous. An example would be a market forecaster who is focally concerned with possible and probable future cost, price, and profit figures, and who, for whatever reasons, is prepared to assume that his understanding of the contextual variables - ecological, sociocultural, etc. - is already adequate.

The above list is far from complete, but is perhaps sufficient for illustrative purposes. One final observation should, however, be made, namely that the researcher who does not think he needs an adjunct research project involving EFR or something like it, might, in some cases, be wrong. Much of the value of EFR and similar broad approaches lies, I believe, in helping to insure that the right questions are being asked, and all of the right questions, at least the major ones. It is conceivable that a researcher with a tight model and a rigid research instrument might become the victim of his own premature closure, and pursue too narrow a range of questions - only later, perhaps even years later, to discover that he has made a mistake. Perhaps, in some instances, EFR could help avoid such mistakes.

5.2 APPROACHES WITH WHICH E.F.R. MIGHT EFFECTIVELY BE COUPLED

In asking the question of whether EFR would make a useful adjunct to another Futures Research approach, one point to consider is that EFR elicits both cognitive and evaluative positions. Some other FR methods are so designed, or at any rate so used in customary practice, that they are more or less limited to the cognitive and the expectational. In such an instance, the researcher might find EFR useful as an adjunct that will carry him beyond the ascertainment of what people believe or expect, to a discovery in depth of what they want, or want most -- or of how much of a disvalued outcome they are willing to tolerate.

Not only is the scope of coverage of an EFR interview relatively broad, but so is the range of possible participants. Although EFR is certainly not just conversation, it is conducted in a conversation-like ambience -- and conversation is an accepted and relatively non-threatening way to spend time in, presumably, any culture. I can thus visualize conducting a successful EFR interview, properly adapted, with a taxi-driver in Sao Paulo, a rug merchant in Cairo, or an elementary teacher in Burma -- all of whom would, for example, probably find a request to fill out a Delphi questionnaire quite overwhelming.

Unlike most other Futures Research methods, then, EFR does not suffer from the limitation that it must be used only with sophisticated or experts. True, a viable EFR project can (and sometimes should) be designed so that its sample of interviewees consists only of experts, but other projects might call for samples of non-experts, or mixed samples. If the sample is mixed, one may normally
expect that the forecasts of the experts in their areas of expertise will be more precise and more self-assured. Whether such forecasts will prove to be more useful, however, is a separate question, on which the overall research results ought to shed some light. In some instances, the experts' forecasts might turn out to be naively narrow and undercontextualized, or technocratically opinionated and divorced from broader questions concerning the quality of life that non-experts prefer, etc.

5.21 E.F.R. AND SCENARIO-WRITING

The fundamental building block of the EFR method is, of course, the scenario. Each S provides three of these, which become the raw material of protocols, which in turn become the raw material from which the final research product is produced. And this research product itself is often construed in the form of composite scenarios (3.221).

In the short history of organized Futures Research, the scenario has enjoyed a comparatively long and honored career. Wilson eloquently stakes the claim for what he terms "scenarios" (here referred to as "scenario-writing" to distinguish Wilson's type of approach from EFR) when he points out that: Scenarios are (or should be) multifaceted and holistic in their approach to the future. In the early days of futures research, and still to a great extent in the popular literature, it is the isolated event, the specific prediction, that rivets attention . . . However, history is a 'booming, buzzing confusion' of events, trends, and discontinuities; it is constantly in motion and so is more accurately represented by a motion picture than by a snapshot. Scenarios have a special ability to represent this multi-faceted, interacting flow process, combining (when appropriate) demographic changes, social trends, political events, economic variables, and technological developments" (1978: 227).

Wilson illustrates the numerous advantages of scenario-writing with an example of its utility to the General Electric Company, for which he works. He concludes:

Scenarios . . . can be disciplined explorations of the future, forcing the writer to Spell out the full range of underlying assumptions in the forecast, and encouraging a needed holism . . . All in all, they may be both the most demanding and the most rewarding of any futures methodology.

Though Wilson's case for scenario-writing is, in my view, cogently persuasive, one notes that it is silent on the question of who does the writing, on the basis of what data inputs. One is left to infer that the scenario-writer is probably a single expert, and that the data inputs might be largely company reports, files, and archives, plus personal knowledge about the company acquired by the expert through the years. If this were to be the case, one could still argue that such an expert, so informed, could assemble useful and stimulating scenarios - for there is no denying that the writing of understandable, credible, useful, and stimulating scenarios is indeed an important and uncommon skill, nor is there any denying that one person, through time, can develop deep understanding of the realities and potentialities of an organization or community.

Granting all of the above, however, I would further argue that there might be circumstances in which this sort of scenario-writing project could be broadened and enriched if combined with an EFR component, while at the same time in no way usurping the role of the scenario-writer himself. A company as large as General Electric, after all, has a greater annual cash flow than many
independent nations, and is characterized by enormous social and technological complexity. Scenarios about the company's future would, I think, be richer and more relevant to the organization's total experience and potential if there were a preliminary EFR component, with a sample stratified in accordance with the company's main operating and planning units, designed to reach sufficiently below top management so that some junior administrators and scientists would be tapped, who might prove to be less completely socialized to company norms, and less likely to accept the type of "conventional wisdom" that might tend to characterize the content of the company's reports, files, and archives.

A few members of the sample might also be trained as EFR interviewers, and assist the scenario-writer with the tasks of interviewing, protocol-editing, pattern delineation, analysis, interpretation, and generalization -- all of which would, I think, serve to contextualize and enrich the final scenarios that are generated.

When we shift our consideration from a corporation to a community or nation, the argument for a more participatory approach takes on added cogency. The development of scenarios for my state of California, for example, is not something that I would comfortably leave solely to scenario-writing experts, or to professional planners. Clearly, a more democratic approach is preferable, simply because more of people's fundamental rights are involved. I suspect that experts such as Wilson would readily agree.

This more participatory approach might also increase the ultimate heuristic and educational impact of the final product (7.5), for it seems clear that people are more likely to be educated in discussions based on a set of scenarios, when they themselves have earlier inputted ideas that have been used to build those scenarios, and can hence identify, to some extent, with one or more of the scenarios that finally emerge.

5.22 E.F.R. AND THE SURVEY METHOD

In my view, the use of the survey method in Futures Research holds great promise, and two ways will be presented in which E.F.R. could be used adjunctively with the survey method, to improve the final research product.

It is best to start by looking briefly at conventional anthropological fieldwork, and examining how it sometimes combines ethnography with survey research. In such fieldwork, the ethnographic component is typically carried out first (largely or entirely) and is also typically much more basic to the success of the total project, than is the survey component. In Futures Research as well, it would seem that the EFR component will also typically precede the survey component, but whether one component or the other will be more basic or important will, I think, depend on the nature and purposes of the particular research project. I can imagine projects that are basically ethnographic, and which use the survey component only to check a few key variables through interviewing a larger sample drawn from the same population. I can just as readily imagine projects that are basically survey in nature, but which use an EFR-style component as a means of developing a better survey instrument and doing a better job of interpreting the data that that instrument produces.
When a conventional anthropological fieldwork project combines the two approaches, the researcher typically spends many months doing ethnographic inquiry, especially interviewing key informants, in order to establish the general patterning of the culture, and many of the more specific cultural rules that condition people's decisions as to how to behave under particular circumstances (1.13). The fact that there are cultural norms or rules does not, however, necessarily mean that all of the people follow them, or follow them in the same way. Thus, the anthropologist is interested not only in the cultural commonalities, but also in the individual variations, especially since these variations will give him hints as to how the cultural norms and rules are likely to change in the future. But the anthropologist cannot gain an adequate grasp of these variations, exceptions, deviations, etc., simply by interviewing his key informants in depth, for the latter do not, usually, have reliable answers to such questions. What the anthropologist can do with informants, however, is to identify types of variation, and then refine his understanding of the types and categories of variability, and of their analytical and interpretive implications, to the point where he is now able to ask questions on a survey instrument that will secure the information he needs about variability with respect to this or that subject, more effectively and precisely. At some point, he weighs the importance of all these various areas of variability, and makes a decision as to whether it would be a prudent use of his time and resources to do a survey on selected areas of variability. If so, he proceeds to incorporate the necessary questions into an interview schedule, draw a proper sample of members of the population under study, and carry out the necessary survey research.[5.11

There can be, then, in conventional anthropological fieldwork, - a dynamic and mutually helpful interplay between ethnography and survey research. Ethnography is used both (1) to identify and refine questions to be asked by means of a systematic survey, and (2) to enrich the investigator's broad holistic and contextual understanding of the entire problem area, so that after the survey data have been gathered and analyzed, he will be better capable of interpreting these data. The survey results, - for their part, will provide a kind of concreteness, thoroughness, specificity, precision, and reliability that will serve as a rigorous check on possible excessive or faulty generalization from purely ethnographic data.

In Futures Research, the interplay between these two types of research ought to be, if anything, even more productive. This is because the results of most EFR studies will probably be less culturally patterned than the results of most conventional ethnographic studies, for the reason that in EFR one is discussing with the interviewee various possible cultures that could exist, while in conventional ethnography one is discussing with the informant the culture that (in some ontological sense) does exist. The basic orientation of EFR is upon conceivable possibility and relative probability, while that of conventional ethnography is, ideally at least, upon existing actuality. For this reason there will, clearly, be more variability in the data produced by the EFR study. A related point is that, as discussed in Note 2.2, in EFR one deals not with an informant, but with an interviewee, whose task is explicitly limited to explaining what he alone expects and values (as distinct from explaining also what he perceives others to expect and value). The fact that the EFR interviewee is "on his own," and not constrained by a duty to report also what he perceives others to believe and value, is a factor that further contributes to variation in response. While it is still true that much of what is included in the EFR protocols can properly be interpreted in terms of cultural norms and rules -- and indeed I am struck by the extent to which this is true -- nonetheless it is also true that the variation in response is also considerable. This fact makes the checking of variability
by means of the survey method a natural form of follow-up research, which merits a few additional comments.

5.221 IDENTIFYING AND REFINING SURVEY ITEMS: Especially in those cases where the survey researcher is interviewing members of a culture or subculture that is strange to him, it seems likely that the use of EFR as the first stage will enable him to identify a number of variables that might - not otherwise have occurred to him at all, or else to refine already-identified variables into survey-askable forms in ways that might not otherwise have occurred to him. This formulative process would emerge from the

5.222 INTERPRETING SURVEY DATA: It also seems likely that EFR materials thusly collected could be useful to the survey researcher after he has collected and analyzed his survey data, and has reached the stage of interpreting this analyzed data. The interpretation of the survey data would, I think, be enriched by the application of insights developed during the interpretation of the EFR data - especially insights as to the EFR interviewees' shared cognitive frameworks and assumptions, and shared values

It should, finally, be briefly noted that interpretation applies not only to data in hand, but also to missing or inadequate data. Even in the best of surveys it is likely to happen that the researcher, after he sees the results of his survey, will discover that there are certain questions that he neglected to ask, or neglected to ask in quite the right way, or in quite the proper depth, and other questions that were asked, but produced numerous non-responses. He cannot go back and re-do the entire survey, but he can go back and re-read his EFR protocols, plus his analysis (3.3) and interpretation (3.4) thereof. From this re-reading, he can perhaps develop reasonable assumptions that will guide him in handling his missing data problems. While there is, of course, no adequate substitute for missing survey data other than complete survey data, nonetheless the survey researcher who has no EFR data to use in this manner would certainly be worse off than the one who did.

Much more could be said about the interface between EFR and the survey method in Futures Research, but perhaps these comments are sufficient to render plausible the notion that the coupling of the two could lead to better results than the use of either alone.

5.23 E.F.R. AND THE DELPHI METHOD

The Delphi Method is one of the most famous of Futures Research methods, and is, moreover, a method invented by futures researchers specifically for Futures Research. For a basic description of this method, and a commentary upon its strengths and weaknesses, see Linstone 1978. From the beginning, in designing EFR, I have had in mind the desirability of its being used conjointly with the Delphi Method. Fortunately, in 1979 I met, and gave advice and encouragement to, a scholar who wished to proceed to do just this, namely Chumphol Poolpatarachewin, a Thai educational researcher and university faculty member, who wished to study the expectations and preferences of Thai university professors concerning possible and probable alternative futures for Thai higher education. Chumphol was interested in middle-range futures and used A.D. 2000 as his horizon date. His preliminary results are, in my view, quite promising (Chumphol 1980).
Chumphol calls his method "EDFR," or "Ethnographic-Delphi Futures Research." Basically, what it entails is (1) using EFR first; then (2) studying the EFR protocols in order to identify and refine the various trends and issues mentioned by one or more interviewees; and (3) embodying these systematically into a Delphi questionnaire, which is then (4) administered to the same sample one or more times, in the usual Delphi manner.

The trends and issues Chumphol captures by means of the EFR component of his project turn out to be quite numerous, for Chunipol imposes no requirement that a trend or issue be either frequently mentioned or consensually validated. Even if only a single interviewee mentions a particular trend or issue, Chumphol will include this on his Delphi questionnaire if he deems it relevant to his overall research orientation. What Chumphol does in his Delphi is, then, roughly comparable to making every mentioned and interesting trend or issue into what this Handbook terms a standard subject probe (2 6212), except that Chumpol goes one step farther, in the sense that every Delphi respondent is so probed - not just, as in EFR, those scenarizers who are interviewed after the subject probe has been discovered and standardized [5.2]

The trends and issues Chunphol adduces from his EFR interviews and incorporates into his questionnaire are propositional in form and resemble somewhat the "cognitive propositions" of EFR (3.32). Examples are:

"University administrators will consist of persons who have specialized knowledge of administration. There will be more young administrators."

"New technologies, such as computers and videotapes, will be used.

"Students will have their own roles independent of instructors, administrators, and politicians. There will be new activities created by students."

"Instructors will support students to go out and help society."

The Delphi questionnaire then asks each respondent to indicate whether a particular trend or issue is part of his Optimistic or Pessimistic Scenario, or whether he is undecided. It also asks him, in percentage terms, to judge how likely he thinks it is that the trend or event will materialize by the horizon date. This permits an interesting analysis in terms of consensus and dissensus. Items on which there is consensus can then be used to assemble a composite Optimistic Scenario and a composite Pessimistic Scenario. Chumphol also calculates the mean judged percentage of probability that each trend or issue will materialize.

So far, Chumpol's EDFR Project has involved only a single use of his questionnaire, but when circumstances permit, he plans one or more iterations in the usual Delphi manner. That is, he will study the results of the First Questionnaire and summarize or average them in a suitable fashion. These summaries will then become the anonymous feedback portion of the Second Questionnaire, permitting each panel member to see how the panel as a whole responded to the questions in the First Questionnaire, what the average tendencies of response were, what the extreme answers were, and what reasons were given for the most extreme answers. Essentially, the questions on the Second Questionnaire will then ask the respondent whether he wishes to change his position with
respect to a particular trend or issue, and if so, in what way and for what reasons. Chumpol will then collect the completed Second Questionnaires, study them, summarize or average them, and, if necessary, devise and circulate a Third Questionnaire in the same manner. These iterations will continue until the results attain a degree of stability and clarity considered satisfactory by Chumphol. Presumably, however, not very many iterations will be required.

Chumphol's research differs from most EFR projects so far undertaken in that it is monocultural. That is, he is a Thai discussing with other Thais the future of higher education in Thailand. He appears not to be primarily interested in doing a cultural analysis -- one that might indicate, for example, what are some of the characteristically Thai, or Thai-educator, cultural positions or perspectives vis-a-vis the future. Nor is he interested in cross-cultural comparison, in which these characteristically Thai ways of handling the future would be compared with ways characteristic of some other culture (3.4).

Indeed, what impressed me about Chumphol's monocultural approach is that it results in his couching the trends and issues he discovers through the use of EFR in remarkably culture-free terms, so that if one were to recast them by substituting, for example, "Mexican" and "Mexico" for "Thai" and "Thailand," but were otherwise to leave the wording undisturbed, only a few of the propositions would seem out of place. These propositions will probably not be seen as very instructive by a reader interested in learning about (1) the extant Thai culture or (2) the peculiarities of the Thai culture potential or (3) the way enculturation as a Thai affects scenarizers' approaches to the future; but the propositions might be seen as highly instructive by a reader interested in the commonalities of problems of higher education around the world, or around the Third World.

Not only is Chumphol's project highly focused culturally; it is also highly focused in the sense that it looks just at one quite specialized subculture within Thai culture, namely that of the system of higher education. There is, moreover, relatively little explicit "cross-impact" scope to his project. Basically, higher education is seen as responsive to those officials who run higher education, or else to exogenous factors that remain largely unspecified or implicit. Chumphol's results do not portray possible changes in Thai higher education in the middle-range future as interacting with specified sociocultural or ecological stimuli -- such as a severe energy shortage, rampant and endemic inflation, the threat of external aggression, a revolt of the underprivileged, a modernist movement in religion, a worldwide depression, a powerful women's liberation movement, or similar enironing factors. Such possibilities might or might not be in the backs of the minds of some of the interviewees, but the mode of inquiry does not particularly encourage the elicitation of such material, as far as one can see. True, when he analyzes and interprets his Delphi data, Chumphol, as an alert and informed member of Thai culture, can bring in such exogenous factors as the above -- but in doing so he will be relying primarily on personal knowledge rather than a systematic data base. In short, like every researcher, Chumphol has made a trade-off decision between depth and breadth, and in this case the decision is heavily in favor of depth.

Doubtless because of Chumphol's tighter and more limited focus, his initial EFR interviews averaged only 45 minutes in length, as against the two or three hours that EFR interviews normally take. However, given the fact that the Delphi part of his design calls for additional requests for the panelists' time in order to fill out one, two, or more questionnaires, it is probably fortunate that the
initial EFR interviews were not too long, as there are definite limits on the patience of any panel, especially an unpaid one [5.3]

Chumphol's particular way of combining EFR with the Delphi suggests that there is a continuum of degrees to which the EFR component, with its characteristic concern for spontaneity, creativity, broad cultural patterning, and systemic interconnections, might be emphasized. Where this emphasis is minimal, EDFR is hardly distinguishable from the particular kind of Delphi in which, in the first round, panelists are simply asked to submit suggested events that will then be considered for inclusion in the First Questionnaire (Martino 1978: 392). Here, the items that are suggested would presumably be discrete technological or anagerial breakthroughs, rather than broad processes of culture change; for example, the adoption of audiovisual techniques in Thai universities, rather than the emergence of a politically powerful women's liberation movement. While Chumphol's EDFR is certainly not this extreme in de-emphasizing the above-mentioned features of EFR, I do believe that, in EDFR, such features can profitably be more strongly emphasized. The researcher can bring this about, for example, by creating an interviewing atmosphere that encourages breadth (2.27), and by using appropriate standard domain or subject probes (2.6211, 2.6212). Time and experimentation will determine the range of achievable and useful mixes as between EFR's emphasis on breadth, context, and systemic and Delphi's emphasis on specificity. Meanwhile, we are indebted to Chumphol for creatively demonstrating that EIDER can produce non-obvious, interesting, and useful information.

Having said this, however, I feel it necessary to add a further observation, namely that it seems to me likely that as EDFR is developed, we will find that its final product will almost always be more narrowly focused than a typical EFR product, for the Delphi portion of EDFR will almost automatically have this effect. Delphi, after all, starts its questionnaire iteration process by asking about precise events. For example, it might start by focusing upon the invention of a genetic engineering technique that will obviate sickle cell anemia, and then ask for an estimate of the year by which there is at least a 50% chance that that event will have happened. The rationale for the estimate, the projected causal process, and the context within which the event is projected to occur, might or might not be actively elicited. EFR, by contrast, starts by asking much broader questions, and is so structured that all but the least imaginative interviewees are likely to provide broadly scoped scenarios.

It should be noted, finally, that the use of EFR in combination with the Delphi Method is similar to EFR's use in combination with the survey method -- which is not surprising, since Delphi may be regarded as a kind of iterative survey method. In both cases, EFR is used for the purpose of identifying and refining items for subsequent use in a more structured research instrument (5.221). And likewise, in both cases, the EFR protocols can later be used at the interpretation stage as a means of making greater sense out of analyzed data (5.222).15.4

5.24 E.F.R. AND OTHER METHODS

In the Fowles compendium, several other Futures Research methods and approaches are also reviewed, among them trend extrapolation, cross-impact analysis, simulation modeling, simulation gaming, technological forecasting, technology assessment, the use of social indicators, and social forecasting (1978: 141ff). Many of these approaches are well beyond my experience and
competence, so that I shall not attempt to suggest how EFR could or should be used conjointly with
them. VOrth noting, however, is McLean's comment, with respect to simulation modeling, that
there is a certain tendency to "shift attention from the vital task of producing an adequate model
structure," and "to devote a disproportionate amount of time to the refinement and calibration of
detailed numerical relationships." McLean also notes a "hypnotic inertia of a certain choice of
system representation," and concludes that "any single forecasting technique is inherently
inadequate," and that "a forecasting exercise will be more effective if it is based on the evaluation
of many alternative models rather than a single model and a set of data (McLean 1978: 339-40).
And Johnston adds what I consider to be an appropriate peroration for the present chapter:
"Quantitative forecasting procedures alone cannot be relied upon to yield an adequate awareness of
alternative goals that might be pursued or the priorities that might be called for But qualitative
procedures that commonly incorporate a distinct value orientation cannot possibly reflect the range
and interactions of the many relevant factors in any systematic fashion. These different forecasting
methods must be fused" (1978: 440).

2.85 ECONOMY AND EFFICIENCY

If is often said that one hour of conventional ethnographic interviewing necessitates three hours of
subsequent solitary work by the ethnographer in order to convert his raw notes into an ethnographic
record. This is in accord with my own experience in conventional ethnography. Whether the same
three-to-one ratio would apply if we used traditional write-up methods for an EFR interview is not
clear. lean heavily on the conservative side, let us arbitrarily cut this figure in half, and assume that
one hour of EFR interviewing would necessitate one and one

half hours of write-up. It is instructive
to compare this with the efficiency of using the Cumulative Summarization Technique, which, I
would estimate, seldom if ever involves more than one-eighth of the duration of the entire interview
for dictation.

Let us assume two hypothetical situations, in both of which the actual time required for the
interview proper is 160 minutes. In Situation A, you use traditional write-up techniques, which
means that you bid S adieu and repair to your typewriter, where you spend 1.5 X 160 minutes, or
240 minutes, writing up the interview record. In Situation B, you use the Cumulative
Summarization Technique, which simply adds an additional .125 X 160, or 20 minutes, to the
actual time you are with S. In Situation B, you use 20/240, or one-twelfth, as much time to write
up.

Of course, the comparison is not yet quite fair, since in Situation B you must also devote some time
to (1) editing the draft protocol once it comes back to you from the typist, (2) talking or writing to S
and urging him to edit your edited version and make it his own (2.75); and (3) checking and
incorporating any changes he makes in the protocol. A liberal estimate of how long these tasks
would take, on the average, would be 60 minutes.

Adding this to the 20 minutes it took you to do the dictating during the interview, we get 80
minutes as a liberal estimate of time it costs you to "write up" using Cumulative Summarization.

Thus, the total time-cost to you is no more than 80/240, or one-third, of what it would cost you
using more traditional methods. Especially since I have estimated time costs conservatively in
Situation A and liberally in Situation B, it would seem that, from an efficiency standpoint, there are good grounds for using the Cumulative Summarization Technique in conducting an EFR project.[2.10)

2.86 PROVISION OF A BASIS FOR THE INTERVIEWEE’S CONTINUED GROWTH

So far, our summary of the advantages of a properly conducted EFR interview has focused primarily on obtaining a better research product: that is, on producing a more reliable, better balanced, richer protocol -- more effectively and efficiently. It should also be noted briefly at this point that the better the protocol produced, the better will be the heuristic and educational stimulus that S will receive as a quid pro quo for his participation, since the protocol is a form of permanent baseline feedback to S, which he may file and reread from time to time in years to come, in order to refresh his awareness of what his perceptions and preferences concerning possible or probable alternative futures for his culture were, as of the date on which he was interviewed. Even the illiterate interviewee can benefit in this way, by having a trusted friend read the protocol to him. Thus, in the EFR situation the protocol becomes a permanent basis for further creative thinking on the part of the interviewee. There is, of course, no comparable feedback which the typical informant in a conventional ethnographic situation receives.

The various follow-up uses of the EFR protocol, involving or not involving the participation of the ethnographer, are discussed in 3.62 and Chapter 7, and need not detain us here. Suffice to say here that there are numerous and attractive ways in which the protocol can be used by former interviewees, to pursue problems and interests that they consider worthwhile. This is, I think, a not inconsiderable advantage of EFR, especially in an era when ethnography, and social science generally, are increasingly caning under fire, especially in the Third World, for "taking the data and giving nothing in return."
CHAPTER THREE: THE FORMING OF CONCLUSIONS AND THE WRITING-UP OF RESULTS

When a suitable number of interviews have been conducted, summarized, and recorded in protocol form, and when the protocols have been checked by the interviewees and their corrections incorporated, the next step is, of course, to form conclusions that apply to the corpus of protocols as a whole, and to write up the results. The purpose of this chapter is to present the various methodological steps that lead from a set of finished protocols to the final written product.

3.1 THE PROCESS OF CONCLUSION FORMATION

The sections that follow deal with the strategy of moving toward write-up through a cumulative process of conclusion formation, which is dealt with under three somewhat arbitrary rubrics, namely "pattern delineation," "analysis," and "interpretation." "Pattern delineation" usually dominates the strategy in the beginning, and by this term I mean a broad, often quite intuitive, descriptive summing up of the main themes or patterns of content in the protocols -- which means, of course, the shared patterns of hypothetical culture scenarized in those protocols. As the process moves along, "analysis" usually next becomes dominant, and here the strategy becomes less intuitive and more formal and logical, as well as more theoretically and comparatively oriented. Toward the end, "interpretation" usually becomes dominant, and here the researcher looks primarily outside the protocols themselves, and draws on other sources, and on his own outside knowledge of the extant culture or subculture under examination, as well as his theoretical and professional training. This order makes good sense, I believe, for one can hardly do any very thorough analyzing until one has first fairly well identified and described that which one wishes to analyze; and one can hardly be very definitive in interpreting, or pointing to the broader significance of, one's results, until one has first fairly well done the analysis.

Even so, however, one must not conceive of these three subprocesses of conclusion formation as being water-tight and mutually exclusive. In my own experience, as I proceed to delineate descriptive patterns, I certainly have in the back of my mind, at least, the types of analyses that these patterns might lead to; and any consideration of how to proceed with analysis must certainly be done while simultaneously attending to the possible broader implications of the analysis, either in the sense of comparing the culture under study with other cultures, or of comparing the extant culture with possible or probable future versions thereof. Thus, the three sub-processes intergrade with each other, and the final report will reflect all three.

The strategy of conclusion formation presented in this chapter borrows and adapts, of course, from conventional ethnography. It should be noted in passing that most conventional ethnographies do not make very clear just what intellectual procedures the ethnographer used as he moved from ethnographic field record to final publication. This is regrettable, but doubtless is explained by the complexity and variety of data which the conventional ethnographer must somehow find ways of summarizing, analyzing, and interpreting. However that may be, I do feel that in the case of a new approach like EFR, it is especially important to try to be quite explicit about such procedures, and hence this chapter goes into considerable detail about approaches that I have found useful in my work so far. This is not at all to imply, however, any claim on my part that the approaches
presented are the only way, or even the best way, to proceed. Quite to the contrary, you should regard this chapter as a request for suggestions for better procedures.

3.2 THE PROCEDURE OF PATTERN DELINEATION

By "pattern delineation" is meant a process by which you discern and describe the regularities that emerge in your set of protocols. Just as the conventional ethnographer seeks and identifies regularities in an extant culture, so you are now seeking such regularities derivable from your corpus of protocols, as these apply to an optimistically conceived future culture, a pessimistically conceived one, and a most probably conceived one. The term "pattern" is often used by ethnographers to refer to such regularities, especially those that take the form of pervasive themes that transcend more than one domain of a culture (2.6211).

In looking for patterns that render understandable the possible or probable future cultures projected in the protocols, the ethnographer is, of course, alert to similarities and differences between such projected patterns, and patterns in the extant culture. Essentially, the interviewees will project either that patterns in the extant culture will persist or that they will change, and if change is projected, the projected process of change itself may well be conceived by S in rather clearly patterned terms. The notion of patterning thus serves to some degree to help the ethnographer link up his knowledge of the extant culture to his understanding of how his interviewees project that this culture can, might, will, or should change. For example, in the Thailand Study, the interviewees tended in their Optimistic Scenarios to project persistence in the practice of Thai Buddhism, but to project patterned change in the realm of political economy -- "patterned" change in the sense that the system was projected to become more fair, egalitarian, and redistributive in a number of domains and sub-domains.

The procedure of pattern delineation is cumulative and iterative, in the sense that it deals with protocols not only from a "First Sample" (3.22) of interviewees, but also from as many additional samples as might prove necessary in order to arrive at a satisfactory degree of closure and confidence.

The first step in pattern delineation is simply to take the complete set of finished protocols from the First Sample, and read and reread them with a view to identifying common, modal, or widely shared cognitive CT evaluative positions taken by all or most of the interviewees. It is important to steep yourself in the protocols to the point where they become quite deeply a part of your awareness, so that you intuitively as well as intellectually apprehend, and "get a feel for," the patterning that is in them. As you do this, you should feel free to make marginal notes in pencil, or to interleave pages of your own comments, on particular points that strike you as especially interesting or important -- or troublesome. It is helpful to read all the protocols at a single sitting, so that you can apprehend them in their totality, as it were. It is also helpful to vary the order of the protocols from one reading to the next, as a hedge against bias stemming from the particular order in which the interviews were conducted.

The next step is to prepare a First Draft of the intended publication, which might be an article, a special chapter to be included in a conventional ethnographic monograph, or whatever. Writing the First Draft will make quite clear the "gaps" in the data, and which conclusions are relatively "soft"
and in need of further checking. It is the purpose of the next iteration to fill these gaps and firm up these soft conclusions.

A "Second Sample" of interviewees is now interviewed, which is similar in composition, though smaller. In interviewing this sample, you use all of the standard probes used in interviewing the First Sample, plus additional standard probes designed to check all points that remain doubtful after the write-up of the First Draft, or that otherwise require checking.

Thus, the Second Sample generates a second set of protocols which will further insure that the conclusions ultimately reached are based on adequate data.

3.21 THE IMPORTANCE OF REDUNDANCY

In EFR, as in conventional ethnography, redundancy plays an important role. In conventional ethnography, the researcher typically uses a variety of types of informants, some of whom he interviews intensively and systematically, others less so. From interviews with such people, the ethnographer gradually discovers redundancy. That is, he discovers, with respect to a particular topic, that he is getting essentially the same story over and over from appropriately selected people whom he has reason to trust. Once this redundancy reaches a certain level, the ethnographer begins to conclude that, with respect to this topic, he has indeed discovered a patterned regularity, and does not need to do further interviewing on this particular topic. In a sense, it can be said that the good ethnographer must go "too far" in order to be sure that he has gone "far enough" - that he interviews more people than eventually prove necessary, about a given topic, in order to be sure that he has interviewed enough of them to insure reliability.

While EFR in some ways treats the interviewee quite differently than does conventional ethnography (Note 2.2), both approaches utilize redundancy in essentially the same manner. In the case of the 1977 Thailand Study, by about the twelfth interview I was beginning to be a little bored with certain aspects of the interviews, because more and more areas of redundancy were emerging. Well before the twelfth interview, like any ethnographer, I had begun to formulate tentative hypotheses as to the patterning that was likely to emerge across the corpus of protocols as this corpus grew. I was also beginning to formulate analytical propositions and interpretive perspectives.

3.22 WRITE-UP OF THE TRIAL DRAFT

It was at this point in the process of conclusion formation that I adapted to the needs of EFR a strategy that is common in conventional ethnography, namely, the write-up of a trial draft I decided that I would continue to interview until I had obtained the 17th interview, and regard these 17 as my First Sample I would then write a First Draft based on this set of 17 protocols, being careful to note areas of concern where agreement was substantially less than conclusive, and other such areas about which a substantial percentage of the interviewees had simply not volunteered any coverage at all I would then interview a Second Sample of approximately half the size of the First Sample -- eight more - bringing my "N" to 25 I would ask each interviewee in the Second Sample a series of new standard probes (in addition to the standard probes used on the First Sample) so that all key conclusions that emerged in the First Draft -- especially those that seemed somewhat shaky -- would be specifically checked, as part of the process of converting the First Draft into a Second
Draft. If there still remained gaps that I judged to be serious, my plan was to take a Third Sample, and so on, until I was satisfied with the completeness and solidity of my conclusions.

In the actual event, I was pleased to discover that the material elicited in the Second Sample provided confirmation for all of the major initial conclusions reached in the First Draft. In no case was an initial conclusion substantively upset, although new material was generated that was helpful in more effectively presenting these conclusions. I had no misgivings about concluding that no Third Sample was necessary.

3.221 THE CONSTRUCTION OF COMPOSITE SCENARIOS: The simplest way to initiate the descriptive write-up process is simply to write out what seems to you to be the essential shared, or composite, content of the First Sample's protocols regarding Optimistic, Pessimistic and Most Probable Scenarios (the last also including the composite or shared model for change, if any). In organizing this trial draft, you have a choice of (1) dealing with each domain or subject in turn, and indicating under each the shared optimistic, pessimistic, and most probable positions; or (2) completing the composite scenarios one at a time, with the various domains and subjects subsumed under each composite scenario, as relevant. I tend to favor the second approach, on the basis of experience to date. For an example, see Appendix Five.

In some cases, this is both the initial and the final structure that the final write-up will assume, in which case the more formal and logical type of analysis described in 3.3 is not included. When this is so, the final product will possibly be quite adequately descriptive and perhaps also interpretive, but somewhat less analytically penetrating.

3.222 THE IDENTIFICATION OF COMMONALITY AND VARIABILITY: In preparing the First Draft, I arbitrarily adopted the generalizing rule that whenever a substantial portion of the interviewees took a position on a matter that I regarded as important, and where 80% of them took a roughly similar position, I would regard this as the modal position and report it as such in the First Draft.

In cases where 80% of those who mentioned a particular matter mentioned it in one way, and all or most of the remaining 20% mentioned it in a particular significantly different way, I assigned to myself the added responsibility of conveying the "minority position," as it were.

Of course, judgment is required on the part of the ethnographer in deciding what to regard as a plurality of positions. Similarly, judgment is required in deciding whether all of the minority positions have sufficient commonality to justify regarding them as "a" minority position, rather than a plurality of minority positions. I know of no a priori way in which I or anyone could standardize a procedure for making such decisions.

I invite anyone who is intrigued by this problem to work on it further, and perhaps some additional and useful guidelines can be devised. Meanwhile, suffice to say that in my own First Draft, I leaned over backwards to present variations of positions, in an attempt to insure against prematurely concluding that a particular position was characterized by commonality. If the reader is disturbed by the judgmentality of this procedure, I can only add that it would be my guess that most write-up situations faced by the conventional ethnographer are probably handled at least as judgmentally,
and perhaps more so. And I might add, incidentally, that the fact that ethnography involves this judgmental aspect does not, as a matter of scientific principle, disturb me unduly, for the great complexity and broad comprehensiveness of ethnographic data virtually require it, and, moreover, a method that permits this degree of latitude to the researcher makes possible truly creative insights and conclusions.

3.223 THE IDENTIFICATION OF GAPS: In going through the first 17 protocols of the Thailand Study, it was clear to me that certain domains or subjects that interested me were not adequately covered by the protocols. What would happen, for example, if only 10 out of the first 17 interviewees mentioned demography of their own accord (assuming that demography was not initially a standard domain probe)? For illustration, let us assume that this is so, that 80% of these 10 individuals, or eight of them, took an antinatalist position, and that the other two took a pronatalist position. Using the "80% rule," I would tentatively conclude that there was an emerging antinatalist pattern in the corpus, and would treat "Demography" accordingly in my First Draft. Yet, it is quite conceivable that the seven individuals who happened not to raise the subject of demography of their own accord, might all, if they had been probed, have come up with - natalist position. (One can, after all, imagine a culture or subculture where pronatalism would be such a standardized value position that many interviewees would not even think to raise the subject.) If one accepts this kind of reasoning, then it follows that I was at that point not yet ready to say anything in print about my interviewees' shared or patterned cognitive or evaluative positions with respect to demography.

3.224 THE CREATION OF NEW STANDARD PROBES: In the above example, the proper remedy, clearly, would be to designate "Demography" as a new, standard domain probe for the interviewing of the Second Sample of interviewees. In the actual Thailand case, this was in fact done, and an additional eight interviewees were thus asked nondirectively about demography in the event that they did not spontaneously broach it. All eight took antinatalist positions, and the overall redundancy with respect to demography was sufficient to persuade me that there were probably relatively few, if any, pronatalists among my 25 interviewees. (In the First Sample, there had been none in fact.)

Similarly, for all other doubtful matters and for all tentative key conclusions reached in the First Draft (including those that did not seem doubtful), new standard probes are created. These might be domain probes, subject probes, or theme probes (2.621).

3.23 ITERATION OF THE PROCEDURE

The procedure for the formation of conclusions calls, in theory, for iteration of the above procedure as many times as are needed in order to obtain conclusions that the ethnographer judges to be tenable. In the case of the Thailand Futures Study, given my decision to focus upon broad culture patterns rather than more finely grained variables, 25 interviews were, in my judgment, more than sufficient. However, if I had been attempting to get at more specialized, detailed, or precisely-conceptualized variables, I might have ended up deciding to iterate the procedure beyond the Second Sample.
Obviously, the decision as to whether one iteration or more than one is needed depends also on how many "indeterminate," "problematic," or "ambiguous" domains or subjects the investigator is willing to tolerate in his final report. In my own final report (see Textor 1978 and Appendix Four), for example, there were a number of such areas, some of which I mentioned explicitly, and others of which I left implicit. An example of an area where no discernible redundancy or consensus emerged was the area of the ownership of basic industry and basic commercial institutions. There was consensus across the 25 interviewees in their Optimistic Scenarios that a desirable culture for Thailand in the year 2000 ought to include very firm governmental controls on basic industry and on the major commercial institutions -- but whether those controls should assume the form of government ownership was simply not a matter on which anything like consensus emerged.

In my view, the sheer fact that no consensus on an important subject like this emerged, even after 25 highly detailed interviews, can sometimes be, in itself, an important datum. I decided to regard this particular subject as one on which consensus among Thai intellectuals, of the type who would be available to me in California, probably did not exist. In making this decision, I was, of course, bringing to bear more than just the actual result of this particular research endeavor. I was also engaging in interpretation, that is, using background knowledge of Thailand gained over 25 years of research on that country. In other words, the notion that there may well be no consensus on this matter among Thai intellectuals generally, was consistent with my knowledge or impressions about this subject gained by other means, such as conventional ethnography, and friendship with Thai intellectuals. More will be said about interpretation in Section 3.4.

3.3 TO STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURE OF ANALYSIS

As the ethnographer moves farther along in delineating descriptive patterns that apply across the first set of protocols, he finds himself moving intergradingly toward more analysis, toward the use of logical, formal, and theoretical categories. Whereas, in the earlier stages of pattern delineation, the ethnographer is perhaps more concerned with getting to the point where the data make sense to him, in analysis the concern shifts toward finding a way by which the data will make sense to his reader, especially the reader who is from a culture or subculture other than that under study. Whereas, in pattern delineation there is an emphasis on summarizing descriptively what exists in the protocols, in analysis this emphasis shifts to a more disciplined consideration of what could have emerged in the protocols, but did not, and why. The categories used in analysis lend themselves, then, to cross-cultural comparison, and hence to theorizing. In this section we shall look briefly at some of the ways I have found useful to conduct an analysis of EFR protocols, looking first at the analysis of consensus, then dissensus.

In seeking analytical "handles," I found myself confronting what must be an extremely common realization in all types of Futures Research, namely that there is an unavoidable ultimate distinction that must be made between the possible-or-probable on the one hand, and the desirable on the other -- the first being cognitive, the second, evaluative. The Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios, it will be recalled, stress desirability within the limits of possibility, and ignore relative probability (2.54-2.55). The Most Probable Scenario, on the other hand, focuses on relative probability, and suspends a consideration of desirability (2.56). These built-in crosscutting emphases in the structure of the EFR interview necessarily lead to similar distinctions when it comes to writing up the results of a set of interviews, and in particular to four analytical constructs that should here be introduced,
namely the "basic cognitive framework," the "cognitive proposition," the "evaluative proposition," and the "value trade-off." These four constructs are discussed below, and exemplified in Appendix Four.

3.31 THE BASIC COGNITIVE FRAMEWORK

The notion of "basic cognitive framework" derives both from my own work, and from conceptual development work done by Harold D. Lasswell (1966). By "basic cognitive framework" I mean a set of assumptions as to what the "givens" are with respect to the future of a particular culture. In effect, a "given" feature of a sociocultural system is a feature that is seen by the interviewees as being virtually certain to persist or exist in a particular way. For example, the Thai interviewees tended quite overwhelmingly to regard civil war or prolonged civil disruption as virtually unavoidable. In other words, they cognized perduring civil war or disruption as being, in effect, not a variable, but a given. Within the given limits of this framework, interviewees could consider numerous potential variables in terms of relative probability.

3.32 COGNITIVE PROPOSITIONS

A "cognitive proposition" deals with a variable within the context of a declared or implied basic cognitive framework. It is a proposition, in sentence form, which seems satisfactorily to express the consensual position with respect to relative probability. A cognitive proposition can be expressed in either the indicative or subjunctive mood (2.726). An example of the first mood is that the interviewees considered it unlikely that the nonviolent "Middle Way" of canonical Buddhism could, over the middle run, provide a viable ideological basis for resolution of inter-class and urban-rural conflict. An example of the second mood is that the interviewees took the position that unless there is steady, substantial, and visible progress through the next several years toward greater economic equity, the political system will collapse.

It is, finally, well to keep in mind that a cognitive proposition is a perceptual, cognitive, or expectational position which, as a matter of definition, has no necessary connection whatever to propositions about evaluative positions, which we will now examine.

3.33 EVALUATIVE PROPOSITIONS

Evaluative propositions are defined as declarative statements indicating what is considered desirable or socially valuable by all or most of the interviewees. Such statements, as a matter of practical fact, also focus on matters perceived as realistic or possible, for the reason that the ground rules for eliciting the Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios call for discouraging utopian or dystopian fantasizing (2.54-2.55).

Examples of evaluative propositions are that the government of Thailand should take firm and stringent measures to control the economy, and that the influence of the military in political matters should decrease drastically.

Despite the definitional differences between a cognitive and an evaluational proposition, it often happens that they will deal with the same subject matter. At least for present practical purposes, we
are safe in assuming that an interviewee must, in some sense, cognize a matter before he can have a value position about it. Of course, he probably will not have a value position about every subject that he cognizes -- but he will about many such subjects. Further, the interviewee's value position about a particular phenomenon will often be based on his cognizing of possible or probable outcomes flowing therefrom, which outcomes are seen as having further possible or probable outcomes, and so forth, until a point is reached in the chain of outcomes where there is a situation that he distinctly values or disvalues. Thus, the Thai interviewees valued firm governmental controls over the economy because they cognized that without some such control, continued economic inequity (a disvalued result) would ensue. Indeed, it seems clear to me that what they ultimately valued was not governmental controls as such, but greater equity.

3.34 VALUE TRADE-OFFS

The identification and formulation of evaluative propositions is an analytical operation at a fairly low level of abstraction. It is often helpful to move to a higher level by identifying more abstractly conceptualized value clusters, and then phrasing the analysis in terms of value tradeoffs. For example, in the Thailand Study it seemed clear to me that there were at least four value clusters evident in the data, four master rubrics subsuming many other expressed or implicit value commitments, namely: order, freedom, growth, and equity. Virtually all of the interviewees were in favor of some form of order, some form of growth, some form of freedom, and some form of equity. The problem is, however, in Thailand or in any society, that it is not possible to maximize across all four of these major value considerations simultaneously. In the Thai situation, my judgment is that if the system maximizes economic growth, it will almost inevitably sacrifice considerable freedom and equity. Accordingly, in writing the Thailand article (see Appendix Four), I included a certain amount of value trade-off analysis, in which some of the implications of optimizing across all four value clusters are explored.

Incidentally, this analysis in terms of value trade-offs has clear conceptual linkages with the Cross-Impact Method of Futures Research (Stover and Gordon 1978)

3.35 THE ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL VARIABILITY

So far, in dealing with analysis, we have been concerned primarily with handling those parts or aspects of the content of the protocols where there is consensus among interviewees. It remains to discuss another kind of analysis, namely that which becomes necessary, as suggested in 3.222, where there is disensus or variability. Instead of one modal cognitive or evaluative position, there might be two essential positions, and our analysis would then ask why this variability exists, or, at least, what it is associated with. For example, in the Thailand Study, there were two modal positions taken with respect to government ownership of the basic economic resources of Thailand. The majority position was that there must be strong governmental control of the economy, but left the question of government ownership indeterminate. The minority position outrightly called for government ownership and tight socialist control, including the organization of farmers into communes. In analyzing this minority position, I asked myself the questions: (1) What other positions tend to be taken by those who take this position? and (2) Do the minority advocates stem from a common intellectual or experiential background? Regarding the first question, an examination of the protocols revealed that minority advocates tended to give vague answers when
free-probed as to the apparent inconsistency (2.6223) between their valuing of drastic measures to
insure economic equity, and their valuing of individual human rights and political freedoms.

It was my judgment, based on this free probing, that they themselves were
unclear or undecided with respect to the equity-freedom trade-off. Regarding the second question,
an examination of the Biographical Sketches (2.52) revealed that every such advocate was a social
scientist (though the converse was far from true). This type of deviant case analysis can, I believe,
often improve the quality and credibility of the overall analytical effort.

It is worth a brief digression to note that ER is inherently capable of carrying out considerably less
of this kind of analysis of dis sensus than could typically-be carried out by a sociological survey
approach, for the obvious reasons that in EFR the biographical data are sparse and not highly
structured, and samples are small. That is, if the Biographical Sketch had included 30 or 40 items
with respect to the biographical background of a considerably larger sample of interviewees, it
would have been possible to do a much more sensitive analysis of cognitive or evaluative positions,
by biographical background variables. What we confront here is simply a built-in limitation of
EFR, and indeed of most ethnographic approaches. It may well be that EFR could and should lead,
in many cases, to some kind of follow-up research of a survey nature which would afford this richer
analytical opportunity, and others like it, and indeed I am contemplating various efforts in this
direction (5.22).

3.4 THE PROCEDURE OF INTERPRETATION

Just as generalization intergrades with analysis, so analysis intergrades with interpretation. The
essential difference between the two is that analysis concentrates upon what is inside the corpus of
protocols, while interpretation brings to bear everything else, beyond the protocols, that the
researcher knows about the culture and problem under study. Thus, my interpretation of the
Thailand protocols attempts to tell – the reader what I think the descriptive patterns and analyses
mean, in terms of what I otherwise know, or think I know, about Thai culture, Thai history, Thai
politics, Thai international relations, Thai economic development patterns, and the like.

The context of interpretation is not, however, limited just to what else is known about the unique or
peculiar qualities of the particular culture under study. The context also includes what is known
about that culture in a broader comparative and theoretical way. In proceeding with my
interpretation of the Thailand material, for example, I tried to be alert to various attributes of the
Thai extant culture as a type of culture, contrastable with other types. Since Thai culture and
society can be characterized as a peasant-based, mixed capitalist, "development-oriented" system,
interpretation of the corpus of protocols can readily draw upon various theories of modernization.
The growth-equity and freedom-equity trade-offs noted in 3.34 are immediately suggested to the
modernization theorist, since modernization theory stresses these trade-offs.

As EER is applied to various cultures by researchers with varying degrees of previous background
on the culture they are studying, it will become increasingly clear ki important it is to have such a
background before undertaking an EFR study. I urge anyone attempting to teach himself how to do
ER to start, if at all possible, by examining alternative futures for a culture he already knows
something about. This is another way of saying that the most appropriate way to regard EFR is as a
supplement to, rather than a substitute for, standard ethnographic and other social science approaches (6.23). Another aspect of interpretation is what might be referred to as "diagnosis."

Interviewees enculturated in a particular culture or subculture may tend to take certain characteristic positions, or tend to approach the future with a certain characteristic style, etc. If the researcher is concerned with attempting to diagnose these cultural peculiarities with a view to identifying biases, "blind spots," or educational needs, a corpus of EFR protocols might serve as a reasonable data base, at least initially. This diagnostic aspect of interpretation is further discussed in 7.2.

Another aspect of interpretation that is likely to become more important and useful has to do with comparing and contrasting the way interviewees enculturated in by Culture A, as opposed to Culture B, "handle" the future. My students have so far interviewed intellectuals and professionals from Brazil, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, Venezuela, and West Germany -- and even though their samples have been small, the results suggest quite strongly that there are striking differences in the ways these different cultural groups approach the future: differences in their readiness to entertain broadly or narrowly varying possibilities, in their average level of confidence that the future can be managed, and so on. Some of these differences reflect real differences in national situation, resource base, and the like, of course. But other differences cannot be explained, I feel, without reference to the differing enculturation processes through which the different groups have come.

A final comment on interpretation is in order. One of the somewhat unusual aspects of EFR is that it will often be used with samples that include interviewees who are intellectuals end/or experts in various relevant subject matter areas. During the interview, some of these interviewees might volunteer their own notions as to what a given trend or projection means, or could mean, or would mean, in cultural or theoretical terms. For example, in the Thailand Sample, my interviewees included some who knew at least as much as I, and probably more, about such subjects as Thai cultural history and patterns of change, or about theories of economic development or political modernization. While of course the final responsibility for sound interpretation must rest upon the shoulders of the researcher, nonetheless this source of interpretive assistance can be an important asset.

3.5 THE "ENIC" AND "ETTC" PERSPECTIVES -

Throughout the process of conclusion formation, the ethnographer bears in mind the two fundamental perspectives of ethnography, namely the "emic" and the "etic." For the benefit of the non-anthropologist reader, and with some oversimplification, we may call the emic perspective that of the native, and the etic perspective that of the outsider, the comparativist. These terms were coined by Pike, who explained them thus: In contrast to the Etic approach, an Emic one is in essence valid for only one language (or one culture) at a time....It is an attempt to discover and to describe the pattern of that particular language or culture in reference to the way in which the various elements of that culture are related to each other in the functioning of the particular pattern, rather than an attempt to describe them in reference to a generalized classification derived in advance of the study of that culture. (154: 8).
The implications of the emic-etic distinction are quite profound, and the reader who wishes to pursue them further is referred to Pelto and Pelto (1978: 54-66) and the references they cite. Suffice to say here that good’ ethnography requires the constant and judicious use of both perspectives, and so, in my view, does good EFR. In EFR, the ethnographer’s sensitivity to the emic perspective would appear to be especially important in pattern delineation, since this subprocess involves the writing up of summaries of patterns or regularities that appear in scenarized future cultures, and in some cases and to some extent the ethnographer will express these regularities in the terms that the interviewees themselves use. The delineation of such patterns in scenarized future cultures leads naturally to a consideration of the similarities and differences between such scenarized patterns, and the patterns that the researcher perceives as existent in the extant culture - and again, such extant patterns will in some cases be discerned and expressed in terms that these interviewees, or other informants in conventional ethnographic research on the same culture, have used. As the process of conclusion formation moves toward an emphasis upon analysis, the etic perspective will take on greater importance, since analysis tends to imply comparison among cultures And as conclusion formation moves further, toward an emphasis upon interpretation, there will be some tendency to relate the described-and-analyzed materials to both what else the researcher knows about the extant culture (including his emically-formulated knowledge) and what he knows about theory. However, it would be misleading to separate these three subprocesses of conclusion formation too sharply, and it is important to emphasize that in all three subprocesses the emic and etic perspectives should be kept in mind, and related to each other.

3.6 WRITE-UP OF THE PENULTIMATE DRAFT

After the Second Sample of interviews has been completed, the conclusion formation procedure calls for a rigorous inspection of the protocols resulting therefrom, with a view to discarding, altering, or or retaining the pattern delineations, analyses, and interpretations tentatively advanced in the First Draft This Draft is now revised, and becomes the Second Draft, which will normally be a more confidently and persuasively written document, more penetrating in its analysis and more resourceful in its interpretation. It is now time to decide whether you need to interview a Third Sample and write a Third Draft, and so forth. When you reach a point at which you decide that no further interviewing is needed, the draft then in hand is your Penultimate Draft.

3.61 SOLICITING FEEDBACK FROM A SUBSAMPLE OF INTERVIEWEES

Once the Penultimate Draft is written, I recommend that you then draw a small purposive subsample of your total sample (First Sample plus subsequent samples) of interviewees, and ask them to check the Penultimate Draft for balance, cogency, logic, and persuasiveness. In the Thailand Study, I selected about five interviewees for this purpose, being sure to include at least one woman, at least one social scientist, at least one natural scientist, at least one interviewee who favored social transformation as distinct from reform, etc., and spoke to each of them prior to asking for their assent in checking over the Penultimate Draft. I explained that I wanted their comments and criticisms as frankly as possible, and that I would be attentive to each and every criticism. I was pleased to note that almost all of them did convey their responses, and that these responses were conscientious and thorough -- yet on the whole highly supportive of the descriptions, analyses, and interpretations that appeared in the Penultimate Draft. In fact, no important substantive changes were recommended by any of these critic-readers, though a number
of suggestions with respect to presentational style were made, and I was able to accept and incorporate every one of these.

Of course, there was one important limitation on the ability of these critics to contribute at this point, namely that the critics had not, and under the circumstances could not have, read the protocols themselves.

Thus, they did not have access to the same detailed data base to which I had access. Of course this was unfortunate, but under the circumstances - it was unavoidable, for to have let these critic-readers examine the raw protocols would have violated the spirit, if not the letter, of my pledge to maintain absolute confidentiality. Even though the protocols were - rigorously anonymized (2.21, 2.741), there was always a chance that a critic-reader would have thought that he recognized a particular interviewee by the content of the latter's remarks -- or that the latter might hear - rumors that would lead him to fear or suspect that this had happened, etc., etc. -- and I was not about to take this risk. In other situations, however, with adequate planning it is possible to avoid this problem. Indeed, there are a number of rich alternatives available to the researcher who works with interviewees who are willing to share each other's protocols, as is discussed in 7.11 and 7.31, and exemplified in Appendix Five.

3.62 USE OF THE CONFERENCE TECHNIQUE

The conference technique involves the conduct of a conference of interviewees after the Penultimate Draft has been written. The researcher attends this conference as an observer, or, if SD invited, as a resource person and/or moderator. The researcher takes extensive notes on the interaction and discussion at the conference, and utilizes insights thus developed to further analyze and interpret the material in the Penultimate Draft. In the case of the Thailand Study, three such conferences occurred as a direct (and spontaneous) result of the fact that the organizers of the conferences had been given EFR interviews. I attended each such conference as an invited guest, and each experience helped me in improving and editing my Penultimate Draft. The conference technique is discussed further in 7.1.
CHAPTER FOUR: SAMPLING CONSIDERATIONS AND PROCEDURES

In Chapter Two we looked at the individual interview, and considered procedures for the appropriate and reliable summarization of that interview. The end-product of such summarization is the interview protocol.

In Chapter Three we widened our view, looked at an entire corpus of protocols, and considered procedures for the formation of appropriate and reliable conclusions that apply more or less uniformly across those protocols. These conclusions take the form of broad descriptive patterns; analyses in terms of basic cognitive frameworks, cognitive propositions, evaluative propositions, or value trade-offs; or interpretations.

In this chapter we widen our vied further, look at the nature of our sample of interviewees, and consider the extent to which we are entitled to generalize the conclusions developed from the corpus of protocols resulting from interviews with this sample, to a specified larger population of people from which our sample has been drawn. In this chapter, I seek to incorporate into the EFR methodology a set of sampling principles and procedures that will insure that the results of an EFR study will be as representative as possible of the results that would have been obtained if it had been possible to interview all members of the total population from which the sample was drawn.

4.1 THE "100% SAMPLE" STRATEGY

The most straightforward strategy for insuring representativeness is, of course, the taking of a 100% sample, in which case the sample is identical with the population. Fortunately, in EFR it quite often can happen that a snail enough category of people can be defined as the total population, so that it is logistically and financially feasible for you, with or even without collaborators, to interview that population in its entirety. Examples of such 100% samples might be all members of the City Council of Palo Alto, California, all members of the Shop Stewards Council of Guadalajara, all tenured faculty members of the tokyo University Faculty of Education, all cabinet members of the Republic of Tanzania; all members of the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation, etc. Wherever the situation permits you to take a 100% sample, you will have the luxury of feeling confident that the patterns you delineate, the analyses you make, and the interpretations you render, based upon a complete set of protocols, apply to all members of the population unambiguously. You need not worry about making allowances for sampling bias or sampling error. Both you and your readers may thus repose more confidence in the final research report.

In numerous other instances, however, the EFR researcher will find it impossible or unnecessary to design his research in such a way as to take a 100% sample, which is why this chapter is needed. In proceeding with my discussion of sampling, I shall make no pretense whatever to technical expertise in the field of sampling statistics, but will limit myself to illustrating the essential spirit of what I consider to be appropriate procedures for an EFR project, by showing how I would set up the sample for a hypothetical study of Thai university professors. I shall not attempt to provide a complete or elaborate rationale, much less to deal with the technical aspects of statistical inference. If you wish to pursue these more technical problems further, you should consult the literature on
sampling If you are then still left with doubts as to how to proceed, you are urged to consult a competent statistician

4.2 THE DESIRABILITY OF A PROBABILITY SAMPLE

Where it is not possible to draw a 100% sample, the sample that is drawn should, if at all possible, be a probability sample, that is, one in which each member of a specified population has a known probability of being selected. This is well illustrated by the case of my 1977 Thailand Study. At that time, I was still in the process of developing the basic approach of EFR. I had my hands full conceptualizing and experimenting with procedures for interviewing, summarizing, delineating descriptive patterns, analyzing, and interpreting. In order not to complicate matters further, I opted for the convenience of drawing a "judgmental" and "opportunity" sample of Thai intellectuals available in the San Francisco Bay Area at that time.

Given the prior need to develop these internal aspects of EFR, this decision was, I think, appropriate. However, I am left with the problem that I have no objective basis for inferring or stating the extent to which these 25 interviewees represent all Thai intellectuals then available in the Bay Area, much less all Thai intellectuals in the U.S. at that time, and still much less all Thai intellectuals at that time, regardless of residence. While I do, as a matter of personal judgment, believe that the sample is not unrepresentative of Thai intellectuals available in the Bay Area at that time (subject to certain further qualifications), the design of this research project gives me no objective or rigorous grounds whatever for claiming that this judgment is correct.

As matters stand, I do not have the right, technically speaking, to attribute my findings to any category of people except those in the sample itself. While such a predicament is hardly unusual for ethnographers, it is certainly to be avoided if possible, and the way to avoid it is to use a probability sample, as I shall attempt to illustrate below.[4•1]

4.3 DEFINITION OF THE POPULATION

The first step toward constructing a proper sample is to define clearly the population from which the sample is to be drawn. In our hypothetical example, let us assume that the population of university professors is defined as "all regular, full-time, ethnically Thai professors at University X". Let us assume that University X is the largest, most diversified university in Thailand. Even though I would have liked to define my sample as "all regular full-time Thai professors at all universities in Thailand," let us suppose that for logistical and financial reasons I have decided to treat the professors at University X as a not unreasonable proxy for all Thai university professors, and that I have a satisfactory sociocultural rationale for doing so. Let us further suppose that the Thai tradition and administrative system are such that individuals can be unambiguously classified as belonging to, or not belonging to, this population.

4.4 ENUMERATION OF THE POPULATION

My next step is to obtain from the cognizant authorities a complete list of all regular full-time professors at University X, by rank, title, faculty, and department. Let us suppose that no difficulties are encountered in identifying expatriate or other non-Thai professors at University X, these are
then excluded from the enumeration list. I then check this list further, and confer with the relevant authorities as needed, in order to remove any other ambiguities, and to insure completeness.

4.5 DEFINITION OF STRATA AND CATEGORIES

The next task is to define the strata that will structure the sampling, and the categories that will facilitate the temporal ordering of the interviews, in the most productive fashion.

Let us assume that the status structure of Thai universities is such that, culturally speaking, certain ranks are clearly "senior," and others clearly "junior." Almost all "senior" rank-holders are over 45, let us say, and almost all "junior" rank-holders are younger. (If this proves not to be the case, then the actual age of the individual can be used instead, and culturally appropriate cut-off criteria established.) Let us assume that I have decided, on the basis of experience to date, that it usually matters considerably whether an individual is under 45 or over, in terms of how he or she perceives and preferentializes alternative futures -- with greater variability and imagination usually found among the juniors, and greater insistence on practicality and plausible causal process usually found among the seniors. I therefore decide to stratify the population into a "junior" and a "senior" stratum.

Experience to date further suggests strongly that a professor's discipline also has a great deal to do with the way he or she perceives and preferentializes alternative futures. A discipline is, after all, a kind of subculture, and it is not unreasonable to assume that such a subculture affects a person's world view and imaging style. I therefore decide to use a professor's faculty and department as the basis for arraying the names of all the professors prior to drawing my actual sample.

4.6 THE SAMPLING FRAME AND INTERVIEWING ORDER

Let us assume that University X has 720 regular full-time ethnically Thai professors, of whom 360 are "junior" and 360 are "senior." Let us also assume that I have reached an agreement with a Thai social scientist, Dr. Prasoed, that we will work together as co-investigators. We have decided that we will study matched samples in a somewhat autonomous manner, to see whether and how my American enculturation and his Thai enculturation will affect the results we produce. We need, then, to draw two samples that will be matched as to junior-senior characteristics, and also as to the disciplines represented.

First, Dr. Prasoed and I separate the 360 junior professors from the 360 senior professors. Then, we randomly order the faculties by drawing lots. Let us suppose that the order that emerges is Medicine, Humanities, Agriculture, Natural Sciences and Mathematics, Education, Engineering, Social Sciences, and Business. Next, we randomly order the departments within each faculty, again by drawing lots. In the case of the Faculty of Social Sciences, for example, let us suppose that the order that emerges is Sociology, Political Science, Linguistics, Economics, Communication, Anthropology, and Psychology. These random orders of faculties and departments will be the same for the Junior Stratum and the Senior Stratum.

Now Dr. Prasoed and I randomly order the professors within each department. Suppose, for example, that in the Junior Stratum there are 11 professors of sociology. These 11 names will be
ordered randomly. In the Senior Stratum there are 15 professors of sociology, these, too, will be ordered randomly. And so forth.

So far, then, we have now completed our enumerating and our ordering. We now have two lists, a Junior Stratum List and a Senior Stratum List. Each of the two lists has 360 names. Within each list, the faculties and departments are arrayed in exactly the same order, which has been determined randomly. On both lists, the individual names that appear within each department are ordered randomly.

Since Dr. Prasoed and I plan to work quasi-autonomously and later compare results, we now need to create a list of names for him, and a parallel one for me. By lot, we determine that he will get the odd-numbered names on each of our two lists, and I will get the even-numbered names.

He therefore gets the names numbered 1, 3, 5, and so forth up to 719, and I get the names numbered 2, 4, 6, and so forth up to 720.

Now, for simplicity's sake, suppose that Dr. Prasoed takes his 360 names and re-numbers them consecutively from 1 to 360, so that there are no gaps in numbering. I do the same. Then, each of us will mark brackets on his list indicating each faculty and, within faculty, each department.

Dr. Prasoed and I decide, on the basis of past experience plus a consideration of the immediate situation, that each of us will draw a 10% sample. Each of us now has a randomly-determined list of 360 names from which to draw this sample.

By lot, we determine a number between 1 and 10 to serve as our starting point for systematic sampling. Let us say that this number turns out to be 7. This means that Dr. Prasoed's Junior Sample consists of professors numbered 7, 17, 27, and so forth, up to 177, and his Senior Sample consists of professors numbered 187, 197, 207, and so forth, up to 357. This gives Dr. Prasoed 18 junior and 18 senior professors. My sample is exactly matched.

Dr. Prasoed and I agree that we will work closely enough together to achieve comparability of results, but autonomously enough so that he can make his own decisions as to how to proceed and how to reach conclusions, and I can make mine. Let us suppose that he and I agree that we will not be consulting on research strategy -- or will consult only minimally -- until each of us has had a chance to interview 18 professors and write a First Draft (3.22). In order to achieve comparability of results, we agree that our first 18 interviews will be with professors numbered 7, 27, 47, and so forth -- up to 347 -- that is, with every other professor in the sampling order. The purpose of this arrangement is to insure that each of us interviews nine junior and nine senior professors, and that the full gamut of disciplinary orientations is traversed.

We further agree that in drawing our Second Sample (3.23) we will each interview nine additional professors, and that these nine will be similarly numbered in such a way as to spread across the gamut once again. Let us assume that we determine, by lot, that the Second Sample will consist, in his case and in mine, of professors numbered 17, 57, 97, 137, 177, 217, 257, 297, and 337. And, if a Third Sample should be needed, it will consist of the remaining nine professors in the sample, namely professors numbered 37, 77, 117, 157, 197, 237, 277, 317, and 357.
Dr. Prasoed and I have now established our sampling frame. Each of us has a uniquely identified First, Second, and Third Sample, and Dr. Prasoed's frame is totally parallel with nine. All of this has been done on a totally probabilistic basis. And if it should turn out that more than a Third Sample is needed -- which would seem quite unlikely -- the same principles and procedures can be used once again.

4.61 THE INTERVIEWING ORDER

So far, nothing has been said about the order of interviewing those individuals who have fallen into our samples. One procedure would be simply to follow the numerical order, starting with 7, then 27, then 47, and so forth. However, it is most unlikely that Dr. Prasoed and I would commit ourselves in advance to any such rigid order, for such a commitment would vitiate the general ethnographic principle that, all else equal, one should cast the widest possible net early, and then gradually identify and more closely examine variables which are more and more clearly seen to be common or crucial. Consequently, in starting out, Dr. Prasoed and I are seeking the maximum diversity first, and attempting to gain, as soon as possible, an awareness of the full range of domains, subjects, and ideas that our interviewees wish to deal with spontaneously. Thus, it would make no sense to "finish up" the senior professors first, or the engineering professors first, etc. Rather, all else equal, both of us will choose our early interviewees so as to mix seniors with juniors, humanists with engineers, and so on.

Another advantage of a sampling frame that permits full freedom for the interviewer to choose the order in which he will interview designated interviewees, is that it enables him to devise tactics designed to minimize contamination, that is, bias that would occur if Interviewee A were to tell Interviewee B, before the latter is interviewed, about what the interview covers, and how A dealt with it. Contamination is always a potential problem that the researcher should consider, whenever he is interviewing a sample of interviewees drawn from a population of people who are in frequent communication with each other. This is dealt with in Note 4.2.

For these reasons, Dr. Prasoed and I agree that, as long as each of us stays within the formally-drawn First Sample of 18 names, the order in which each of us interviews his 18 professors is entirely up to our judgment, as well as to the vicissitudes as to which of the 18 professors is available when. As long as these 18 individuals (or their pre-determined substitutes, as we shall see in the next sub-section), are interviewed, the particular order in which they are interviewed does not matter, as far as the integrity of the probability sample is concerned.

4.62 SUBSTITUTIONS FOR UNAVAILABLE INTERVIEWEES:

We face now the problem of finding substitutes for professors whose names fall into the sample, but who prove to be unavailable due to absence, illness, or whatever; or who prove to be unwilling to be interviewed for whatever reason; or who prove to be otherwise uninterviewable. The substitution rule is that I must now take the next professor on my list. Thus, if my first interviewee was supposed to be Professor 17 but he proves to be unavailable, I must now take Professor 18. If 18 is not available, I must take 19. And so on. This rule insures that the substitute will be from the same discipline as the unavailable selectee (except in the event that the latter was the last member of his department on my list — but this event will occur randomly, and thus will cause no problem
from a sampling point of view.) Rigid adherence to this rule insures against availability bias, as well as possible subjective selection bias on my part.

4.7 POSSIBLE VARIATIONS AND ADAPTATIONS

The example given above is one of many ways to proceed with sampling for an EFR study. Depending on the logical requirements of a particular research design, the shape and character of a particular population, and various logistical and financial constraints, there are any number of variations and adaptations that might legitimately be made. These variations and adaptations might be in substitution for the kind of approach outlined above, or in supplementation of it. In this section, an example of adaptation will be given, followed by an example of variation. Clearly, many other possibilities might also be mentioned, but these will perhaps serve as useful illustrations.

Before proceeding, it might be useful to restate two basic features of the research design presented in our hypothetical example, namely that the design is based on random principles, and that it is proportional. The randomness derives from selection by lot at every step of the design, and the proportionality derives from the fact that the sample is systematic, and designed to select every n-th member of the population. This means that the representation of each faculty and each department will be approximately proportional to its strength in the total population.

4.71 SUPPLEMENTARY PURPOSIVE SAMPLING

Under some conditions, it might be advisable to supplement the above-described stratified-systematic-random design with the use of a certain amount of non-random, purposive sampling. Let us suppose, for example, that after all members of the regular sample at University X had been interviewed, and after the First Draft (3.22) and other drafts (3.23) had been written, it turns out that I find myself regretting the fact that, due to the vagaries of the draw, three or four professors widely known to be unusually seminal thinkers had failed to fall into my sample -- which would hardly be surprising, considering the smallness of the sampling fraction. In such an event, I would not consider it inappropriate, at this stage, to interview these seminal thinkers -- especially if, in my judgment, they possess expert knowledge in areas that I now deem important for interpretive (3.4), as distinct from descriptive pattern delineation (3.2), purposes. I would not, however, consider myself in any way obligated to interview such additional persons.

4.72 DIFFERENT SAMPLING FRAC7TONS FDR DIFFERENT SUB-SAMPLES:

A word should be added about the question of sampling fractions and proportionality. Suppose now that Dr. Prasoed's and my initial purpose is different. Suppose that we want, from the beginning, to study both university X and the Y Institute of Technology, and to compare shared perceptions and preferences found at X with those found at Y. One of the first questions we ask is whether we can expect equal variability of responses from the two universities. We then take note of the fact that University X has eight separate faculties, each with several departments, while Y Institute has no separate faculties, and only six departments, all in engineering, namely: aeronautical, chemical, civil, electrical, industrial, and mechanical. This prima facie lower variability at Y would probably lead Dr. Prasoed and me to decide that, initially at least, we would take a smaller sample than 1 in 10 -- perhaps 1 in 20. Of course, if our expectation is upset and we discover what we consider to be
as much variability of perception and preference at Y as we earlier did at X, we always have the flexibility of enlarging the sampling fraction later, using stratified-systematic-random procedures of the type discussed above.

The essential point made here is simply that the sampling fraction depends on one's assumptions as to the degree of variability of response that one is likely to find, and this depends on the degree of subcultural, experiential, educational, or other relevant variability of the population under study. For example, the sampling fraction to be used in a Thai agricultural village might be considerably smaller than that used at Y Institute.

4.8 SUMMARY

Much more could be said about the various technical aspects of sampling, and about project administration. However, this brief presentation will perhaps suffice to indicate the general approach I favor. It is an approach that (1) randomizes and rigorizes selection of the sample, (2) systematically guarantees that the full gamut of subcultures or types of world view is represented; and (3) utilizes appropriate proportionality; while (4) permitting the use of judgment on the part of the researcher as to the order of interviewing, so that he can move from broad exploration of the full range of responses to a more careful focus on particular domains and subjects. The presentation has, finally, illustrated how EFR can be used cooperatively and interculturally, in such a fashion as to rigorize the study of how the differing enculturative backgrounds of two or more researchers can produce different -- or similar -- research results.[4.3]
CHAPTER FIVE: THE ARTICULATION OF E.F.R. WITH OTHER FUTURES RESEARCH METHODS

EFR, like its parent, conventional ethnography, is an inherently flexible research approach -- more so than most. Because of this flexibility, EFR is, I believe, rather readily adaptable for use jointly with other FR methods in the same research project. This chapter will explore a few types of situation in which the coupling of EFR with another method would seem possible, and likely to produce a research product superior to that which could be expected if either method were used alone -- superior in the sense that the product would be more comprehensive, plausible, reliable, precise, and/or useable. These explorations will necessarily be tentative and conjectural since, with only one exception known to me, these joint uses have not yet been tried in practice.

By the "joint" use of EFR with another FR method, I mean that EFR is used first, and then Method X; or vice versa. I do not have in mind any kind of blending of EFR with Method X into some new kind of hybrid Method Y. If such hybridization ever occurs, it will most likely occur only after the type of adjunctive use considered in this chapter has first been tried.

The spirit of inter-method comparison and cooperation in which this chapter is written is, by the way, very much in keeping with current methodological thinking in FR, as summarized in the Handbook of Futures Research, the methodological chapters of which provide a comprehensive and useful summarization of the state of this art (Fowles 1978: 141-448).

One notes in this compendium that author after author points to the limitations of any single method, and to the need for the use of more than one method to plumb the complex subject matter of Futures Research. This chapter will be loosely guided by Fowles' classification of research methods, though will make no effort to be exhaustive in its coverage.

5.1 APPROACHES WITH WHICH E.F.R. SHOULD NOT BE COUPLED

Perhaps the simplest way of starting our exploration is to indicate briefly some of the types of research methods with which EFR cannot, or should not, be coupled. The strengths of EFR are that it promotes a certain boldness and spontaneity of spirit, a searching breadth of scope, and an emphasis upon examining holistic interconnectedness among environmental, social, and cultural variables. The researcher whose method already possesses these advantages probably will not need to couple that method with EFR. And the researcher whose method lacks these advantages but who judges that he does not need them, also probably will not wish to consider coupling his method with EFR.

EFR, like conventional ethnography, is as oriented to discovering what the problem is --what the key questions are, that ought to be asked -- as it is to ascertaining answers. The researcher who has already clearly and firmly decided what his problem and his questions are, and what his guiding model is, and who is reasonably satisfied that he already has an adequate understanding of the context surrounding his problem, probably will not wish to consider coupling his method with EFR. Researchers in this category are bound to be quite numerous.
EFR is intended to accommodate those researchers who formulate problems in terms of systems - especially cultural and ecological systems, and in terms of "systems of systems." For some researchers, this systemic emphasis might not be congenial.

EFR is also characterized, at bottom, by a definite qualitative bias. While there is no reason why the EER format cannot be used to elicit S's quantitatively conceived responses as well - and indeed almost any scenario is bound to contain some quantitative forecasts -- nonetheless the researcher whose interests are primarily quantitative and who is not interested in learning more about the qualitative context of his quantitative analysis, will probably not see much advantage in coupling his approach with EFR. Such researchers are very numerous. An example would be a market forecaster who is focally concerned with possible and probable future cost, price, and profit figures, and who, for whatever reasons, is prepared to assume that his understanding of the contextual variables - ecological, sociocultural, etc. - is already adequate.

The above list is far from complete, but is perhaps sufficient for illustrative purposes. One final observation should, however, be made, namely that the researcher who does not think he needs an adjunct research project involving EFR or something like it, might, in some cases, be wrong. Much of the value of EFR and similar broad approaches lies, I believe, in helping to insure that the right questions are being asked, and all of the right questions, at least the major ones. It is conceivable that a researcher with a tight model and a rigid research instrument might become the victim of his own premature closure, and pursue too narrow a range of questions - only later, perhaps even years later, to discover that he has made a mistake. Perhaps, in some instances, EFR could help avoid such mistakes.

5.2 APPROACHES WITH WHICH E.F.R. MIGHT EFFECTIVELY BE COUPLED

In asking the question of whether EFR would make a useful adjunct to another Futures Research approach, one point to consider is that EFR elicits both cognitive and evaluative positions. Some other FR methods are so designed, or at any rate so used in customary practice, that they are more or less limited to the cognitive and the expectational. In such an instance, the researcher might find EFR useful as an adjunct that will carry him beyond the ascertainment of what people believe or expect, to a discovery in depth of what they want, or want most -- or of how much of a disvalued outcome they are willing to tolerate.

Not only is the scope of coverage of an EFR interview relatively broad, but so is the range of possible participants. Although EFR is certainly not just conversation, it is conducted in a conversation-like ambience -- and conversation is an accepted and relatively non-threatening way to spend time in, presumably, any culture. I can thus visualize conducting a successful EFR interview, properly adapted, with a taxi-driver in Sao Paulo, a rug merchant in Cairo, or an elementary teacher in Burma -- all of whom would, for example, probably find a request to fill out a Delphi questionnaire quite overwhelming.

Unlike most other Futures Research methods, then, EFR does not suffer from the limitation that it must be used only with sophisticates or experts. True, a viable EFR project can (and sometimes should) be designed so that its sample of interviewees consists only of experts, but other projects might call for samples of non-experts, or mixed samples. If the sample is mixed, one may normally
expect that the forecasts of the experts in their areas of expertise will be more precise and more self-assured. Whether such forecasts will prove to be more useful, however, is a separate question, on which the overall research results ought to shed some light. In some instances, the experts' forecasts might turn out to be naively narrow and undercontextualized, or technocratically opinionated and divorced from broader questions concerning the quality of life that non-experts prefer, etc.

5.21 E.F.R. AND SCENARIO-WRITING

The fundamental building block of the EFR method is, of course, the scenario. Each S provides three of these, which become the raw material of protocols, which in turn become the raw material from which the final research product is produced. And this research product itself is often construed in the form of composite scenarios (3.221).

In the short history of organized Futures Research, the scenario has enjoyed a comparatively long and honored career. Wilson eloquently stakes the claim for what he terms "scenarios" (here referred to as "scenario-writing" to distinguish Wilson's type of approach from EFR) when he points out that: Scenarios are (or should be) multifaceted and holistic in their approach to the future. In the early days of futures research, and still to a great extent in the popular literature, it is the isolated event, the specific prediction, that rivets attention . . . However, history is a 'booming, buzzing confusion' of events, trends, and discontinuities; it is constantly in motion and so is more accurately represented by a motion picture than by a snapshot. Scenarios have a special ability to represent this multi-faceted, interacting flow process, combining (when appropriate) demographic changes, social trends, political events, economic variables, and technological developments" (1978: 227).

Wilson illustrates the numerous advantages of scenario-writing with an example of its utility to the General Electric Company, for which he works. He concludes:

Scenarios . . . can be disciplined explorations of the future, forcing the writer to Spell out the full range of underlying assumptions in the forecast, and encouraging a needed holism . . . All in all, they may be both the most demanding and the most rewarding of any futures methodology.

Though Wilson's case for scenario-writing is, in my view, cogently persuasive, one notes that it is silent on the question of who does the writing, on the basis of what data inputs. One is left to infer that the scenario-writer is probably a single expert, and that the data inputs might be largely company reports, files, and archives, plus personal knowledge about the company acquired by the expert through the years. If this were to be the case, one could still argue that such an expert, so informed, could assemble useful and stimulating scenarios - for there is no denying that the writing of understandable, credible, useful, and stimulating scenarios is indeed an important and uncommon skill, nor is there any denying that one person, through time, can develop deep understanding of the realities and potentialities of an organization or community.

Granting all of the above, however, I would further argue that there might be circumstances in which this sort of scenario-writing project could be broadened and enriched if combined with an EFR component, while at the same time in no way usurping the role of the scenario-writer himself. A company as large as General Electric, after all, has a greater annual cash flow than many
independent nations, and is characterized by enormous social and technological complexity. Scenarios about the company's future would, I think, be richer and more relevant to the organization's total experience and potential if there were a preliminary EFR component, with a sample stratified in accordance with the company's main operating and planning units, designed to reach sufficiently below top management so that some junior administrators and scientists would be tapped, who might prove to be less completely socialized to company norms, and less likely to accept the type of "conventional wisdom" that might tend to characterize the content of the company's reports, files, and archives.

A few members of the sample might also be trained as EFR interviewers, and assist the scenario-writer with the tasks of interviewing, protocol-editing, pattern delineation, analysis, interpretation, and generalization -- all of which would, I think, serve to contextualize and enrich the final scenarios that are generated.

When we shift our consideration from a corporation to a community or nation, the argument for a more participatory approach takes on added cogency. The development of scenarios for my state of California, for example, is not something that I would comfortably leave solely to scenario-writing experts, or to professional planners. Clearly, a more democratic approach is preferable, simply because more of people's fundamental rights are involved. I suspect that experts such as Wilson would readily agree.

This more participatory approach might also increase the ultimate heuristic and educational impact of the final product (7.5), for it seems clear that people are more likely to be educated in discussions based on a set of scenarios, when they themselves have earlier inputted ideas that have been used to build those scenarios, and can hence identify, to some extent, with one or more of the scenarios that finally emerge.

5.22 E.F.R. AND THE SURVEY METHOD

In my view, the use of the survey method in Futures Research holds great promise, and two ways will be presented in which E.F.R. could be used adjunctively with the survey method, to improve the final research product.

It is best to start by looking briefly at conventional anthropological fieldwork, and examining how it sometimes combines ethnography with survey research. In such fieldwork, the ethnographic component is typically carried out first (largely or entirely) and is also typically much more basic to the success of the total project, than is the survey component. In Futures Research as well, it would seem that the EFR component will also typically precede the survey component, but whether one component or the other will be more basic or important will, I think, depend on the nature and purposes of the particular research project. I can imagine projects that are basically ethnographic, and which use the survey component only to check a few key variables through interviewing a larger sample drawn from the same population. I can just as readily imagine projects that are basically survey in nature, but which use an EFR-style component as a means of developing a better survey instrument and doing a better job of interpreting the data that that instrument produces.
When a conventional anthropological fieldwork project combines the two approaches, the researcher typically spends many months doing ethnographic inquiry, especially interviewing key informants, in order to establish the general patterning of the culture, and many of the more specific cultural rules that condition people's decisions as to how to behave under particular circumstances (1.13). The fact that there are cultural norms or rules does not, however, necessarily mean that all of the people follow them, or follow them in the same way. Thus, the anthropologist is interested not only in the cultural commonalities, but also in the individual variations, especially since these variations will give him hints as to how the cultural norms and rules are likely to change in the future. But the anthropologist cannot gain an adequate grasp of these variations, exceptions, deviations, etc., simply by interviewing his key informants in depth, for the latter do not, usually, have reliable answers to such questions. What the anthropologist can do with informants, however, is to identify types of variation, and then refine his understanding of the types and categories of variability, and of their analytical and interpretive implications, to the point where he is now able to ask questions on a survey instrument that will secure the information he needs about variability with respect to this or that subject, more effectively and precisely. At some point, he weighs the importance of all these various areas of variability, and makes a decision as to whether it would be a prudent use of his time and resources to do a survey on selected areas of variability. If so, he proceeds to incorporate the necessary questions into an interview schedule, draw a proper sample of members of the population under study, and carry out the necessary survey research.(5.11

There can be, then, in conventional anthropological fieldwork, - a dynamic and mutually helpful interplay between ethnography and survey research. Ethnography is used both (1) to identify and refine questions to be asked by means of a systematic survey, and (2) to enrich the investigator's broad holistic and contextual understanding of the entire problem area, so that after the survey data have been gathered and analyzed, he will be better capable of interpreting these data. The survey results, - for their part, will provide a kind of concreteness, thoroughness, specificity, precision, and reliability that will serve as a rigorous check on possible excessive or faulty generalization from purely ethnographic data.

In Futures Research, the interplay between these two types of research ought to be, if anything, even more productive. This is because the results of most EFR studies will probably be less culturally patterned than the results of most conventional ethnographic studies, for the reason that in EFR one is discussing with the interviewee various possible cultures that could exist, while in conventional ethnography one is discussing with the informant the culture that (in some ontological sense) does exist. The basic orientation of EFR is upon conceivable possibility and relative probability, while that of conventional ethnography is, ideally at least, upon existing actuality. For this reason there will, clearly, be more variability in the data produced by the EFR study. A related point is that, as discussed in Note 2.2, in EFR one deals not with an informant, but with an interviewee, whose task is explicitly limited to explaining what he alone expects and values (as distinct from explaining also what he perceives others to expect and value). The fact that the EFR interviewee is "on his own," and not constrained by a duty to report also what he perceives others to believe and value, is a factor that further contributes to variation in response. While it is still true that much of what is included in the EFR protocols can properly be interpreted in terms of cultural norms and rules -- and indeed I am struck by the extent to which this is true -- nonetheless it is also true that the variation in response is also considerable. This fact makes the checking of variability
by means of the survey method a natural form of follow-up research, which merits a few additional comments.

5.221 IDENTIFYING AND REFINING SURVEY ITEMS: Especially in those cases where the survey researcher is interviewing members of a culture or subculture that is strange to him, it seems likely that the use of EFR as the first stage will enable him to identify a number of variables that might - not otherwise have occurred to him at all, or else to refine already-identified variables into survey-askable forms in ways that might not otherwise have occurred to him. This formulative process would emerge from the

5.222 INTERPRETING SURVEY DATA: It also seems likely that EFR materials thusly collected could be useful to the survey researcher after he has collected and analyzed his survey data, and has reached the stage of interpreting this analyzed data. The interpretation of the survey data would, I think, be enriched by the application of insights developed during the interpretation of the EFR data - especially insights as to the EFR interviewees' shared cognitive frameworks and assumptions, and shared values.

It should, finally, be briefly noted that interpretation applies not only to data in hand, but also to missing or inadequate data. Even in the best of surveys it is likely to happen that the researcher, after he sees the results of his survey, will discover that there are certain questions that he neglected to ask, or neglected to ask in quite the right way, or in quite the proper depth, and other questions that were asked, but produced numerous non-responses. He cannot go back and re-do the entire survey, but he can go back and re-read his EFR protocols, plus his analysis (3.3) and interpretation (3.4) thereof. From this re-reading, he can perhaps develop reasonable assumptions that will guide him in handling his missing data problems. While there is, of course, no adequate substitute for missing survey data other than complete survey data, nonetheless the survey researcher who has no EFR data to use in this manner would certainly be worse off than the one who did.

Much more could be said about the interface between EFR and the survey method in Futures Research, but perhaps these comments are sufficient to render plausible the notion that the coupling of the two could lead to better results than the use of either alone.

5.23 E.F.R. AND THE DELPHI METHOD

The Delphi Method is one of the most famous of Futures Research methods, and is, moreover, a method invented by futures researchers specifically for Futures Research. For a basic description of this method, and a commentary upon its strengths and weaknesses, see Linstone 1978. From the beginning, in designing EFR, I have had in mind the desirability of its being used conjointly with the Delphi Method. Fortunately, in 1979 I met, and gave advice and encouragement to, a scholar who wished to proceed to do just this, namely Chumphol Poolpatarachewin, a Thai educational researcher and university faculty member, who wished to study the expectations and preferences of Thai university professors concerning possible and probable alternative futures for Thai higher education. Chumphol was interested in middle-range futures and used A.D. 2000 as his horizon date. His preliminary results are, in my view, quite promising (Chumphol 1980).
Chumphol calls his method "EDFR," or "Ethnographic-Delphi Futures Research." Basically, what it entails is (1) using EFR first; then (2) studying the EFR protocols in order to identify and refine the various trends and issues mentioned by one or more interviewees; and (3) embodying these systematically into a Delphi questionnaire, which is then (4) administered to the same sample one or more times, in the usual Delphi manner.

The trends and issues Chumphol captures by means of the EFR component of his project turn out to be quite numerous, for Chunipol imposes no requirement that a trend or issue be either frequently mentioned or consensually validated. Even if only a single interviewee mentions a particular trend or issue, Chumphol will include this on his Delphi questionnaire if he deems it relevant to his overall research orientation. What Chumphol does in his Delphi is, then, roughly comparable to making every mentioned and interesting trend or issue into what this Handbook terms a standard subject probe (2.6.2.12), except that Chumpol goes one step farther, in the sense that every Delphi respondent is so probed - not just, as in EFR, those scenarizers who are interviewed after the subject probe has been discovered and standardized [5.2].

The trends and issues Chumphol adduces from his EFR interviews and incorporates into his questionnaire are propositional in form and resemble somewhat the "cognitive propositions" of EFR (3.3.2). Examples are:

"University administrators will consist of persons who have specialized knowledge of administration. There will be more young administrators."

"New technologies, such as computers and videotapes, will be used.

"Students will have their own roles independent of instructors, administrators, and politicians. There will be new activities created by students."

"Instructors will support students to go out and help society."

The Delphi questionnaire then asks each respondent to indicate whether a particular trend or issue is part of his Optimistic or Pessimistic Scenario, or whether he is undecided. It also asks him, in percentage terms, to judge how likely he thinks it is that the trend or event will materialize by the horizon date. This permits an interesting analysis in terms of consensus and dissensus. Items on which there is consensus can then be used to assemble a composite Optimistic Scenario and a composite Pessimistic Scenario. Chumphol also calculates the mean judged percentage of probability that each trend or issue will materialize.

So far, Chumpol's EDFR Project has involved only a single use of his questionnaire, but when circumstances permit, he plans one or more iterations in the usual Delphi manner. That is, he will study the results of the First Questionnaire and summarize or average them in a suitable fashion. These summaries will then become the anonymous feedback portion of the Second Questionnaire, permitting each panel member to see how the panel as a whole responded to the questions in the First Questionnaire, what the average tendencies of response were, what the extreme answers were, and what reasons were given for the most extreme answers. Essentially, the questions on the Second Questionnaire will then ask the respondent whether he wishes to change his position with
respect to a particular trend or issue, and if so, in what way and for what reasons. Chumpol will then collect the completed Second Questionnaires, study them, summarize or average them, and, if necessary, devise and circulate a Third Questionnaire in the same manner. These iterations will continue until the results attain a degree of stability and clarity considered satisfactory by Chumphol. Presumably, however, not very many iterations will be required.

Chumphol's research differs from most EFR projects so far undertaken in that it is monocultural. That is, he is a Thai discussing with other Thais the future of higher education in Thailand. He appears not to be primarily interested in doing a cultural analysis -- one that might indicate, for example, what are some of the characteristically Thai, or Thai-educator, cultural positions or perspectives vis-a-vis the future. Nor is he interested in cross-cultural comparison, in which these characteristically Thai ways of handling the future would be compared with ways characteristic of some other culture (3.4).

Indeed, what impressed me about Chumphol's monocultural approach is that it results in his couching the trends and issues he discovers through the use of EFR in remarkably culture-free terms, so that if one were to recast them by substituting, for example, "Mexican" and "Mexico" for "Thai" and "Thailand," but were otherwise to leave the wording undisturbed, only a few of the propositions would seem out of place. These propositions will probably not be seen as very instructive by a reader interested in learning about (1) the extant Thai culture or (2) the peculiarities of the Thai culture potential or (3) the way enculturation as a Thai affects scenarizers' approaches to the future; but the propositions might be seen as highly instructive by a reader interested in the commonalities of problems of higher education around the world, or around the Third World.

Not only is Chumphol's project highly focused culturally; it is also highly focused in the sense that it looks just at one quite specialized subculture within Thai culture, namely that of the system of higher education. There is, moreover, relatively little explicit "cross-impact" scope to his project. Basically, higher education is seen as responsive to those officials who run higher education, or else to exogenous factors that remain largely unspecified or implicit. Chumphol's results do not portray possible changes in Thai higher education in the middle-range future as interacting with specified sociocultural or ecological stimuli -- such as a severe energy shortage, rampant and endemic inflation, the threat of external aggression, a revolt of the underprivileged, a modernist movement in religion, a worldwide depression, a powerful women's liberation movement, or similar environing factors. Such possibilities might or might not be in the backs of the minds of some of the interviewees, but the mode of inquiry does not particularly encourage the elicitation of such material, as far as one can see. True, when he analyzes and interprets his Delphi data, Chumphol, as an alert and informed member of Thai culture, can bring in such exogenous factors as the above -- but in doing so he will be relying primarily on personal knowledge rather than a systematic data base. In short, like every researcher, Chumphol has made a trade-off decision between depth and breadth, and in this case the decision is heavily in favor of depth.

Doubtless because of Chumphol's tighter and more limited focus, his initial EFR interviews averaged only 45 minutes in length, as against the two or three hours that EFR interviews normally take. However, given the fact that the Delphi part of his design calls for additional requests for the panelists' time in order to fill out one, two, or more questionnaires, it is probably fortunate that the
initial EFR interviews were not too long, as there are definite limits on the patience of any panel, especially an unpaid one [5.3]

Chumphol’s particular way of combining EFR with the Delphi suggests that there is a continuum of degrees to which the EFR component, with its characteristic concern for spontaneity, creativity, broad cultural patterning, and systemic interconnections, might be emphasized. Where this emphasis is minimal, EDFR is hardly distinguishable from the particular kind of Delphi in which, in the first round, panelists are simply asked to submit suggested events that will then be considered for inclusion in the First Questionnaire (Martino 1978: 392). Here, the items that are suggested would presumably be discrete technological or managerial breakthroughs, rather than broad processes of culture change; for example, the adoption of audiovisual techniques in Thai universities, rather than the emergence of a politically powerful women's liberation movement. While Chulfolphol's EDFR is certainly not this extreme in de-emphasizing the above-mentioned features of EFR, I do believe that, in EDFR, such features can profitably be more strongly emphasized. The researcher can bring this about, for example, by creating an interviewing atmosphere that encourages breadth (2.27), and by using appropriate standard domain or subject probes (2.6211, 2.6212). Time and experimentation will determine the range of achievable and useful mixes as between EFR’s emphasis on breadth, context, and system-analysis and Delphi's emphasis on specificity. Meanwhile, we are indebted to Chulnph3l for creatively demonstrating that EIDER can produce non-obvious, interesting, and useful information.

Having said this, however, I feel it necessary to add a further observation, namely that it seems to me likely that as EDFR is developed, we will find that its final product will almost always be more narrowly focused than a typical EFR product, for the Delphi portion of EDFR will almost automatically have this effect. Delphi, after all, starts its questionnaire iteration process by asking about precise events. For example, it might start by focusing upon the invention of a genetic engineering technique that will obviate sickle cell anemia, and then ask for an estimate of the year by which there is at least a 50% chance that that event will have happened. The rationale for the estimate, the projected causal process, and the context within which the event is projected to occur, might or might not be actively elicited. EFR, by contrast, starts by asking much broader questions, and is so structured that all but the least imaginative interviewees are likely to provide broadly scoped scenarios.

It should be noted, finally, that the use of EFR in combination with the Delphi Method is similar to EFR's use in combination with the survey method -- which is not surprising, since Delphi may be regarded as a kind of iterative survey method. In both cases, EFR is used for the purpose of identifying and refining items for subsequent use in a more structured research instrument (5.221). And likewise, in both cases, the EFR protocols can later be used at the interpretation stage as a means of making greater sense out of analyzed data (5.222).

5.24 E.F.R. AND OTHER METHODS

In the Fowles compendium, several other Futures Research methods and approaches are also reviewed, among them trend extrapolation, cross-impact analysis, simulation modeling, simulation gaming, technological forecasting, technology assessment, the use of social indicators, and social forecasting (1978: 141ff). Many of these approaches are well beyond my experience and
competence, so that I shall not attempt to suggest how EFR could or should be used conjointly with them. VOrth noting, however, is McLean's comment, with respect to simulation modeling, that there is a certain tendency to "shift attention from the vital task of producing an adequate model structure," and "to devote a disproportionate amount of time to the refinement and calibration of detailed numerical relationships." McLean also notes a "hypnotic inertia of a certain choice of system representation," and concludes that "any single forecasting technique is inherently inadequate," and that "a forecasting exercise will be more effective if it is based on the evaluation of many alternative models rather than a single model and a set of data (McLean 1978: 339-40). And Johnston adds what I consider to be an appropriate peroration for the present chapter: "Quantitative forecasting procedures alone cannot be relied upon to yield an adequate awareness of alternative goals that might be pursued or the priorities that might be called for But qualitative procedures that commonly incorporate a distinct value orientation cannot possibly reflect the range and interactions of the many relevant factors in any systematic fashion. These different forecasting methods must be fused" (1978: 440).
APPENDIX THREE: EXAMPLE OF AN E.F.R. PROTOCOL

[Explanatory Note: The protocol that follows is that which was dictated during an interview with Mr.. Chupong (Jiab) Kanchanalak, and recorded on videotape. After editing, and the addition of captions and voice-over commentary, this videotape became the 38-minute training tape, A Guide to Ethnographic Futures Research. For the reader who has the opportunity to view the Guide, it is useful to refer during viewing to this protocol, so that the relationship between interview and protocol will be clear., Khun Jiab has given permission, of course, for the Guide and this protocol to be used. - RBTI

Note: This Biographical Sketch is filed separately from the Protocol, itself, in order to preserve confidentiality.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

S No. 19 is Mr. Chupong (Jiab) Kanchanalak, aged 24, born and reared in Bangkok. Jiab's father is ethnically Thai, an engineer trained in Thailand, and very successful at his profession.. His mother is Sino-Thai and has important coinsurance interests. He spoke only Thai in his home. There is considerable wealth in the family, and Jiab has not lacked for advantages. He attended the elite French Catholic school, St. Gabriel's, at both the elementary and secondary levels. Thereafter he spent a year at Triam Udomsyksa at Chulalongkorn University, followed by a year and a half at Fishburn Military School in Virginia. After some time at a junior college in Virginia, Jiab enrolled in Georgetown University, where he took a B.S. in Foreign Service. He plans to return to Georgetown for more training, and then to enter the Thai Foreign Service. Jiab was recently married to a doctoral candidate in philosophy at Stanford University.

Although he grew up exclusively in Bangkok, and later in America, Jiab has made a special effort to learn about upcountry Thai life. He has spent two or three months in Nakorn Sawan Province in the near North, a month in Khonkaen in the near Northeast, and three months in Songkhla in the South. At each place he roomed in the capital city, but made day trips out into the countryside to talk to farmers and other local people. Despite his exposure to Christian schools, Jiab has remained Buddhist in religious orientation, though he does not contemplate entering the monkhood.

OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO

DEMOGRAPHY

Optimistically, in the year 2001 the population of Thailand will be about 60 million people. S pointed out that the 60 million figure is "optimistic" in the sense that any lower figure would be, in his judgment, unrealistic.. Other than that, S would prefer a population of around 45 to 50 million Thais.

ENERGY

Since the Thai government will at a minimum be responsible for a much larger population in AD 2001 than was true in 1979, a national energy policy of some force and vigor will prove necessary.
A keystone in this policy will be to reduce consumption and conserve energy. For example, public transportation will be encouraged by government policy, and the use of private automobiles strongly discouraged. Similarly, the use of much air conditioning will be strongly discouraged.

On the supply-side, the new discoveries of natural gas in the Gulf of Thailand will provide ample natural gas supplies for Thailand. With respect to oil, optimistically Thailand will receive Indonesian oil on favorable terms, since Thailand is a fellow member of ASEAN [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations].

POLITICS

Optimistically, Thailand in the year 2001 will have a government which is responsible to the people's basic needs. People will have more civil and political rights than is now the case. There will be more freedom of expression.

Optimistically, by the year 2001 the Thai people will be more mature politically. Twenty-two years will allow them quite a considerable chance to learn and to mature. They will have a better understanding of their rights and a better understanding of the role that government should play in the national life.

Optimistically, the national leadership will be civilian, and the military as a whole will play a lesser role than was true in 1979.

The national government will be representative, and the representatives will be elected. However, the government will also be more or less centralized. This is necessary because Thailand is not a rich country and it has a growing population.

S volunteered that S acknowledges that government is generally not as efficient as private enterprise in getting things done, but at the same time government is more effective in insuring fairness. Fairness will be especially important: as Thailand moves into an age in which resources will be scarce.

Optimistically -- and this is also realistic -- by the year 2001 corruption will have been totally eliminated.

ABSENCE OF CIVIL WAR

There will, under this Optimistic Scenario, be no civil war. The reforms envisaged in this Optimistic Scenario are realistic and can be accomplished without resort to major bloodshed.

ECONOMICS

The people in the year 2001 optimistically will have better income and better opportunity to get ahead in an economic sense.
Generally speaking, the free enterprise-cum-state socialism system of 1979 will change considerably by the year 2001, when there will be "socialism with a human face." That is, there will be socialism but without great oppression, without forced labor or other forms of oppression which would be contrary to the basic Thai cultural tradition, which emphasizes individual liberty and dignity.

The central government and its executive structure will play a major role in the regulation of the economy. Many of the basic resources will, optimistically, be under actual government ownership by the year 2001, as a means of insuring fairness. Another reason for the government's taking over certain resources, such as tin resources in South Thailand, is that such resources have a direct relationship to national security. Other resources such as the forests and major manufacturing plants will, optimistically, be under government ownership - the auto assembly industry, and textile industry, etc.

Thailand, optimistically, will have what could be called a "mixed" economy. Especially in agriculture, it will be mixed, due to the unrealism of expecting that the government could, if it wished, take over all farmland. However, optimistically, the government will be clever enough to succeed in taking over ownership of the larger farm estates, leaving the smaller farms in private hands.

An important feature of this "mixed" economic approach is that it is part of a broader process by which Thailand will be selective in its development policy. Thailand will select those aspects of modern and industrial life found in foreign nations, which are in Thailand's own best interests, and reject other elements which are not. For example, optimistically, by the year 2001 Thailand will legislate rather effectively against foreign cosmetics, large private foreign automobiles, and similar luxury items. Other luxury items, such as jewelry and wristwatches, can be made domestically in Thailand, and will be. Still other such items will actually be encouraged, such as badminton rackets, sports equipment, and the like -although, optimistically, such sports as golf will be discouraged.

The distribution of wealth will, as a matter of basic and conscious government policy, become more equal. It will be recognized that one of the great problems of the 1979 period was the unfair distribution of wealth. In general, those people who make a solid economic contributions by their economic performance will be rewarded with wages and salaries, while those who are more idle and who in 1979 received their income in the form of rent, interest, or dividends, will be proportionately less rewarded.

SOCIAL EQUITY

Optimistically, in the year 2001 people will generally have a better opportunity to realize their potential. The nation as a whole will have an opportunity to learn more from other countries and to benefit from this learning in Thai terms. The farmers of Thailand, who are the core of the nation, will have a better way of life and will receive more attention from the government.

BASIC EQUALITY
The government will insure that every Thai has access to the basic necessities of life such as decent housing, decent food, and decent clothing. Emphasis on equity will also apply beyond the level of necessity. For example, if one group in society has access to air conditioning, then all groups will have such access. Air conditioning may be a bad example, but the point is that any luxuries that may exist will, optimistically, be widely and more or less equally shared in the population rather than being available only to the few. The emphasis on equality will also apply, of course, to the rural-urban gap, which will be progressively narrowed as far as government services, life opportunities, and respect and status levels are concerned.

MINORITY AIMS

With respect to the Thai-language minorities, S optimistically forecasts that accents like the northeastern, the northern, and the southern will persist and will be encouraged, because they give grace and variety to Thai life.

With respect to the non-Thai minorities, such as the Chinese, the hill tribes, and the Muslim Malays in the South, the Optimistic Scenario calls for their acquiring the same basic political and social status as the Buddhist Thais themselves, while retaining cultural autonomy. For example, the Muslim Malays in the South will become bilingual in Malay and Thai, using their Thai to insure relative equality in governmental and political matters, and using their Malay in their daily life in order to retain a sense of Malay identity. The Malays will, of course, also retain their Muslim religion. The same principles will apply to the Chinese and the hill tribes. It is more realistic to expect that the Chinese will be able to attain these standards by the year 201, and somewhat less realistic with respect to the hill tribes and the Malays, because of their greater cultural distance.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SEXS

With respect to the civil and legal status of the female in general, she will be more recognized and will attain complete legal equality. Equal pay will be given for equal work.

The now-existing double standard which permits men to play around, but not women, will optimistically and realistically shift drastically over the next 22 years. Polygamy in the form of a man keeping a major wife and several minor wives, will decline to zero.

Nightlife based upon sexuality will, optimistically, drop off to zero. Prostitution and massage parlors will be abolished as wasteful and as serving no acceptable national purpose.

Some of the above-mentioned goals with respect to rapidity of culture change may seem unrealistic to some observers, but S believes that they are realistic, because they will be accompanied and promoted by educational campaigns managed by the government which will point out, among other things, the need to conserve Thailand's resources, and to utilize those resources in a wise manner.

EDUCATION

Optimistically the realistically, there will be drastic changes in education. Available resources will be much more heavily channeled to the lower levels of education in order to insure equality of
educational opportunity and the kind of education that will serve practical national needs. Optimistically the realistically, Thais will have access to worthwhile secondary schooling on a universal basis. There will be considerable emphasis on practicality and on vocational education. There will be less emphasis upon expensive tertiary education; for example, advanced medical education will be de-emphasized, and the training of "barefoot doctor" type therapists will increase.

The "open university" of the 1970's will be phased out, and in general there will be fewer universities. Perhaps Chulalongkorn and Thannasart Universities will actually be physically moved out of Bangkok so that they can be closer to the people and more articulated with the people's needs.

RELIGION

Since Buddhism is a very flexible religion, it can be readily adapted to the needs of a new kind of Thailand. Since Buddhism is good for the people's morals, it will be maintained and encouraged. However, some of the religious content will be altered under government leadership or pressure in order to bring the content of religion more closely into articulation with national goals. For example, the emphasis upon the transitoriness and hence the unimportance of the present life will be substantially reduced because the new culture will emphasize the importance of social justice in the present life.

Although the tradition of encouraging every Thai male to become a monk briefly will be encouraged, the longer-term monks will decline in number and increase in quality. There will be less deviation from appropriate monkly standards of behavior.

With respect to non-Buddhist belief systems such as magic and spirit worship, there will be a progressive decline, and part of this will be the result of government campaigns to educate people away from these orientations.

The rationale for the scenario on religion is that Buddhism is an integral part of Thai culture. Optimistically, the Thai educational system will assist the Thai people toward a better understanding of Buddhism, and toward an ability to interpret Buddhism in the light of modern conditions and problems.

THE ARTS

Optimistically, there will be strong emphasis upon drastic change in the arts. In particular, the educational and other systems will emphasize the necessity for Thais to learn who they are, before they proceed to learn about other cultures. The media of public communication will assist in this effort.

MANNERS AND MORALS

Thai culture of the year 2001 will optimistically have departed from the "consumer society" of 1979, in which money bought every satisfaction, and the market provided everything for which money was available. In the year 2001 the government will have outlawed all manner of socially
and culturally destructive elements and influences; for example; there will be no more massage parlors, and movies that portray violence without any redeeming purpose will be unavailable. S replied to a question that the Thai phenomenon of kreengcaj [unwillingness to be obstrusive] will persist, but with new limitations upon it. There are many kinds of kreengcaj, and optimistically those kinds which result in exploitation will be firmly discouraged. The educational system will encourage Thai young people to be more aggressive and assertive. Nonetheless, S volunteered that "kreengcaj is part of our culture and we cannot get rid of it, nor should we, because if we did we would no longer be Thai."

PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO

POLITICS

The key element in the Pessimistic-Realistic Scenario is that an ultra-conservative group of national leaders will control Thailand. This group will be heavily, though not necessarily wholly, military in composition. It will be selfish and narrow, as well as oppressive. It will have a narrow political base, and partly for this reason will not be able to solve the "rice-and-fish-sauce problem." In short, this government will be elitist in composition and in orientation- It will be divorced from society, and repulsive to intellectuals, some civil servants, university students, and the like, some of whom might form their own resistance groups or else join the Communist Party of Thailand.

The upshot of this type of conservative leadership will be a very bloody civil war. Whether this civil war becomes widespread is a matter which probably will be determined in the crucial few years following 1979. The civil war will be short if there is no outside interference on either side; otherwise, it will be long.

The Pessimistic Scenario calls for the steady growth of the jungle forces, who will pick up increasing political support among a rural population that will have lost confidence in the ability and willingness of the Bangkok government to undertake progressive reform designed to improve the lot of the rural people.

ECONOMICS

The key to the economic scenario is simply the persistence of the status quo. Corruption will persist, as will the gap between rich and poor, exploitation of the farmers, generally low living standards, and discrimination by males against females, by rich against poor, by the educated against the less educated, and by city people against country people.

Another important aspect of the Pessimistic Scenario has to do with inflation. While self-reliance and conservation would obviate inflation under the Optimistic Scenario, under the Pessimistic Scenario heavy reliance on imports such as oil, plus the present bad habits of Bangkok people with their luxurious and wasteful consuming habits, will fire the fuels of inflation in a manner similar to that which applies in the present situation.

MOST PROBABLE SCENARIO
S started by indicating that the Most Probable Scenario is difficult to construct because one must make many assumptions about the motivations and behaviors of external powers. Nonetheless, the following is the most likely scenario. Basically, it is a scenario that calls for civil war, involving considerable suffering. Eventually a point will be reached in which both the military in Bangkok and the jungle leadership up-country will decide that they have had enough, and therefore they will sit down and arrange a truce. This truce will call for some form of coalition government, but might also include a formal or informal de facto agreement as to which side controls which territory within Thailand -- in other words, it would take the form of coalition-cum-informal partition.

By the year 2001 Viet Nam will be very strong and will have completed its consolidation of power in Cambodia and Laos. For its own reasons and ambitions, Viet Nam will not want a strong Thailand. It will, therefore, keep the Communist Party of Thailand weak, by insuring that supplies to it do not cross the Laotian and Cambodian borders. Given the nature of Thailand's other borders, this reduces somewhat the possibility that the Communist Party of Thailand can receive military supplies from other foreign sources. The key strategy of Viet Nam, in short, will be to keep the Communist Party of Thailand weak [i.e., too weak to dominate] and thus to keep the conflict going, so that Thailand will not be a serious obstacle to Viet Nam's international ambitions.

An additional reason why Viet Nam will wish to keep Thailand weak is its recognition that Laos and Cambodia are closely related culturally to Thailand and might become attracted to a strong Thailand. This helps explain why Viet Nam attacked Cambodia in January 1979 in order to assume effective control. Under the Most Probable Scenario, the coalition arrangement will come about in part because of pressure applied by interested external powers.

With respect to what the culture of Thailand in the year 2001 will look like under this Most Probable Scenario, little can be said. There will be much social and cultural dislocation, and the very event of civil war will discourage the accomplishment and solidification of many of the positive cultural goals outlined in the Optimistic Scenario.

Cultural reasons are also cited, as well as historical reasons, in support of the Most Probable Scenario. S believes that the Thai military have tended historically to compromise with externally imposed difficulties and threats. They would rather sacrifice some of their privileges in order to save the remainder. Thus, even though on purely ideological grounds it would seem unlikely that a coalition-with-partition agreement could emerge, nonetheless, political necessity might dictate just that.
CULTURAL FUTURES FOR THAILAND: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC INQUIRY
Robert B. Textor, Stanford University

This article attempts to achieve four purposes:

1. To present, to the general futures researcher or the social scientist, a cultural and ethnographic approach to Futures Research.
2. To exemplify this approach by presenting a case study of its application to the future of a particular nation, namely Thailand.
3. To convey to those readers whose experience has been largely confined to First or Second World futures research, an appreciation of the vast differences one might encounter when one conducts futures research on a Third World nation, especially one with a non-Western cultural tradition.
4. To present salient findings of interest to the specialist on Thailand or Southeast Asia.

1. THE CULTURAL AND ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROACH TO FUTURES RESEARCH

The approach to Futures Research taken in this article is conceptually cultural and ethno graphically ethnographic. To say that it is conceptually cultural means simply that the concepts of culture, and of sociocultural system, are taken as guiding concepts, and that theories of cultural change are taken as guiding theories. (For summaries of theories of cultural change, see Kaplan and Manners 1972 or Harris 1968). One guiding assumption of the cultural approach is that the way(s) an individual is enculturated has a great deal to do with the way(s) he or she cognizes, values, prioritizes, and forecasts various conceivable alternative futures for his group or nation or region.

These conceivable alternative futures (often similar to complex scenarios) are conceptualized as hypothetical future cultures. Another guiding assumption is that these hypothetical future cultures do not spring full-blown from the blue; rather, they generally represent sets of assumptions concerning the consequences of innumerable incremental behavioral, cognitive, and evaluative changes "at the margin" of pre-existing cultural forms. It follows that a scenario portraying life in, say, Thailand as of A.D. 2000 is regarded as more persuasive, ceteris paribus, if it "hangs together" the way an extant and reasonably healthy sociocultural system does. This hanging-together emphasis (stemming from functionalist and systems theory), when consistent with reasonable assumptions or guidelines from theories on modernization, cultural ecology, and cultural evolution,
becomes, I believe, a valuable corrective against the wild, disjointed, or "just so" forecasts which one sometimes finds in the futures literature.

While this particular statement of a cultural approach is my own, it should be emphasized that other anthropologists have worked in the same conceptual vineyard since as long ago as the late Sixties (see for example American Anthropological Association 1970, 1971; Mead 1970; and Gerlach and Hine 1973).

The term "Ethnographic Futures Research" (EFR) refers to the methodological arm of the cultural approach. Just as the anthropologist uses (but is not limited to) ethnography in studying an extant (or even an extinct) culture naturalistically, so he or she can use (but need not be limited to) a form of ethnography to study hypothetical future cultures.

There are many variant strains in the overall ethnographic approach as used on extant cultures, but the key emphases are upon holism, context, and process; and the key approaches are naturalistic observation, participant observation and interviewing, and in general a flexible, adaptable, interactive mode of inquiry. (For a general review of ethnography as a methodology, see Pelto and Pelto 1978.) EFR as here presented retains this emphasis on holism, context, and process, and this flexible, adaptable, interactive mode as well -- though of course observation of future events is not possible. In short, as much of the essential ethnographic approach is used as the peculiar nature of the subject matter will permit, and as is appropriate. It need hardly be added that the materials assembled by means of the ethnographic approach are interpreted in the light of what the ethnographer knows about the present and pre-existing culture whose possible future variants are being explored -- and the more he knows about this culture, the better.

The investigator who uses EFR (whether anthropologist or otherwise) naturally finds himself augmenting the conventional ethnographic approach by borrowing and adapting various techniques or approaches from general futures research, or elsewhere. As will be noted in Section 10, Methodological Details, I have done this.

2. THE APPLICATION OF E.F.R. TO THAILAND

I decided to apply EFR first to Thailand, the world's sixteenth most populous nation, whose culture I have studied professionally for almost three decades, and whose language I speak fluently. In interviewing Thais available near my home in northern California, I attempted to learn from my mistakes and thus to put together an effective method as I went along.

Since my early focus was upon improving the method itself, I decided that drawing a true probability sample of Thais available in northern California, though preferable, was certainly not essential and would have been prohibitively expensive. (Some of my futures work with EFR will, however, almost certainly involve probability sampling designs.) I therefore drew what I considered to be a reasonably adequate "opportunity sample" of 25 civilian Buddhist male and female Thai intellectuals available in California. The sample was not limited to students, but most of the interviewees were, or had been, enrolled in one or another of seven four-year colleges or universities, in a wide variety of subjects. None were expatriates; all intended to return to Thailand and were hence deeply interested in their national future. For details, see Note 1.
It should be noted that the present research differs from much futures research - such as that employing the Delphi Technique - in that the forecasts it presents are generally not those of experts. Only a minority of the interviewees were trained in disciplines normally used to produce macro-forecasts. My purpose was not to obtain expert technical forecasts, but rather, thoughtful general forecasts by concerned Thais who are likely, as highly-credentialed members of a relatively small intellectual and technocratic elite, to have some influence in shaping the future of their culture. In eliciting these forecasts,

I was as interested in the underlying values expressed, as in the plausibility of the forecasted events themselves. Incidentally, my experience suggests that EFR uld be a useful tool in eliciting values from a sample of members of a cultural or subculture even if the investigator had no particular interest in forecasting or in policy matters - since the EFR format seems to be quite effective in concretizing value issues and in stimulating the interviewee to "discover what his positions are," as it were.

2.1 THE INTERVIEW

During the spring and summer of 1977 I personally interviewed each of the 25 members of the sample, the average interview lasting about two and a half hours. The general interviewing approach was nondirective, so as to draw out the untramelled and spontaneous perceptions and preferences of the interviewees. Sufficient structure was provided, however, to afford rough comparability across interviews. The time horizon to which interviewees were asked to forecast was Buddhist Era 2543, which is A.D. 2000. The bulk of the interview concerned the construction of t "scenarios" as of that date, both of which had to be realistic, one of which was desirable ("optimistic") by the forecaster's personal values, while the other was undesirable ("pessimistic"). Details are given in Section 10.

All interviews were totally private. Extreme precautions were taken to insure total confidentiality. Rapport and trust were excellent, and in my judgment the responses given to me by the great majority of these individuals were, in terms of honesty, thoroughness, and openness, the equal of the best interactive experiences I have had in many years of friendship with, and research among, Thais.

No one who was approached for an interview refused, and the great majority, after perhaps some initial nervousness, obviously found the experience enjoyable and helpful. It is by no means an ethnographer's typical experience to be thanked by his informant -- but this is what typically happened, often with comments like: "No one has ever sat down with me before to look systematically at Thailand's future."

2.2 PROBLEMS OF ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

In eliciting my interviewees' "images" of Thai cultural futures, I inevitably faced the problem, as every futures researcher doubtless must, of somehow distinguishing between the cognitive (believing, knowing, and expecting) dimension and the evaluative (evaluating, judging, and prioritizing) dimension of a response. One must somehow cope with the fact, for example, that
often a forecaster will cognize Scenario A as more likely, yet evaluate Scenario B as more desirable. Accordingly, in this article, an analytical distinction is made between cognitive and evaluative "propositions" with respect to alternative future cultures. It should be noted in passing that cognitive propositions on the whole would appear to be more subject to sudden change, than evaluative propositions. That is, what the forecasters on the whole expect will happen is subject to change as major international or national political shifts occur, as oil bonanzas burst, etc. -- while evaluative propositions would tend to reflect longenculturated notions of what is desirable and what is right, and hence be less likely to change quickly.

With respect to the generalizability of my findings, the firmest of caveats must be sounded. While I have no reason to believe that my sample is unrepresentative of Thai intellectuals in the United States or Thai students studying at some of the more respectable American colleges and universities, at that time, statistically speaking there is no alternative to regarding these 25 forecasters as simply their own little universe. They might or might not -- there is no way of telling -- be representative of Thais throughout California or throughout the United States. Further discussion of this matter is found in Note 1 and Section

Had opportunity permitted, the proper venue for this sort of research would, of course, have been Thailand itself. The question thus naturally arises as to the extent to which distortion is introduced by interviewing Thais in America rather than in Thailand. Interview materials gathered in America reflect, of course, the results of the forecasters having been inducted into the Thai student subculture in the U.S., whose patterning in turn reflects to some considerable extent the patterning of the general university subculture of the U.S. While some values that a Thai student takes on during such subcultural experiences might be quite permanent, others might be quite transitory.

Even those values that are quite permanent, furthermore, might not effectively guide the individual's behavior once he returns to Thailand and rejoins his family, gets a job, faces economic problems, and otherwise rejoin subcultures there. While it would seem axiomatic to the futures field that one's image of the future does indeed somehow condition one's future behavior, I am the first to add that the problem of connecting the present group of forecasters' images of the future of Thailand with their own probable future behavior in Thailand (not to mention connecting these with probable future patterns of overall Thai sociocultural change) is a formidable one.

Indeed, modeling or specifying the process of linkage between images of the future, and future events as they subsequently transpire, is the theoretical Achilles' Heel of all Futures Research -- not just EFR. In facing this difficult problem, I generally follow the change model advocated by Bell and Mau (1971: 21). This model, too complex to explain here, posits a crucial connection between "images of the future," looping through "values," to the "decision-making process," which in turn leads to "individual or collective action" as "the future becomes the present."

3. SECULARITY OF INTERVIEWEES' ORIENTATIONS

To the anthropologist specialized in Thai culture, a fundamental concern is to ascertain just how secular is the cognitive framework in terms of which a sample of Thais would develop expectations or beliefs concerning likely cultural or societal futures. While intellectuals studying at American colleges and universities could be expected to exhibit modern, scientific, and rational approaches to
social causation (see Barry 1967:61), nonetheless, the anthropologist is mindful of the Buddhist background of his interviewees, with its emphasis upon karma as the fundamental causative mechanism for human events. Intertwined with the Buddhist notion of karma in the traditional culture is the Brabmanical notion of fate (choog chaataa)

While one must avoid an overly rigid analytical separation between Buddhism and Brahmanism, and between karma and fate, nonetheless a reasonable statement is that the underlying notion of karma is causation by moral status, while the underlying notion of fate is causation by astrological horoscopic status. Oversimplifying, we may say that the personal process of karmic causation is believed by ordinary Buddhist laypersons to insure - that an individual who does good will receive a good situation in return - either in the present incarnation or in a future one. By the same token, a good situation in the present is retrospectively attributed to some posited good act in the past - either in the present incarnation or in a past one. Fate, by contrast, is on its face an amoral matter, and is believed by ordinary people to be complexly bound up with one's astrological status. One's birthdate determines one's astrological status, but one can misunderstand or mis-divine one's future by faulty or insufficient understanding of this astrological status. Often, the two belief systems work in tandem (and apparently without significant conflict) and individuals seeking a better lot in life, or seeking to explain an unsatisfactory lot, might invoke both systems at more or less the same time.

The interview results reveal a distinct tendency to prefer naturalistic to supernaturalistic explanations of social causation. The most frequently mentioned forces that were seen to "make things happen" were economic desires and drives, and political struggles and policies - and often the two in combination. Other basic forces mentioned were the adoption of modern technology and the influence of the great powers.

Some interviewees foreswore totally the notion that a person's or a nation's karma can cause future events to occur, adding with an apparent tinge of liberated pride that such thinking had nothing to do with their picture of the world. Others evinced an apparently respectful regret that they could not fully accept this part of the religious heritage of their parents. Many saw karmic causation as intertwined with naturalistic causation (in the sense of tecnoeconaiuce forces, political leadership, or indeed as translatable into such a mode of analysis.

Another, related, position taken by some forecasters was that evil committed in this life karmically produced its own punishment, but that this punishment might take the exclusive form of strong feelings of guilt, rather than in itself producing some kind of overt action.

Overall, there was mild to strong skepticism concerning karma that derives from one's previous lives (as distinct from the past portion of one's present life) and indeed skepticism regarding the very notion of the reality of previous lives. Those who doubted this notion also tended to doubt the notion of future lives. These doubts appeared correlated, in an overall way, with political orientations to the left of center.

Some interviewees explained that they invoked the Brahmanically derived concept of fate to explain larger and more sudden turns of events, while reserving the Buddhist concept of karma for smaller, more gradual and incremental, changes.
Only a minority of the forecasters gave evidence of believing that either fate or karma applied to the Thai nation taken as a single whole, though some added that these concepts do apply to individual leaders of the nation, who in turn might thereby influence the course of future history. Interviewees who did invoke either concept at the national level invariably invoked it also at the personal level, but the reverse was often not true. I might add, finally, that it is plausible, and I think highly probable, that many scenarizers who reject both karma and fate in explaining gross national and societal events, still retain one or both concepts as "fall-back" elements in their personal security systems as they confront individual life crises.

On the whole, then, the sample tended to be secular rather than religious in their approach, in the sense that they would look first to naturalistic causes, and restrict supernaturlistic explanations to the otherwise unexplainable residuum -- or else reject such explanations altogether. Similar interviews with less acculturated, less cosmopolitan Thais would doubtless reveal patterns of a more supernaturalistic orientation to the future..

4. PREOCCUPATION WITH POLITICS AND VIOLENCE

The optimistic and pessimistic scenarios as of A.D. 2000 that I asked each forecaster to sketch with broad brushstrokes were intended to reflect whatever subject matter domains -- symbolic, social, economic, political, esthetic, religious, etc. -- were of greatest concern to him personally. The interviewee was urged to be spontaneous, and not to worry whether his or her scenario covered the "right" subjects -- for there was no right or wrong to be concerned with. He was further advised that it is almost impossible to shock an anthropologist, and once again reassured of total confidentiality.

Despite this emphasis upon breadth, virtually every scenarizer indicated a prime concern with politics, and a prime anxiety about the prospect of massive political violence. While I of course had expected most forecasters to include politics in their scenarios -- after all, intellectuals are often politically concerned -- I was struck by the centrality of their political concern. Even forecasters who *pressed the ethnographer as being distinctly not of "political" personality type focused on political variables.

There was a strong tendency simply to assume that the political future would be a violent one. Virtually every pessimistic scenario included massive violence. A minority of optimistic scenarios also included violence, not, of course, because violence itself was seen as desirable, but rather because it was seen as an inevitable part of a desired non-gradualistic and radical restructuring of society. The human cost of civil violence was seen as very high, with thousands of innocent non-combatants losing their lives. The cultural cost was also seen as high, with widespread disruption of social structure, programs, and amenities. There was a tendency for forecasters to see massive violence as beginning in the early Eighties and lasting several years, after which "someone has to win." Forecasters, including those not necessarily sympathetic with the insurgent forces fighting from jungle bases, judged that the morale of the insurgents would be high and that that of the government forces would be Rm. The insurgents were seen as possessing an ethos, an ideology, and a set of goals realizable within their lifetimes; the government forces were seen as essentially lacking these advantages. Therefore, even though the numbers and military strength of the insurgents were extremely limited, there was a greater tendency to project their victory than the
government's -- again, quite apart from which side a forecaster appeared to sympathize with, if either.

The pervasiveness and intensity of this expectation that there will be political violence comprise the most important "new" (to me, at least) finding produced by this study. Almost as important as this is the evident pervasiveness and intensity of the conviction that it is economic inequity that will bring about this violence. Historically, members of the Thai elite, including those studying in America, have been considerably less concerned about inequity than is generally typical of Third World students in America. The Buddhist religion, with its emphasis upon assuming that present inequity must have its roots in one's insufficient morality in same past life, has often been cited as a cultural explanation for this lack of profound concern with inequity.

While forecasters perceived clearly that there was a link between inequity and violence, most of them made no claim to understanding clearly how inequity could be or would be translated into effectively organized insurgency. Indeed, some interviewees pointed out that such translation, if and to the extent that it does occur, would doubtless involve disagreement and disputation within insurgent ranks, plus much trial and error. Hence, many forecasters feared that such a process would be a slow one, which would imply a period of protracted violence rather than a spurt of violence that could somehow be passed through quickly.

While I have defined my role as recorder and interpreter, rather than evaluator, of the scenarizers' protocols, I do feel constrained in this one instance to express a measure of disagreement with the position taken by most of them. Without in any way minimizing the danger of civil war, the progressive politicization that has recently occurred in many rural areas, or the obvious political necessity of promoting equity, I tend to place somewhat more emphasis on the tradition-orientedness of many Thai farmers - who constitute the great bulk of the Thai population - than do a number of the forecasters. I consider it possible, from the vantage point of having spent some years living and working in rural Thai villages, that the forecasters, most of whom have spent little time in villages, perhaps somewhat underestimate this rural conservatism.

In any case, it should be noted, finally, that while the forecasters' preoccupation with politics and their expectation of massive violence are clear, they might well prove to be labile see why this might be so, and to provide context or further interpretation, we now move to a brief historical note.

5 A NOTE ON HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Thailand is the only Southeast Asian nation that never fell to European colonialism, due in part to an intact and reasonably effective monarchical form of government, in which the King was in theory an absolute ruler. In 1932 a bloodless revolution changed the monarchy to a constitutional one, and led to efforts to modernize and democratize the nation much more energetically than before. These efforts met with only limited success, and for numerous reasons by the late Thirties ultimate power had passed to the military. Numerous coup de' état have occurred, and numerous new constitutions have been proclaimed, but during the 46 years since 1932 the process of enhancing freedom while maintaining stability has faltered, and during most of these years considerations of stability have prevailed, usually expressed structurally in the form of military domination of the government.
In October 1973 an historic tipping point was reached, as literally hundreds of thousands of students, workers, and other citizens poured into the streets of Bangkok and in due course forced a trio of military quasi-dictators to resign and go into exile. (The demonstrators were aided by crucially timed covert action by a sympathetic monarch, as well as certain actions by elements of the military pursuing their own ends.) During the demonstrations, however, scores of students and others were gunned down by the military on the streets of Bangkok, marking the first time in modern Thai history that domestically-induced political change entailed substantial loss of civilian life. (See Heinze 1974). Thereafter, under various civilian leaders, Thailand experienced an enormous growth in popular political expression and participation through parliamentary and other relatively democratic means. Pent-up frustrations, fueled by rampant inflation, resulted in many strikes and other demands for equity in a society which, by some international standards, lacked equity. The price of this movement toward equity and freedom was considerable social disorder.

Thais concerned more with freedom and equity cheered these developments, while those concerned more with order and economic growth deplored them. This latter group included the military leadership, some of whose members are believed to have actively abetted social disorder, including violent disorder, in a desire to force a showdown (see Morell 1976: 171-4). Also abetting social disorder were various civilian rightist and leftist groups.

In 1976 another historic tipping point was reached, this time in the opposite direction. On October 6 occurred the siege of Thaninasart University, in which police and paramilitary forces using heavy weapons, augmented by enraged mobs of civilians, attacked a large number of mostly unarmed individuals, principally students. Quite a number of these individuals died from bullet wounds, from hanging, and even from being soaked with gasoline and set afire. The venom and hatred expressed on that day profoundly violated traditional Buddhist values of loving kindness, compassion, and respect for life. Millions of Thais were deeply shocked.

Following the October 6 affair, the military in effect reassumed power, though under a civilian-led cabinet. Under this new Thanin Administration, thousands of alleged political dissidents were herded into jails, where many were held for months without being charged, living under cramped conditions, and eating poor food. Reports of harassment and torture multiplied. While the treatment these prisoners received may not have been much worse than what many ordinary criminals have sometimes received, these were political prisoners, often of middle-class background and high educational attainment -- the very sort of person with whom interviewees in the present study could readily identify. Since the tipping points of 1973 and 1976, Thai politics can never be the same again.

The 1976 event evidently convinced a number of Thai intellectuals who previously had sought equity and/or freedom through constitutional processes that such a quest was futile. Some thousands of these disenchanted people joined the insurgent underground operating out of the jungles. The situation in many ways recalled the Vietnamese historical experience. It was no longer possible for responsible observers to ignore the underground as potentially an important political force.
It was during the Thanin Administration that the 25 forecasters were interviewed. This administration, though led by a well-intentioned and honest man, was so rigidly anti-Communist and anti-leftist that the forecasters were doubtless in some cases extremely wary of discussing the Thai national future with each other (see Note 3), especially since this Administration had explicitly instructed Thai students overseas to inhibit their political involvements. Because the EFR approach offered total safety of expression (see Section 10), it is probable that many forecasters were franker in talking with me than with many other Thais.

In any event, the atmosphere was hardly one of freedom, a fact which was poignantly driven home to me when I visited Thailand during the summer of 1977, and discovered at first hand how fearful and inhibited were various of my Thai social scientist colleagues, including some of conservative political orientation.

In October 1977, for a number of complex reasons, the military leadership deposed the Thanin Administration, and a new administration under General Kriangsak took charge. Despite its military leadership, this new regime has proved to be much less rigid and much more inclined to tolerate expressions of dissent. Newspapers became relatively free once again, and academic freedom was reasserted in various ways. Prime Minister Kriangsak took the initiative toward the insurgent forces in the jungles, offering amnesty for surrender; he also moved rapidly to establish relations with nearby Communist states. For these and other reasons, it is my feeling that, if it were possible to administer the 25 interviews at this writing (July 1978), I would probably find some moderation in the overall expectation of massive and perduring violence.

6. THE TWO MAIN PERCEIVED PATHS INTO THE FUTURE

The optimistic-verse -pessimistic scenario approach turned out to be well adapted to the research problem. In interview after interview, the same two basic alternatives emerged: (1) continuation of control by the then existing military-dominated authoritarian regime or others of similar type; or (2) assumption of control by a Communist or Socialist regime after protracted and violent struggle. Clearly, forecasters saw politics as the central crucible from which subsidiary variables flowed — such as economic or technological variables. This contrasts starkly with the results of many Western futures studies, in which political stability is simply assumed, and the prime movers of future events and processes are seen as technological or economic.

At one point I wondered whether the fact that forecasters formulated the future in terms of the same two paths might be an artifact of the method, which after all asked for just two scenarios, one optimistic and one pessimistic. I was not to wonder long. Some of the earlier interviewees became sufficiently intrigued with Futures Research that, totally on their own initiative, they organized their own informal discussion group to consider alternative futures for Thailand, and thus to prepare themselves intellectually and emotionally for returning home. They held two well-organized half-day discussion sessions to which Thais from various universities (including forecasters) were invited, as was I. The first such session was entitled, "Thailand's Future. The Quest for a Third Path." This Third Path was defined as a middle way, as something like the "path of moderation" celebrated in formal Buddhism. Also inspired by Buddhism was the consensual definition of this Path as one which would avoid both the suppressive violence of a quasi-fascist military-dominated regime, and the revolutionary violence of a quasi-communist insurgency.
movement seeking, Vietnam-style, to seize power in province after province, and finally in
Bangkok. By the end of the second seminar a variety of theoretical Third Paths had been
considered, but the consensus was that none was realistic. In particular, seminar members found it
difficult to envision an ideological and theoretical rapprochement between this-worldly,
materialistic, anti-religious Marxism, and anti-materialistic Buddhism. The fact that such a group of
informed, concerned Thais should reach such a conclusion is, I think, portentous for the future of
the Thai people.

I then suggested to the seminar that each of the two paths could be variously subdivided, as part of
an effort to find a third one. For example, leadership of subdivided paths might be as indicated
below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEFT PATH</th>
<th>RIGHT PATH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HARD-LINE</td>
<td>MODERATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists in Insurgent Forces.</td>
<td>Non-Communists who work with or for the Insurgent Forces, hoping to moderate their policies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The seminar seemed to like the idea of subdividing the paths, and in due course one member
presented a possible Third Path which envisioned at least some limitation on violence, and yet also
had some claim on realism. This scenario would occur only after there had been considerable
bloodshed: at that point, Moderate Right-Liners and Moderate Left-Liners would be so appalled by
Thais killing Thais that they would negotiate a modus vivendi wherein steps toward some sort or
socialist Thailand would occur with key support from (perhaps younger, more modern) military
officers, without further major bloodshed. The obvious drawback to this scenario was of course that
it depended on considerable bloodshed to activate it -- yet the point was made in its defense that
such bloodshed would be much less extensive than that assumed in other scenarios. A further
drawback was that this Third Path was generally seen as not highly probable because of ideological
differences, yet the point was made that Thai leaders have in the past risen above ideological
differences in order to preserve the nation. But whether rising above such differences would mean
ideological stalemate and a freezing of then-existing social relationships, or ideological negotiation
and rapprochement that would permit constructive social change, remained a vexing question.

7. SHARED VALUE ORIENTATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE

We move now from cognitive to evaluative orientations. The broadest categorization of evaluative
orientations is best rendered in terms of a conservatism-to-radicalism continuum. Unsurprisingly,
there is general dissatisfaction with the status quo, and all forecasters prefer very substantial change
-- even those hailing from typically "conservative" occupational callings. Essentially, all of the
forecasters are either "liberal" or "radical." Among the latter, however, there are fewer who essentially follow a classical Marxist radicalism, than who call for a selective return to earlier and simpler traditions of Thai life. The majority, however, are liberal in that they prefer gradual, incremental change.

As we move to concrete value propositions, what strikes me is how much essential consensus exists (despite areas of confusion and disagreement) concerning the kind of future Thailand the forecasters desire, within the bounds of reasonable realism. I am persuaded that considerably more consensus emerged than most interviewees themselves probably suspected existed. Below are listed twelve value propositions which the data from the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios indicate are widely shared among the forecasters. While any such generalizing profile inevitably involves some distortion of individual positions, in my judgment the following propositions represent a fair summary of the values expressed on particular subjects or concepts.

1. Thailand must somehow preserve its national independence. To the reader from a powerful nation who has not done research in the Third World, it is difficult to overstate the sense of dependency that many of the forecasters expressed. They simply did not see their nation as being the master of its own fate, in the sense that Americans, for example, culturally assume national autonomy and scope for choice. Forecasters seemed, to this observer, informed and objective about, and resigned to, the low power position that Thailand occupies in world affairs. Many felt a need for one or more allies among the great powers unless and until there is stable world peace, but few seemed to regard this as otherwise a good thing in itself, and some saw it as distinctly harmful. In the event that a full-fledged civil war breaks out, interviewees who expressed opinions on the subject strongly hoped that the great powers would remain neutral and, especially, that they would not become directly involved in a military way. The memory of deep American involvement in Vietnam, and its war-prolonging consequences, was clearly operative.

At the same time, however, forecasters hardly expected that the great powers would simply go away and leave Thailand alone. Thailand is an attractive market for manufactured goods. More important, Thailand and nearby countries have raw materials that industrial nations need, materials some of which will increasingly be in critically short world supply. Especially if new deposits of oil or other increasingly demanded minerals are found—a natural gas bonanza actually did begin in 1978—Thailand was seen as likely to have no other choice than continued intensive relations with the industrial world, capitalist and probably communist as well.

2. Thai culture must be selectively conserved and revitalized. Those forecasters who spoke at all about Thai culture as a whole cultural system, spoke with deep feeling and pointed to a need for preserving and enhancing those aspects of their culture which give uniqueness and beauty to Thai life and a sense of identity to the Thai people. Cultural dependency upon the industrialized West or Japan must, they felt, be reduced. Implicitly, cultural dependency was more likely to be decried when wrapped in economic dependency. Consumerism was to be decried when wrapped in economic dependency. Consumerism was criticized not only because it sometimes violates Thai traditions, but also because it provides status symbols that artificially separate Thai from Thai. Thus, consumerism which more or less necessitates that Thais of a certain social status purchase and use certain foreign imports, was more criticized than imported movies which the individual can more freely refuse to patronize.
Selective cultural conservation was seen as a process that Thais must assertively lead and manage. For example, kreengcaj deference to one's seniors in the kin group was seen as a custom that should be retained because it contributes to the integrity of the family, while such deference to one's senior in a governmental hierarchy should be reduced because it contributes to rigidity, wrong decisions, and waste of national resources.

Scenarizers, radical and non-radical alike, devout and apparently otherwise, were unanimous in contending that the religious aspect of their culture should be selectively conserved. Buddhism was seen as a unifying, identity-giving, and humanizing force of great power. However, some forecasters felt that certain magical or divinatory accretions of folk Buddhism ought to be eliminated, and that the existing steeply hierarchical organization of the monks should be democratized.

On the whole, there seemed to be greater clarity about cultural items worthy of being discarded or resitied, than about items worthy of being somehow revitalized - but at any rate, there was no mistaking a certain pervasive yearning for an enhanced sense of Thai-ness through the revivification of cultural symbols, and a feeling that if this revivification required the use of governmental regulatory power or financial subsidies, well and good.

This entire value proposition, 'bile it will be recognizable to the Thai reader, represents, I believe, a relatively new value configuration Historically, Thais have borrowed cultural items from the West and elsewhere on a relatively pragmatic and laissez-faire basis. While governmental power has certainly been used to encourage some types of borrowing and discourage others, on the whole over the past several decades there has been no comprehensive government policy on this matter, and certainly no overall official rationale. Forecasts are now saying that there ought to be, that a laissez-faire policy leads to too many value contradictions to be tolerable any longer. An implication of this position, I believe, is that as times moves forward it will increasingly become the mark of the intellectual in Thailand to possess a coherent rationale for expressing opinions about selective cultural borrowing and rejection.

This value proposition was seen by some forecasters as highly relevant to the cognitive proposition that some kind of socialist rule is likely by A.D.2000. In contemplating this prospect, not a few forecasters seemed to be reducing some of their fears by expressing the hope that socialism, when and if it comes, will be "Thai-style" That is, not too harsh, regimented, or humorless. Clearly, this position reflects awareness of the genocidal form that "socialism" has taken in formerly Buddhist Cambodia, and the harsh and rigid form it has taken in Laos, a nation half of whose people are extremely similar in culture to the Thais. There was, however, a certain wish-fulfilling and fantasizing quality to these comments.

3. Inequities must be redressed. As indicated above, the interviewees shared the cognitive position that inequity is the root cause of political instability, and essentially took the functionalist position that no government can remain stable unless it redresses inequities in a forthright and visible manner. Aside from this cognitive proposition, there was also the evaluative proposition, shared even by forecasters of distinctly privileged socioeconomic background, that the Thai social system is extremely unfair in the rewards it distributes, and that this is blatantly wrong. Virtually all
optimistic scenarios called for reducing "the gap" between rich and poor. Virtually all pessimistic scenarios presumed a government that was unwilling or unable to reduce this gap.

One could argue that household income distribution in Thailand is somewhat more equitable (or less inequitable) than in the nearby nations of Malaysia, the Philippines, or Indonesia (see Sumitro 1975: 230). I doubt, however, whether facts of this sort would be regarded very seriously by most forecasters. Rhetoric aside -- and most forecasters seemed little interested in rhetoric -- it seems clear that they have a vision of a much more equitable Thailand, and this vision is fundamental to both their cognizing and their evaluating.

The difference in life chances between rural and urban people came in for considerable attention, with some forecasters pointing to the rice premium as a disguised tax that essentially exploits the farmers for the benefit of urban dwellers. (Cf. Samphorn Sangchai 1976: esp. p. 28.)

One special form of social inequity was pointed up by both female and male scenarizers, namely inequity as between the sexes. While the social position of the Thai woman has traditionally been high by general Asian standards, nonetheless the need for complete legal and social equality for women was an emphasized theme. Forecasters explained prostitution as stemming primarily from poverty, and under optimistic conditions forecasted its substantial reduction as poverty is eliminated. Radical forecasters went further and forecasted its virtual prohibition.

Many forecasters addressed the problem of inequity of educational opportunity as an institutional feature that tends to perpetuate inequities between classes, as well as between urban and rural Thais. While those who spoke to education issues were uniformly of the view that education has a contribution to make toward a more desirable Thailand, the current content of education was criticized as being often irrelevant to the country's real needs, and as perpetuating unneeded snob values and in effect blocking the social mobility of many Thais who under different conditions could make strong contributions to a better Thailand.

4. Government must be made responsive. With great regularity, forecasters cognitively took the position that a government must be responsive or it will be replaced by another that is. Evaluatively, a key theme was not that a specifically parliamentary-style system for insuring responsiveness is needed (though some called for this), but simply that some means must be found to insure that the government truly responds to people's needs. The social distance between the government in Bangkok and the ordinary peasant in the village was remarked by several, and various forms of village democracy designed to give local people more control over their own lives were proposed as optimistic scenarios, by both radical and non-radical forecasters.

No optimistic scenario called for an indefinitely continuing domination of the political process by the military, and many called specifically for military officers to confine their concerns strictly to professional military matters, and to enjoy no greater political rights or powers than civilians.

5. Corruption and favoritism must be drastically reduced. This value proposition is one of the least surprising, and indeed it was presented by forecasters as one of the most obvious and fundamental. Corruption and favoritism were portrayed as both indices and perpetrators of inequity and non-responsiveness. in optimistic scenarios both were forecasted as minimal by the year 2000, while in
pessimistic scenarios the existing government was seen as based so heavily on these two social patterns as to be unable to bring about their fundamental reform.

6. Freedom must be enhanced. ForecAsters used a variety of definitions of freedom. Most tended to emphasize personal freedom and civil liberties. The Thanin Administration's policy of placing restrictions on professors' freedom to teach, and students' freedom to inquire, was seen as undermining the next generation's capacity for coping with national problems. Some radical forecasters tended to emphasize what might be called cultural freedom under the guidance of a new socialist government, in which Thais would collectively make their own decisions concerning the national future, would avoid excessive consumerism, would bring an end to political-economic-cultural dependency, and would jointly decide how national resources would be utilized and divided when pressed, such forecasters conceded that the ideological tutelage caned for by their optimistic scenarios would probably result in a diminution of "psychic" freedom - e.g., the individual farmer's feeling free to decide whether to go to work or take the day off.

7 Violence must be minimized. The crucial subject of violence has been discussed above in its cognitive aspects Suffice here simply to add that the avoidance or minimization of violence was a fundamental value proposition among the forecasters, even those who desired radical social change. Since there was a rather strong tendency to regard the insurgents as the more likely winners of the political struggle in the long run (regardless of personal preference) there was also a tendency to prefer that, however the struggle for power might be settled, it be settled quickly, so as to minimize loss of life.

8 Disorder, even if nonviolent, must be minimized. Traditionally, the Thai people have placed a strong positive value upon situations of all sorts that are neat and orderly (riabrai). All else equal, the forecasters expressed a preference for social order, and this preference tended to apply even among some who would bring to an end the elaborate deference traditionally required of juniors in a hierarchical structure. It might incidentally be noted that the preservation of sane-thing like the existing order of things is in fact very much in the interest of most of these forecasters, who, as returning graduates of respected colleges and universities, will stand to benefit from the existing order and prestige hierarchy.

9. The population must be limited. Scenarizers of every political persuasion were aware of Thailand's high current rate of population growth, and eager to use the educational potential and technical capacity of the government to promote smaller families. The sample apparently did not include a single demographic chauvinist.

10. The natural environment must be preserved. Forecasters considered it imperative that action be taken to preserve the environment, giving such examples as the need to reduce air and water pollution, and to curb erosion through scientific forestry policies. The extreme air pollution and traffic congestion of Bangkok were frequently cited as examples of an inadequate national ecological policy.

11. The economy must grow. Forecasters saw much greater chances for accomplishing social equity programs in an expanding economy than in a stagnant one. Many pessimistic scenarios included stagflation resulting from the flight of private capital, stemming in turn from lack of
investor confidence due to political instability. Even radical forecasters supported economic growth strongly, though in a context of economic and cultural independence from foreign countries, especially capitalist ones. It was generally believed that Thailand's high population growth rate and strong built-in demographic momentum constituted further imperative reasons for stimulating economic growth. There was a general tendency, though, to prefer agricultural over industrial development, and to prefer industries linked to Thailand's natural comparative advantages, over industries located in Thailand solely or largely because Thai wages are low. Small, labor-intensive, dispersed industry was preferred to large, capital-intensive, urban industry.

12. Stringent governmental controls must be imposed upon the economy. There was consensus that a laissez-faire economy would not, under Thai conditions, be an equitable economy, and that it would also result in unwanted social distortions, such as too much consumerism and cultural dependency. The need for strong, rational, responsible, corruption-free controls upon the economy was taken as almost axiomatic, and some forecasters went further in varying degrees, advocating governmental ownership of various economic resources and facilities.

Unsurprisingly, no consensus emerged as to just what combination of socialist-style controls and ownership is needed, though in general, foreign firms were seen as requiring closer control than domestic ones, and securing same kind of effective control of the basic means of production was the shared general concern. While the flexible, economizing advantages of private enterprise were appreciated by same, other were simply silent on the issue. No one advocated a massive rollback of controls on private enterprise. Most of the forecasters were too Young to have clear direct recall of the corruption and waste that often occurred under government management of numerous industries and businesses during the Fifties. In any case, it is clear that when forecasters called for government involvement, they were implicitly calling perhaps less for policy change than for a whole new ethos in which honesty, expertise, and incorruptibility would prevail in the execution of policy - though it was not clear, even implicitly, just how this ethos could be caused to emerge.

8. VALUE TRADE-OFFS

While the twelve value propositions listed above summarize a considerable degree of consensus, they do not deal with trade-off considerations, that is, considerations in which the satisfaction of one value reaches a point where it diminishes the potential for satisfying another value. In my judgment, the data can be further analyzed in terms of four very broad values which modern intellectuals of virtually any society would see as important (though culture-specific definitions of these values would vary), and these are order, growth, equity, and freedom. The Thai forecasters explicitly or implicitly noted some of the trade-offs among these values, which I summarize below by pairing and cathination - this time, however, adding more of my own interpretive perspective.

1. Order-Growth There is least conflict or trade-off here. The cultural assumption is that an orderly policy will be, all else equal, an economically productive one. The forecasters seemed to recognize, however, that rapid economic growth, of the type that Thailand has been experiencing, threatens traditional bases of order in the middle or long run.

2. Order-Equity Forecasters desired order but saw existing inequity as a threat to the very type of order which traditionally has been based on this inequity -- because modernizing processes have led
to public attitudes that no longer condone such inequity. Foresters desired orderly progress
toward greater equity, and tended to despair of the then-existing regime's willingness or ability to
lead in that direction.

3. Order-Freedom. One forecaster analyzed the past forty-odd years of Thai history as a sort of
dialectic between order and freedom, with now one and now the other motif controlling, but with
order controlling for more years than freedom. In my judgment, this analysis is sound.

4. Growth-Equity. Forecasters perceived the Thai governmental elite as emphasizing growth under
capitalism (including that represented by foreign and multinational corporations) and as presuming
a continuation of low salaries and wages for workers, accompanied by high profits, interest, and
dividends for the wealthy investing class. It is a fact that Thai workers' wages are low by the
standards of other non-socialist Asian countries undergoing industrialization, although it is also
ture that Thailand's relatively rich agricultural base helps provide cheap food to urban dwellers.
These low wages, along with a legal system which for many years prohibited unions, were
important inducements for the large infusion of foreign capital that began during the Sixties. There
was same tendency among forecasters to see this system as one of growth based on inequity, and as
one which will therefore prove unviable in the longer run. Just as inequity threatens order, so it
threatens growth -- sooner or later. Forecasters felt overwhelmingly that labor should have the right
to strike or otherwise effectively press claims for greater equity.

5. Growth-Freedom. Forecasters seemed quite aware that freedom of workers to organize and
express grievances could result in interruptions of production, and hence in lower rates of
production, at least in the short run.

6. Equity-Freedom. In viewing this classic and universal dilemma, forecasters tended to take the
implicit position that new equity programs are a political necessity, and that such
programs would, and should, impair those existing freedoms of the investing class which they
would regard as exploitative of working people. The question of whether new, drastic,
nongradualistic programs promotive of equity would in fact also threaten the freedom of the
workers themselves, was one which, I suspect, some forecasters have not fully contemplated and
perhaps find it uncomfortable to contemplate; in any case, no consensus emerged on this question.

It might be added, finally, that each of the above six trade-offs ought to be viewed in terms of
fundamental constraints imposed by the growing world crisis of population, energy, minerals, and
pollution - but that takes us well beyond the present study.

9 CONCLUDING REMARKS

We have seen in this article that an opportunity sample of 25 Thai intellectuals and students in
California viewed the future through largely secular lenses, that they felt forced by the then-
prevailing situation in their country to be political in their focus, and that they were extremely
anxious about the prospect of massive violence.. Speaking within the broad bounds of realism
consensually established by the forecasters themselves, one may conclude that they want political
and cultural autonomy; they yearn for greater equity in a context of governmental responsiveness
and civil freedom; they desire strong economic growth; and they see the government as responsible
for curbing antisocial economic activities, for protecting the environment, and for promoting population limitation. In short, there is a quite solid consensus in favor of a future national culture that will be relatively modern in structure, humanistic in orientation, yet uniquely Thai in style.

To the young Thai intellectual reading this article, many of these conclusions concerning shared cognitive or evaluative propositions might provoke the response that there is "nothing new" in them. However, from the perspective of the student of history or of cultural change, there is a great deal that is new. One thing, there are certain important topics about which the propositions are silent, for the simple reason that, contrary to expectation or not, consensus among the forecasters did not exist. Further, it is instructive to slip back in time just two decades, and ask ourselves whether a similar sample of forecasters, if similarly interviewed in 1957, would have produced similar value propositions. Since I knew the subculture of the Thai students in America during the Fifties reasonably well, I shall hazard a bit of speculative retrodiction as to differences between then and now -- retrodiction that is, of course, not subject to proof or disproof. Then, many of the forecasters would have basically focused their forecasts on essentially nonpolitical variables and, by implication, have expressed the (plausible) notion that an intellectual could live out his life in Thailand quite satisfactorily without becoming politically concerned or involved in any very important sense. Now, the forecasters are indeed politically concerned, and quite pessimistically so.

Then, any expectations of political violence would have been confined mainly to small numbers of military men engaged in sporadic coups de' dat in Bangkok; now, the modal expectation is that violence will involve large numbers of innocent civilians throughout the nation over a sizeable period of time. Then, Thailand had a population of some 24 million, and even Thais of high educational attainment tended to be ignorant of the population-ecology problem; now, with a national population of some 44 million (Thomlinson 1971: 23) we find all or virtually all of the forecasters demographically and ecologically aware, or even sophisticated.

Then, there would have been, I think, an emphasis upon modernization stemming (in greater part than same forecasters perhaps would have realized or conceded) from a desire to seem modern in Western eyes; now, this tendency has substantially dissipated, and has been partially replaced by a desire to pursue an independent Thai road to development and to minimize undue and harmful Western influence and "modernization without development," as it were. Then, desire for personal freedom would have been emphasized; now, desire for freedom is still emphasized, but in a manner that is tightly coupled with desire for equity. Then, desire for modernization stemmed from optimistic or complacent idealism; now, desire for modernization is accompanied by a sense of pessimistic despair. Then, need for fundamental social change was seen as genuine but only moderately urgent; now, it is seen as truly urgent, but at the same time not highly likely. Finally, then, members of the Thai student subculture in America tended simply to assume that they would return home at the end of their studies and live out their lives in Thailand. Now, some forecasters speak freely of the possibility of becoming expatriates if and when events prove that they cannot lead happy and effective lives in Thailand.

In conducting the ethnographic interviews on which this article is based, I have exerted the strongest kind of effort to keep my own biases under control, and to listen carefully, patiently, and integratively to everything the forecasters had to say. While I do not wish to be labelled either an
optimist or a pessimist but simply a concerned student and friend of Thailand, I must nonetheless register a measure of concern. The forecasters whose expectations and values are herein summarized belong to a truly impressive group of qualified intellectuals, experts, and technocrats who possess the potential to contribute effectively to the very kind of modernizing and humanizing leadership which many observers feel is needed at this point in Thai history. It is ironic that individuals of such quality (who, to repeat, might or might not be representative) should exhibit anxiety, doubt, alienation, and pessimism.

I can only conclude by thanking the forecasters for their forthright honesty and confidence, and by wishing with and for them that events shall somehow non-violently transpire toward that kind of future Thailand which they, with obvious concern and loyalty, clearly desire for their society.

10. METHODOLOGICAL DETAILS

[Content deleted – RBT]

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NOTES
1. No overall listing of Thai students studying in California or in the U.S. was available to me, so that I was, and remain, unaware of overall demographic parameters of either total population. For this reason no precise statement or claim can be made as to the degree of representativeness of the sample, and in this article I generalize simply to the sample, rather than to any universe, real or theoretical.
At the same time, however, I was at pains to build my sample in such a way as to avoid any obvious unrepresentativeness. I countered a perhaps natural tendency to select social scientists by seeking out people in engineering, business, etc.'

It is possible that my sample has a "California bias." One Thai methodologist, for example, has advised me that Thais in California have a tendency (vis-a-vis Thais in the rest of the U.S.) to be studying on scholarship rather than family funds, to be unusually high in achievement motivation, and to be disproportionately Sino-Thai in background.

Finally, there is the problem of possible information bias. Some forecasters had not been in Thailand for a few years, and hence did not have fresh first-hand information. Mitigating this, however, was the fact that the American press, as well as the rather active Thai-language press published in California, were free to print whatever they wished with respect to Thai affairs -- while the press in Thailand at that time was rigidly controlled. Moreover, Thais in California on the whole probably felt considerably freer to express themselves concerning their country's future than they would have at home under conditions prevailing during the Than in Administration.. Some of these problems can be resolved as soon as the present research project can be taken to Thailand, where a variety of types of forecasters can be interviewed.

The sample I ended up with had the following characteristics. The great majority of them were students, and the great majority of these were graduate students, Seven California four-year colleges or universities were represented. About half of the forecasters were in the various social sciences, with the remainder spread over many fields, especially applied ones.: About one-third were female.. The median age was about 27, with a semi-interquartile range from 24.5 to 31.5.

2. An EFR study of Sweden in the year 2005, conducted by Stanford University students partially under my direction in 1978, with locally available Swedish intellectuals and students as forecasters, revealed a striking tendency for forecasters simply to assume that over the next generation governmental regimes would be responsive to popular needs and demands, and hence that the governmental structure would be highly stable. Even one avowed Communist forecaster, whose party has virtually no chance of attaining power in Sweden, evidenced this attitude..

3. The first of the two seminars was conducted totally in Thai, and I was the only non-Thai present.. The second was conducted almost totally in English, since several non-Thai-speaking Americans were present. These Americans, all university students, generally had had some experience in Thailand; they participated actively and asked knowledgeable, stimulating questions.. Thus, the first seminar was one in which Thais were stimulating Thais, while the second was one in which Thais were being stimulated by both Thais and Americans..

In participating in these two seminars, I enjoyed the special advantage that I had earlier given the private futures interview to most of the Thais present, and during these interviews some had told me many things that they obviously did not wish to share in the larger seminar situation. I thus received, in effect, three quite separate types of data flow.
4. Somchai Rakwijit (1976: 65) reports a survey of Thai opinion in which similar findings emerge. For example, in his sample, 43.4% of "big businessmen and industrialists" prefer "strong democracy/mixed economy," while 40.4% prefer "strong democracy/free enterprise."

5. I wish to thank several of the forecasters for their suggestions for improving the manuscript of the present article; all of them preferred to remain anonymous, as did certain other experts who read and criticized the manuscript. In addition, I wish to thank Jack Alpert, Roy Amara, Clifford R. Barnett, Robert Johansen, Robert C. North, Denis C. Phillips, Bernard J. Siegel, G. William Skinner, Franklin B. Weinstein, and Linda Weinstein. Needless to add, responsibility for the content of this article is solely mine.
APPENDIX FIVE: EXAMPLE OF A GROUP OF PARTICIPANTS' FINAL WRITE-UP OF AN E.F.R. PROJECT

[Explanatory Note: this Appendix is a reprint of an article that appeared in the Journal of Cultural and Educational Futures, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1980. The article illustrates how the ethnographer can work with his or her interviewees so as to produce a joint product, in which the primary (or, in some cases, exclusive) responsibility for write-up is in the hands of the interviewees, operating as a group.]

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR ASEAN: AN EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

BY The ASEAN Scholars Group:

ASIAH binte Abu Samah, Director, Curriculum Development Centre, Ministry of Education, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Josefina R. CORTES, Professor of Educational Administration and Director, Research and Development Center, College of Education, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Philippines

Miguela B. FLORES, Deputy Director, National Educational Testing Center, Ministry of Education and Culture, Manila, Philippines

'SAW Baron, Professor in Pedagogical Studies in Education and Dean, Faculty of Education, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Agustina NASUTTON, Lecturer, Institute of Teacher Training and Education, Medan, Indonesia

Samuel PAMANTUNG, Lecturer, Institute of Teacher Training and Education, Manado, Indonesia

SONG-SAK Srikalasin, Vice President for Academic Affairs, Sri Nakharinwirot University, Bangkok, Thailand

SUTICHAT Liangjayetz, Director of Personnel, Office of Higher Education, Bangkok, Thailand

TEO Lye Huat, Principal, Gan Eng Sang Secondary School, Singapore

YEE Sze Onn, Lecturer, Social Studies Department, Institute of Education, Singapore

Edited by
Robert B. Textor
Stanford University

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR ASEAN: AN EDUCATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
This article outlines the views which we ten co-authors share concerning alternative middle-range cultural futures for the five member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Two of us come from each of these nations, and we are all educators -- professors, researchers, administrators, and/or planners - employed by our respective national governments, All of us have earned advanced degrees in the West in some education-related field. While only a minority among us have been professionally involved in Futures Research or planning as a specialty, all of us have lived long enough, during a momentous period of Southeast Asian history, to have experienced sweeping changes in the cultures of our respective nations, and all are deeply interested in examining alternative futures, and especially in the educational aspects thereof.

1.1 AN OVERVIEW OF ASEAN

1.1 WHAT IS ASEAN?

The ASEAN countries comprise the bulk of the region conventionally known as "Southeast Asia. The only portions of Southeast Asia that do not belong to this organization are the three Communist Indochinese states, Burma, and the tiny sultanate of Brunei.

ASEAN was formally established in Bangkok in 1967 upon the signing of a Joint Declaration by the foreign ministers of the five countries.

1.2 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

As a regional organization, ASEAN aims primarily to secure peace, progress, and well-being for its peoples through regional cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, scientific, and technological fields. It is not a political or military organization.

The organization's objectives and principles are set forth in the ASEAN Concord (February 23, 1976, First ASEAN Summit Conference):

1. The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is seen as an essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member will attempt to eliminate threats to its stability posed by subversion.
2. Member states, individually and collectively, are to take active steps toward the early establishment of the ASEAN region as a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality."
3. The elimination of poverty, hunger, disease, and illiteracy is a primary concern of the member states, which are to intensify cooperation in economic and social development, with particular emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on the improvement of the living standards of their peoples.
4. Member states are to assist each other within their capabilities in times of natural disasters or calamities.
5. Member states are to take cooperative action in their national and regional development programs, utilizing as far as possible the resources available in the ASEAN region to broaden the complementarity of their respective economies.
6. Member states are to rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences, and to strive to create conditions conducive to the promotion of peaceful cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia on the basis of mutual respect and mutual benefit.

1. Member states are to vigorously develop an awareness of regional identity and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN community, respected by all nations on the basis of mutually advantageous relationships, and in accordance with the principles of self-determination, sovereign equality, and non-interference in the internal affairs of any nation.

1.3 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

ASEAN functions through various ad hoc and permanent committees accountable to the annual meeting of ministers, whose decisions are made on the basis of unanimous consensus. The first ASEAN Summit Conference, held in Bali in 1976, created the ASEAN Secretariat to serve as the central administrative organ. The Secretariat is located in Jakarta, Indonesia.

1.4 COMMITMENTS AND LEADERSHIP

All five ASEAN governments are committed to social and economic development through regional self-reliance. Each member country has an extraordinary and pragmatic quality of leadership that has mobilized cadres of capable people who are facing squarely the major problems of each nation. All five governments recognize the importance of closer regional cooperation and have developed an elaborate framework of consultation on all major social and economic issues. As a regional alliance, ASEAN has gained respect and recognition from Western and other powers, and from other regional alliances.

1.5 CURRENT EFFORTS

Among the many efforts currently being undertaken by the ASEAN leadership to advance toward ASEAN's goals, the following examples are illustrative.

1. ASEAN is attempting to increase intra-regional trade through mutual across-the-board preferential tariff reductions of 10% on all products, and through trade liberalization schemes on manufactured products.

2. ASEAN is attempting to promote industrial cooperation by allocating among the member nations certain large-scale industrial projects, e.g., urea for Indonesia and Malaysia, superphosphates for the Philippines, diesel engines for Singapore, and potash for Thailand. Each of these projects will be joint ventures with all the five member countries participating in equity and sharing in profits and risks (60% for the host country and 10% for each member country).

3. ASEAN is attempting to expand economic relations with the socialist countries.

1.6 THE TIMELINESS OF ASEAN FUTURES RESEARCH

Futures Research today on ASEAN could hardly be more timely. This timeliness is borne of an urgency increasingly felt by ASEAN's political leaders in recent years, to find ways to bring about
harmony and unity among the five nations as they face unprecedented threats from the outside. In particular, they face a profoundly different international situation consequent upon the fall of Saigon in 1975, and a genuine territorial threat consequent upon the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978. Such epoch-making events could hardly fail to impact upon ASEAN as an organization, even though the organization is, officially and technically, not of a military or political character. Thus, ASEAN as an organization is under pressure to develop rapidly, as part of a broader process in which the governments of the five nations engage increasingly in collective anticipation and action.

Nonetheless, at this writing ASEAN remains, in many respects, a blueprint organization -- a potential rather than an accomplished reality. To a very considerable extent, ASEAN will become that leaders in the region decide to fashion it into. Within certain limits, the future form of ASEAN will be invented by these leaders -- and the invention that emerges will be a Southeast Asian invention, one which will probably look quite different, in important respects, from regional organizations elsewhere. In shaping ASEAN, these leaders will, in other words, be drawing upon their own enculturative experiences as Southeast Asians, and building in terms of the images they hold as to what ASEAN can and should be. Since we ten co-authors are Southeast Asians in a position to further the development of ASEAN, it would seem appropriate enough that our own relevant images be made the object of our own self-study -- which is what this article is about.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ASEAN REGION

The ASEAN region embraces a striking variety of cultures and traditions. Through the centuries, indigenous cultural forms have been modified by strong influences from Indian and Chinese civilizations, and more recently from the West -- Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Chinese religious orientations, and Christianity, as well as a variety of pre-existing religious forms, exist side by side, and in various blends. Except for Thailand, the ASEAN countries were all colonies of Britain, the Netherlands, or the U.S. until after World War II, and for this reason the attainment of full functional independence in all aspects of national life, and especially in economics, remains an important agenda.

2.1 DEMOGRAPHY

Demographically, the ASEAN region is characterized by a diversity of racial types, languages, and religions. Migrations of different peoples through the centuries explain this diversity in part, as does the location of the region on trade routes passing between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

With the exception of Singapore, birth rates in the ASEAN countries are high, especially in the Philippines. Spatially, the population is unevenly distributed. Large concentrations of people are found in the deltaic zones, the river valleys and flood plains, and along the coastal lowlands. Most of the population is rural (except in Singapore) but there is a constant drift from the countryside to the cities and towns, which are becoming increasingly congested as a result.

2.2 NATURAL RESOURCES
With the exception of Singapore, which has an area of only 224 square miles and virtually no resources other than some rock aggregates and building sand, the nations of ASEAN are rich in minerals and other raw materials. Collectively they are responsible for the bulk of several of the world's leading primary commodities, such as rubber and palm oil. In addition, to these items are minerals such as tin, iron ore, copper, petroleum, and natural gas, as well as extensive areas of commercially valuable hardwood forests.

2.3 DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS

Although the five ASEAN countries have much in common, they differ significantly in levels of economic development. At one end of the scale is Singapore with its industrial and trading economy; at the other is Indonesia with its immense, resource-rich agricultural economy. Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand are intermediate in level of economic development. Marked disparities occur in income between rural and urban people and between different ethnic groups. Except for Singapore, there is a growing unemployment and underemployment problem. At the same time, there is a general shortage of manpower at the higher levels, especially in science and technology. Added to these problems are those brought about by inflation and increasing energy costs. In spite of the area's abundance of natural resources, the question remains as to whether the five member states can manage to pool their resources and effectively implement concrete plans for regional economic cooperation, thus helping to raise the standard of living for the 240 million people who live there.

Like many other regional organizations around the world, ASEAN is beset with many problems. Perhaps even more serious than the threat posed by Vietnam are the numerous problems that have arisen within and between the various nations: problems arising from economic disparities, sociocultural differences, differences in political systems and ideologies, and unequal treatment accorded certain ethnic, regional, or rural groups.

Also characteristic of the ASEAN countries is the process of rural-to-urban drift which, if left unchecked, will lead to a dangerous proliferation of slums and squatter areas of a type already common in and around the urban centers of Manila, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, and Bangkok.

Socially and culturally, the goal of each of the ASEAN countries is to create a national identity and national purpose for its polyglot population. The rapid pace of modernization has led to a breakdown in traditional values and norms, and disrupted the extended family system. Responses to the dislocation of modernization are seen in the tendencies toward religious revival currently evident in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and in a growing emphasis on indigenous aesthetic and artistic forms of expression.

2.4 EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS

In education, much progress has been made in various spheres, but serious problems still remain. These include the following.

1. An increasing demand for education at all levels.
2. Limited access to education due to inadequate space and
3. Inequality in educational opportunities as between rural and urban people, ethnic groups, and income groups.
4. Serious shortages of teachers in science, mathematics, and English.
5. Oversupply of teachers in the humanities and/or social sciences.
6. Need to gear the curriculum so that it is relevant to national needs.
7. Problems caused by changes in the medium of instruction (except in Thailand).
9. Reluctance of teachers to serve in areas away from the towns and cities.
10. Escalating cost of education.
11. Poor quality of teachers, partly because less able students go into teaching.
12. Inefficiency in the management of education.
13. The difficulty of simultaneously satisfying both the quantitative and the qualitative demands for education.
14. Excessive social and economic value attached to the school certificate and college diploma.

3. THE ETHNOGRAPHIC FUTURES RESEARCH (E.F.R.) APPROACH

The bulk of this report represents the result of an experience in thinking about alternative futures for ASEAN, in which we members of the ASEAN Scholars Program spent two months in early 1980 at the Stanford University School of Education, and especially its International Development Education program, engaged in reading, reflection, and discussion concerning these alternative futures, and their educational implications. The initial idea for this Program came from scholars in the ASEAN region, and after appropriate diplomatic and administrative discussions the program came into being under the sponsorship of the U.S. International Communication Agency in cooperation with the U.S. Office of Education. The Stanford experience was part of a broader one, involving visits to other universities and educational organizations throughout the U.S., called the "ASEAN Project in Curriculum Development for Long Range Planning and Assessment in Education."

Our period at Stanford was enlivened by the fact that each of us was given an Ethnographic Futures Research (EFR) interview by Robert B Textor, who originated and developed this approach Dr. Textor is Professor of Education and Anthropology at Stanford, and served as Coordinating Consultant for the Stanford portion of our total program.

EFR is a new type of ethnographic inquiry adapted to the needs and constraints of Futures Research. EFR is a confidential, non-directive, loosely structured, open-ended, interactive means of eliciting, in scenario form, people's present perceptions about possible or probable alternative middle-range future cultures or subcultures for a particular society or group. EFR is an auxiliary approach to the study of culture change, and as such produces a research product, simultaneously, it is intended to produce an educational process, for both interviewer and interviewee. No further attempt to explain the rationale and procedure of EFR is needed here, since these are dealt with in detail in Dr. Textor's A Handbook on Ethnographic Futures Research, which may be ordered through him.

Our EFR interviews averaged more than three hours in length, during which Dr. Textor elicited from us our scenarios for possible or probable, and preferable, sociocultural futures for our respective countries, and for the ASEAN region as a whole, as of an approximate horizon date of A.D. 2005.
The scenarios thus elicited were not, of course, predictions - but simply reasonable, non-utopian, non-dystopian statements of broad, interrelated, and usually coherently patterned expectations and preferences concerning alternative cultural futures that, in our perception, could become reality.

The immediate result of Professor Textor's having interviewed us was that each of us received, shortly thereafter, a rather lengthy protocol summarizing his or her scenarios. This protocol, dictated piece by piece during the interview in our presence, and hence subject to our immediate feedback and correction, was divided into several sections: (1) our "Optimistic Scenario" for our country and for the ASEAN region as of A.D. 2005; (2) our "Pessimistic Scenario"; (3) our "Most Probable Scenario"; and (4) our "Most Plausible Model" of causation of the Most Probable Scenario.

The next step was for each of us to study, edit, and correct his or her protocol, assessing it holistically and checking it for accuracy and overall balance. This step was done privately, in order to provide insulation against interviewer influence.

After we had edited our protocols, we voted unanimously that each of us would share his or her protocol with each of the others. Duplicate copies were made, and each of us then studied the other nine protocols. This, plus long discussions that followed, proved to be a rich educational experience, and served noticeably to raise our consciousness, and to encourage us to identify as "Aseanians" -- a term that we now began to use in referring to ourselves. Our conclusion is that EFR is a useful educational and sensitizing experience, and a useful auxiliary tool for the educational planner and policymaker. The educational effects of the EFR experience were heightened by other activities we pursued: attendance in numerous courses, meetings with numerous professors in our own special education- and futures-oriented ASEAN Seminar, and numerous informal discussions with Stanford faculty and students. The value of our experience was further heightened by the fact that we all resided in two nearby hotels in downtown Palo Alto, and spent a great deal of time together informally. Both logistically and intellectually, our experience was further enriched by almost daily contact with Macario Anonuevo and Hernando Gonzalez of the Philippines, and Yusoff Hanifah of Malaysia, who are doctoral candidates in International Development Education and scholars of substance in their respective nations.

As our images of alternative futures for ASEAN became clearer, we made presentations on this subject, first to Professor Textor's "Cultural Approaches to Alternative Futures" class, where we received feedback from Stanford students, and then, more formally, to a faculty-student seminar sponsored by the Stanford International Development Education Center, and open to the university community. The present report is the precipitate of all these presentations and discussions. The report has, at our request, been edited by Professor Textor. Also at our request, he has added his own brief comments, as appropriate, here and there throughout the article, in order to add the perspective of an outsider who has spent many years specializing on the region as a whole; these comments are indicated by his initials.

As my first comment, let me simply express NY thanks to the ASEAN Scholars for contributing to my knowledge of current problems in the ASEAN region, and for being willing to undertake searching inquiry into areas that often lay beyond their immediate concern as educators. In editing
In their report, I have tried to stay as close as possible to what I discern to be letter and spirit of their intent.

We would be the first to concede the obvious, namely that no one can know what the ASEAN countries or region will be like in three or five years, much less twenty-five. Yet one thing is quite certain: they will be much different from today. Twenty-five years ago some of our countries had not yet even attained independence, and others had only recently gained it. When change is so rapid, it is only prudent that leadership, including that in education, attempt to anticipate it, prepare for it, and educate for it. It is in this spirit that we present below our Optimistic, Pessimistic, and Most probable Scenarios, plus additional commentary. We hope that the experience of reading this material will prove stimulating to the reader in a manner reflecting our own sense of excitement.

4 THE OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO

An "optimistic scenario" is here defined as one which is not quite the best that could occur, but highly desirable. Generally speaking, our Group tends to share the following Optimistic Scenario for ASEAN and its constituent countries between 1980 and 2005.

4.1 DEMOGRAPHY

Optimistically, we forecast a gradual decrease in the rate of population growth in all the ASEAN countries, due to the spread of education, especially family planning education of the masses of people, to the effective implementation of family planning programs, to the increasing awareness of the people of economic and social problems that follow from a large population increase, and to the desire of married couples for better educated and better provided-for children.

Indonesia, with approximately 140 million people in 1980, will optimistically attain a 2.2 percent rate of population growth by 2005. Its population will then be about 250 million people.

In Malaysia the growth rate will fall from 2.5 percent in 1980 to 1.5 in 2005. Its population will be around 25 million in that year, as against 13 million in 1980.

Optimistically, the Philippines will reach a population growth rate of 2.0 percent by 2005, and its total population will have grown from 49 million in 1980 to about 73 million two and a half decades later.

Thailand's rate of population growth will gradually fall from 2.5 percent in 1980 to 2.2 in 2005, so that its total population will increase from 45 million to about 80 million.

On the other hand, Singapore, which had a 1.2 percent rate of population growth in 1980, will alter its population policy so as to encourage a somewhat higher population growth rate, in order to forestall the effects of an unduly aged population. At the present rate of growth, Singapore will have a population of about 3.7 million people in A.D. 2005, as against 2.7 million in 1980.
By A.D. 2005, based on the projected optimistic rate of population growth, the population of the entire ASEAN region will be about 430 million. A typical family in the region in A.D. 2005 will have 2 or 3 children. There will still be people in the region who will continue to oppose family planning on religious or other grounds, but they will have minimal effect on the trend toward a falling rate of population growth.

An optimistic scenario must, of course, remain within the bounds of realism, and our sense of realism forces us to concede that some of the more crowded cities will almost certainly outgrow themselves, and some densely populated islands, such as Java, Bali, and Madura, will become "city islands."

Optimistically, over the next 25 years there will be appreciably greater migrational mobility within all the ASEAN countries, bringing about a better distribution of the population, especially to areas that require a plentiful supply of labor to meet economic development needs.

While some readers might not regard the population levels in the above forecast as "optimistic," and while we ourselves might wish for population stabilization to occur at lower levels, our sense of realism does not permit us to forecast, even optimistically, lower levels than the above. We nonetheless do feel that this forecast, accompanied by other optimistic yet realistic assumptions, carries with it the distinct possibility of economic growth, higher standards of living, and political stability.

4.2 ENERGY

In looking upon the energy domain, optimistically or otherwise, it is clear that there will be some variability among the five ASEAN nations, due to obvious differences in their natural energy endowments.

Singapore will continue to be highly dependent for its oil supply on other countries. In Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, oil will continue to be found and exploited, but the most optimistic forecast that our sense of realism can support is that the supply will be sufficient only to meet the domestic needs of these countries, except possibly in Indonesia.

However, all the ASEAN countries will look into alternatives to petroleum. Malaysia and Indonesia will develop hydroelectric power. The Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand will develop gas. Geothermal energy will be harnessed by the Philippines and Indonesia. And all the ASEAN countries will also attempt to develop nuclear energy if this proves to be safe and cost-effective.

4.3 GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Optimistically and realistically, by A.D. 2005 the political boundaries of the ASEAN nations will remain approximately as they were in 1980.

The Malaysia-Thailand boundary will remain stable. The separatist element in the four Muslim provinces of South Thailand will not succeed in seceding. Brunei will have become a part of
Malaysia. Sarawak and Sabah will still be a part of Malaysia, but a higher proportion of top civil servants will be sarawakians and Sabahans. The territorial extent of Indonesia and the Philippines will remain the same.

Optimistically and realistically, the five ASEAN nations will enjoy a fair degree of internal political stability by A.D. 2005.

Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand will, optimistically, enjoy governments chosen through democratic processes, as Malaysia and Singapore did in 1980, and will continue to.

In Indonesia, the President of the Republic might be military or might be civilian, but both military and civilian citizens will have the same rights and opportunity to become president. Whoever is President in A.D. 2005 will have attained that office in accordance with the Five Principles (Pancasila) and the 1945 Constitution. If the President is a military person then, it will not be because he is military, but simply because he is the most capable person to carry out that role.

By A.D. 2005, martial law in the Philippines will have become a thing of the past, and there will be conventional constitutionalism with orderly change of government in response to electoral results.

The "New Society" of the Philippines -- which, on its face, is simply a movement toward harnessing all resources to the end that all of the Filipino people will enjoy a higher quality of life - - will optimistically have achieved substantial progress, so that by 2005 the Philippines will have become a society that is egalitarian, participatory, and humane.

By A.D. 2005 Thailand will optimistically enjoy a civilian-led government by virtue of the full cooperation of the Thai military. Military people will still have a voice, but in order to run for Parliament, a military officer will have to resign his commission first. Even counting such resigned persons as "military," the military influence in government will be less than that of civilians. Nonetheless, the military will still have some influence, and political stability will still depend on their support. The Thai monarchic institution will survive in its present form.

In A.D. 2005, Malaysia and Singapore will have political systems much the same as those in 1980.

In Malaysia, the monarchy will continue to function within a parliamentary system of government. However, there will be an informal tendency toward closer contact between the monarchy and the people. Optimistically and realistically there will have been substantial progress made toward amalgamating the three major cultural groupings, that is, the Malays, Chinese, and Indians -- and hence toward creating a more concrete overall Malaysian identity.

The political system in Singapore will continue to be rational, clean, and fair. It will have accomplished SD much additional visible progress that the electorate will continue to repose a high degree of confidence in the People's Action Party (PAP) Although Singapore will not have become a one-party state, no other political party will have emerged to challenge the PAP seriously. The party will accomplish this because its leadership will have successfully groomed a new generation of young and talented, as well as academically outstanding leaders who will discharge their responsibilities to the satisfaction of the overwhelming majority of Singaporeans.
By A.D.2005, optimistically and realistically, all the ASEAN peoples will enjoy greater freedom of expression, including freedom to criticize the government at every level, it will be freedom with responsibility, which will be seen as a fundamental feature of good citizenship.

Because of effective enforcement of anti-corruption laws, and more importantly because of further economic growth and better social services that will have more than satisfied the basic economic and social needs of the ASEAN peoples, corruption, especially in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, will have declined to a minimal level by A.D.2005.

By that year, optimistically and realistically, there will have been no communist takeover in any of the ASEAN nations. The general public in these nations will by then be more politically interested, informed, and involved -- so that the external communist threat will tend to draw the ASEAN countries closer together and enhance their solidarity.

A bit more specificity as to just how all these liberalizing changes are to come about would be helpful. The scenario seems to assume cumulative culture change, such that man forms of authoritarian behavior will gradually become unacceptable, and consequently less common. Such culture change can be greatly abetted or frustrated, however, depending on the kind of political leadership a nation has, and on how willing the existing elite is to give up certain privileges. -- RBT

The united stand of ASEAN in the face of a common adversary will, optimistically, spur the member countries toward attaining greater internal political stability, and thus enable them to accomplish greater economic growth and provide better welfare services to their people.

The ASEAN peoples will then be in a better position to appreciate the need for being Aseanians, and for bringing to realization the concept of an Aseanian identity.

4.4 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Each country in the region has come a long way toward modernization over the past 25 years, but there exists much room for improvement in the next 25. Important among existing problems are the income distribution gap, under-production, a weak technological and industrial base, and a less than fully effective record in manpower planning and human resources development.

Even an optimistic scenario must acknowledge inflation as a disease that occurs along with economic growth, and as an epidemic infection from the outside world which will require skillful financial and fiscal management by each ASEAN government.

In looking ahead 25 years, we note the vast amount of still untapped, undeveloped natural resources (except in Singapore, which, however, is well ahead in its human resources and industrial development) together with the existing labor costs in comparison with the developed countries, and hence we find it easy to project realistically a scenario of considerable further economic growth for the region.
Within the context of such an overview, we project that each of the ASEAN countries, except Singapore, will place a continuing and even growing emphasis on agricultural and rural development in an effort to increase agricultural production and hence exports. The problem of food shortage is not likely to exist in the ASEAN region for a long time to come.

This statement does not take into account problems of endemic malnutrition found in various parts of the region, or seasonally precarious food production situations in such areas as Northeast Thailand and Central and East Java. - RBT

Singapore will continue with its policy of following and adapting from the experiences of the highly industrialized nations in determining how to manage and change its economy. The republic will move rapidly toward technological and industrial growth, which will bring it greater prosperity and material well-being. The industrial growth of the other ASEAN countries can generally be forecasted, optimistically, at a much higher rate than previously experienced, or at least at a rate not below the previous rate - because of low labor costs, greater volume in agricultural production, and more effective ways of exploiting natural resources. Thus, while Singapore will continue to grow in such export-oriented industries as electronic computers, the rest of the ASEAN countries can be forecasted to grow in import-substitution industries and export-oriented agriculture. At present, there are certain basic and intermediate industries already established even in the least industrially developed ASEAN country, such as textile factories, fertilizer plants, automobile assembly plants, etc., which will foster the development of various chains of forward or backward linkage industries.

The tourist industry in each ASEAN country is a factor in the economy, and there is no reason not to forecast its continuing growth. Further efforts toward maintaining the cultural uniqueness of each country -- which is a worthy end in and of itself -- will also be beneficial to its tourist industry and to growth in its goods and services sector.

Transportation and communication in each country will inevitably grow with higher demand, producing the side effect of increasing traffic problems. The building and construction sectors of the economy will also continue to grow.

We optimistically forecast the emergence of an ASEAN model of growth that will be less and less dependent on the West. Appropriate measures will be introduced to insure against undue dependence on any one particular capital-supplying nation. The development pattern will be conceptualized in terms of a much more diversified array of social indicators than has been used in the past. Such a list will include a consideration of balance as between economic growth and a host of other considerations in the general area of quality of life, social harmony, enhancement of people's aesthetic life, and control of environmental deterioration. In other words, economic and material growth will not be conceived as the ultimate goal of development for the region. The ASEAN peoples will, optimistically, have discovered that an exclusive or primary emphasis upon material progress is not, in itself, sufficiently satisfying, and they will hardly wish to goon emphasizing materialism to the virtual exclusion of other considerations, such as the spiritual and aesthetic values in life. Bence, we optimistically forecast that the ASEAN peoples will moderate the emphasis upon materialism as an index of well-being, and increase the emphasis upon spiritual and other non-materialist considerations.
All of this implies a concept of development that emphasizes not competition, but cooperation; a concept not of affluence for some, but of sufficiency for all; a concept of individual rights and ownership that is subject to the well-being of society; a concept of pluralistic power in which human beings may live with one another in more mutually satisfactory ways, and in harmony with nature and the environment; and finally, a concept of liberation from sociocultural imperialism by lessening the dependence of poor nations on wealthy nations which permits the latter to take advantage of the former.

In short, we optimistically forecast a quantitatively and qualitatively balanced developmental model guided by moral and religious principles, in contrast to the Western quantitative materialistic technological model, as the emerging ASEAN model for development.

The ASEAN organization offers further hope for balanced economic development in that it provides a mechanism for collective bargaining with the industrial and investing nations. Properly used, this mechanism can be effective in preventing foreign interests from unduly playing one member nation off against another, in terms of which will sell a given primary product on least advantageous terms, which will provide the cheapest labor, which will tolerate the greatest "export of pollution," etc. — RBT

4.5 SOCIETY AND CULUME

The Sixties and Seventies saw unprecedently rapid socio-economic and cultural changes in the ASEAN region as a whole. With the improvement of technology in agriculture and industry, with the growth in the volume of international trade, and with better planning and management of national development programs (evidenced, for example, by successive five-year development plans in various ASEAN countries), the peoples of the ASEAN region enjoyed economic prosperity such as they had never seen before. This is not to say, of course, that there have been no problems or dangers such as inflation, stailation, energy depletion at the international level, unemployment, urban congestion, and the like - yet, on balance, the progress has indeed been impressive, as compared with the immediate post-war and post-independence years of the Forties and Fifties.

Such impressive socio-economic progress, particularly at such a rapid pace, could hardly have been attained without sacrifice of other values, and indeed the improved economic and comfort standards, which seem to have penetrated even to the farthest reaches of the rural areas, have long since begun to take their toll. During the Sixties and Seventies there were many symptoms of the erosion of such cherished values as the integrity of the extended and nuclear family systems, community spirit, and concern for elders and others above self -- as a result of the continuing emphasis on economic and material gains.

It is anticipated that such indices of value decadence will be compelling, by the middle or late Eighties, as to produce soul-searching reappraisals in all the ASEAN nations. Optimistically, by the year 2005 each country will have shifted its development strategy from one pivoted mainly on economic growth, to one emphasizing all aspects of human development -- encompassing
humanistic, ethical, and aesthetic values as well as economic and technological goals. Excessive affluence will be frowned upon, and humanity and sufficiency will be the order of the day.

Optimistically, we forecast a revival of religious interest, which had been evident in a more violent form in earlier decades, but which will have found its own positive level by the year 2005. The more insecure, almost militant, revolt against materialism will have tapered off, giving way to a more enlightened, yet still intrinsically spiritual, outlook upon the world that will appeal more and more to the intelligentsia in society. Religious studies and pursuits will be more and more related to the concerns of everyday practical life. Religion will be a strong and unifying moral force.

The integrity of family life, so gravely strained in earlier decades, will also find a new positive level. Optimistically, the accent on humanistic values will pull family relationships together, though perhaps not as closely as they were in the early 1900s. There will be more democratic relationships all around -- between husbands and wives, between parents and children, among siblings, and among relatives -- but there will be a new closeness, stability, and security in these relationships that will be refreshing.

Optimistically, not only will family relationships be more democratic, but so will relationships between the sexes. The status of women will improve significantly, they will be more nearly equal partners of their male counterparts, and will be able to enter fields hitherto closed or only reluctantly opened to them, in the public and private sectors. There will be more women engineers, managers, high-level executives, politicians, and perhaps even presidents or prime ministers! Such improved status may give rise to certain strains in family relationships, particularly in the area of childrearing, but it is also envisaged that there will be better community-based child-care services to help alleviate the problem.

It seems not excessively optimistic to forecast that greater attention will be paid to the emotional and psychological welfare of the aged, with built-in intrinsic and extrinsic incentives for the care of parents and older relatives. For old people who do not have family members to take care of them, there will be comfortable community-style residences and nursing homes available, where they can enjoy the company of others or engage in their own hobbies and recreations.

Optimistically, we forecast that governments will respond creatively to the serious rural-to-urban drift of the Seventies, with a new development strategy that will pay greater attention to improvement of opportunities and amenities in rural areas. Intrinsic and extrinsic incentives will motivate a reverse, urban-to-rural migration that will help relieve the congestion of urban areas.

By 2005 each of the ASEAN countries (except Thailand, where Bangkok Thai has long been the standard language) will optimistically have fully attained its objective of developing a national language (Indonesian for Indonesia, Bahasa Malaysia for Malaysia, and Pilipino for the Philippines) which will be used for daily communication among the people and through the media, and as a medium of instruction at the elementary and secondary levels of education. This successful development of a national language in each of the ASEAN countries will be influential in promoting cooperation among ethnic groups in each country, and will be a strong force in fostering viable national identities.
English will be taught as a second language in school throughout the region - except in Singapore, where it will be the medium of instruction at all levels of education, with Mandarin, Malay, and Tamil taught as second languages. Indeed, the widespread use of English for intercultural communication will serve importantly to bring various peoples together both within and among the ASEAN nations. The national languages of each of the other member ASEAN countries will be a part of the school curriculum in at least some of the ASEAN countries by the year 2005 - as will Japanese, Chinese, Arabic, Dutch, and/or Spanish.

4.6 ENVIRONMENT AND ECOLOGY

Optimistically, by A.D. 2005 all of the ASEAN countries will be considerably more conscious of the need to maintain a healthy environment. The growth of a consumer and ecology movement will result in demands for more effective controls on environmental deterioration. The result will be effective pressure toward diffusing industry. Conservation of forest resources will become the effective national policy in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, minimizing further destruction and promoting restoration through the practice of scientific forestry.

Singapore, which embarked on a "Greening the City Program" in the 1970s, will be a beautiful island with trees and flowers planted everywhere.

Similar programs of beautification and greening of city and suburb will be pursued in Manila, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, and other large cities in the region. The rural areas of the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand will also embark on a greening program.

Singapore, which was already highly conscious of reducing air and water pollution in 1980, will continue with its stringent checks upon motor vehicles and factories emitting poisonous air pollutants. Similar government programs were in effect, and will continue in effect, with respect to water and noise pollution. The government in 1980 had a well established program of checking the growth of private automobile traffic and providing adequate and convenient public transportation. By 2005, public transportation will become so efficient that the growth in the number of private automobiles will have been checked. In similar fashion, all other countries of the region will be conscious of the need to reduce air and water pollution, and will be taking effective action.

4.7 EDUCATION

Optimistically, current efforts at democratizing education, improving efficiency in the delivery of educational services, and enhancing the quality of education in both the formal and non-formal learning systems in each of the member countries will continue to receive sustained support.

It is reasonable to expect that within the next 25 years the social and economic benefits derived from education will be more widely accessible to the poor as well as the rich, to the rural as well as the urban, and to all of the numerous ethnic groups in the ASEAN region. Premature school leaving, low levels of student achievement, repetition and overstaying in grade levels, and other dysfunctional effects will have been substantially reduced. By 2005, all five countries will have
achieved universal elementary education of at least six years schooling, thereby reducing illiteracy to a minimum.

The formal and non-formal educational systems will, optimistically, exhibit a high degree of flexibility and innovativeness in coping with the quantitative and qualitative demands for education arising not only from the aggregate increase in population, but also from ASEAN's commitment to eradicate poverty, hunger, disease, and illiteracy among their peoples, and to develop their capacity to participate in the creation of the conditions necessary for their total well-being -- that is, conditions that will satisfy both their material and non-material needs. Many of these innovative approaches to education will come from combined cooperative efforts among educational institutions of various kinds, both within and among the ASEAN nations. Reliance on non-ASEAN consultants and advisors will decline.

Optimistically, non-formal education will gain a value more or less equal to that of formal education, both socially and economically, because of its flexibility and effectiveness in meeting the immediate and diverse occupational and training needs of individuals of all ages and varying interests. The relationship between formal and non-formal learning systems will be more cooperative than competitive, mutually enriching rather than distinctly separate.

Formal education in the ASEAN countries will be the primary instrument for the strengthening of national identity, while at the same time developing cross-cultural sensitivity and global awareness. Furthermore, it will be increasingly effective in developing the individual's capabilities for economic advancement, for physical, intellectual, aesthetic and emotional growth, and for civic and political competence and responsibility.

Implicit in this scenarized symbiosis between formal and non-formal education would perhaps be the notion that the member governments would take explicit policy steps to avoid creating a large pool of university graduates who will become an unemployed and unemployable intellectual proletariat - which is already a problem of some magnitude in some ASEAN nations today. - RBT

By 2005, the supply of teachers in the countries of the region will have been regulated effectively in accordance with the actual demand for teachers, so that they will attain higher status and receive salaries comparable with other professions. Teachers will enjoy greater autonomy in their teaching functions, thereby attaining a higher degree of both professionalism and status. These changes will serve to make the teaching profession more or less as attractive to young and able students as the other professions.

Optimistically, the peoples of ASEAN will attain a higher level of awareness and knowledge about ASEAN itself, and about the sociocultural characteristics and history of each member nation, through the formal education curriculum, and through the establishment of Asian Studies centers in the universities of the member countries. Moreover, practical knowledge and first-hand information will be generated through educational and cultural exchange programs, through intra-regional sports and performing arts programs, through collaboration in regional research studies, and through the establishment of regional professional organizations, seminars, and workshops.
Already by 1980, a number of projects in education had been identified and developed for regional collaboration under the auspices of ASEAN.

Although people in the ASEAN region seem to have a natural cultural affinity for each other, which makes it strikingly easy for them to relate interpersonally, their separate experiences during the colonial period have left them in some cases deficient in knowledge about the basic facts of each other's nations. Individuals often know more about the former metropolitan country -- Britain, the Netherlands, or the U.S. -- than they do about a next-door ASEAN nation. Therefore, it would seem prudent that high priority be given to the development of basic curriculum materials, by Aseanians, to remedy this problem. -- RBT

This optimistic view of education is considered realistic because it is in harmony with the political will and the common aspirations of the ASEAN peoples for social and economic well-being. Indeed, at no time in the history of the region has the will to attain a higher quality of life in both its material and non-material aspects been as strong, or the challenge to education as soul-searching, as during the past decade. Furthermore, in each of the ASEAN countries there already fortunately exist critical masses of specialized and highly trained talents that are being tapped by the various national governments to provide leadership in translating this vision of education into practical action.

5. THE PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO

A "pessimistic scenario" is here defined as one which is not quite the worst that could occur, but highly undesirable. The EFR protocols for our Group almost all scenarize the following major pessimistic trends that are perceived as within the realm of realism for the period 1980-2005.

1. Pessimistically, the envisaged economic growth of around 5-7% annually will not materialize, due to inflation, depression, and low capital formation. The ASEAN region will continue to be closely tied to the world economy, especially that of the Western capitalist countries, and this economy will worsen as a result of increased energy costs, inflation, and a slowdown in technological innovation.
2. Pessimistically, the gap between the wealthy and the poor will continue to grow, due to continuing inequality of access to education, jobs, and capital.
3. Pessimistically, the population growth rate in the region -- especially in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines -- will continue to remain high, that is, above 2.5% per annum, and the total population of the ASEAN region will exceed 500 million by 2005. Economic growth will not keep pace with population growth. The unemployment and underemployment rates will be high. All this will produce in its train many other social and political problems.
4. Rural-to-urban migration will, pessimistically, increase as a result of low agricultural productivity in the rural areas, the spread of modern education, improved communication, perceived occupational opportunities in the cities, and the general attraction of city life.
5. Pessimistically, the population density of major cities such as Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, and Surabaya will have trebled by 2005, and will outstrip whatever increased services and facilities can be made available. These cities will become painfully crowded.
and congested. Slum areas will grow and fester. Noise, water, and air pollution will increase. The general psychological stress level of living and working in these cities will be high. The suicide rate, especially among the younger people, will be much higher than tolerable.

6. In their efforts to develop and industrialize quickly in order to increase production and job opportunities, the ASEAN countries will, pessimistically, continue to disregard the quality of the environment. There will be increased deterioration of forests, rivers, coastlines, etc. Air, water, and other kinds of pollution will become a major problem.

7. Pessimistically, there will be a further breakdown of traditional value systems and religious beliefs as a result of rapid modernization, industrialization, and urbanization, increased impact of impersonal bureaucratic organizations, and a strong tendency to succumb to consumerism. Crime will become rampant. Intellectuals will come to regard education in the indigenous traditions as a useless hindrance to progress. Education for secular utilitarian ends will continue to be heavily stressed, thus further contributing to the general deterioration of religious faith and religiously guided behavior.

8. Traditional community ties and spirit will deteriorate. Life will become impersonal and encapsulated. Considerable cultural stagnation and distortion will result.

9. It follows from the above scenarizing that competition for scarce economic goods among the various social, ethnic, and regional groups in each of the ASEAN countries will become acute, resulting in frequent communal conflict. Urban-rural conflict will likewise become exacerbated. National disunity will ensue.

10. Pessimistically, politicians and government and military officials will increasingly abuse the power vested in them. Malpractices, corruption, graft, arbitrariness, and favoritism will become rampant. Mismanagement of resources will continue. The result will be a widespread and growing disrespect and distrust of the political and governmental processes in general.

11. Generally, governments will become more and more authoritarian and repressive, yet still unable to cope with the complexity of the socioeconomic and political problems that emerge. This will lead to further deterioration in the relationship between the government and the people. Various forms of strikes, demonstrations, terrorism, uprisings, and even armed conflict will occur.

12. There will be political instability and social chaos of some duration, with frequent conflicts among the socialist, religious, nationalist, and military groups to gain power and assert control.

13. Finally, in an unstable situation such as this, ASEAN as a regional socio-economic and cultural association will become weak, as each member nation tends increasingly to direct energy and funds toward its own internal problems, at the expense of the common problems of the region as a whole.

14. The future of education in the ASEAN region will be dismal and feckless indeed if anything like the above-described scenario materializes, for education (formal or non-formal) can hardly be expected to rise above the total social system of which it is an integral part. Moreover, the situation described above could be greatly exacerbated by political and economic events impinging from outside the region, such as a failure on the part of First, Second, and Third World countries to agree on the terms of a just and humane new international economic order.
15. Finally, all of these exogenous and endogenous problems could be exacerbated if the leadership of the various ASEAN nations proves unable to marshal the forces of change through proactive politics and participatory planning of a type that will genuinely deliver a better life to the masses of ordinary people in the region.

Another possibility that might be included in a Pessimistic Scenario is warfare, both domestic and international. In some ASEAN nations today, military efforts to quell domestic insurgency drain substantial energy and funds away from development programs. As this article went to press, regiments of Vietnamese troops had crossed the Thai-Cambodian border and engaged Thai troops. – RBT

6. THE MOST PROBABLE SCENARIO

All of us in the ASEAN Scholars Group agree that the Most Probable Scenario for the ASEAN countries through to the year 2005 is closer to the Optimistic Scenario than the Pessimistic. We anticipate that things in general will be at least slightly better in 2005 than in 1980.

Most probably, rich natural and agricultural resources in the ASEAN countries -- oil, gas, minerals, rubber, oil palm, rice, etc. -- will be quite prudently and efficiently developed and managed. Economic growth will surpass population growth, and the basic necessities of life will be available to the people.

Most probably, there will not be any massive violent change in socioeconomic or political structure or in political leadership. Corruption and mismanagement will be minimized, as the ethic of efficiency and accountability becomes more accepted by the governing elite. Aesthetic development based on indigenous themes, forms, and motives will be enhanced.

Finally, ASEAN as an organization will most probably become stronger as the result of increased communication and cooperation among the member countries in projects to bring about common economic, social, cultural, and political benefits to more and more people.

7. THE MOST PLAUSIBLE MODEL FOR CHANGE

The Most Plausible Model for Change, as perceived by most of our Group, is one in which national leadership and central government initiative constitute the prime mover of social change -- i.e., the prime agent in initiating, planning, and implementing development programs, besides ensuring public security and peace.

The goals of national development are seen not only in terms of gross economic growth, but also in terms of a general improvement in the welfare and quality of life of the citizens. Thus, included in our model are programs to regulate population growth, and policies aimed toward a more equitable distribution of wealth among the various socio-economic, ethnic, and regional groups in each of the ASEAN countries.

It is highly appropriate to include increased equity (and a reduction of exploitation) in a model such as this. History suggests, however, that the actual attainment of equity (as opposed, for
example, to the enactment of land reform laws that are then not enforced) is extremely difficult to accomplish, especially without resort to authoritarian methods. Thus, the freedom-equity trade-off is a basic one, and more specificity concerning it would have been helpful. -- RBT

Cultural, aesthetic, and religious aspects are also seen as an important part of nation building -- to foster pride in national heritage, and a sense of purpose and identity. Education is perceived both as an instrument for human capital formation and as a means for developing good citizenship and the whole person.

A good government is seen as one which is quite fair and benevolent, and one which can deliver the accomplishment of a large part of these goals. Certain particular Western democratic forms and procedures, though highly valued elsewhere, are generally not seen as top priorities by most of our Group. Values seen to be more fundamental are the maintenance of social peace and security, and the enhancement of the socio-economic and cultural well-being of the ASEAN people.

Thus, almost all of us rank good leadership and an efficient government -- one which is relatively free from corruption and malpractice - as the most important factors that will in turn bring about the Most Probable Scenario of an improved quality of life for the ASEAN people, and greater independence of the ASEAN region from the great powers.

Most non-Southeast Asians who study Southeast Asia would probably agree that the model presented above is plausible. Whether it is the most plausible model, however, is a separate question, and one which ideally would call for a considerably closer examination of the political status quo, and of the nature of emerging leadership and leadership patterns, than the authors have found it possible to present here. - RET

8. IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

We conclude this article by asking why and how we, as educational professors, researchers, planners, administrators, and policy-makers, should be interested in alternative middle-range sociocultural futures for ASEAN. We cannot think of a better response than this quotation: "Time is a threefold present: the past as a present memory, the present as we experience it, and the future as a present expectation."

Our interest in the future springs from our genuine concern for our peoples' survival and continued creative existence in a world that is undergoing rapid transformation culturally, socially, economically, and politically. This concern can be fully appreciated when we consider that in our respective countries, particularly Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, the problem of meeting the basic material and non-material needs of the great majority of our people is at the moment already severe, and that people tend to see their future as the present in its more serious state, i.e., with more widespread poverty, greater unemployment, more enervating malnutrition, more glaring disparities between the rich and the poor, greater rural-urban inequities, rising frustration, erosion of once-sacrosanct cultural and spiritual values, etc.
We believe that we cannot simply let ourselves drift with events and forces of change that are likely to worsen the conditions in our respective countries and throughout the ASEAN region. We trust that, individually and collectively, we can change the course of events by being proactive rather than reactive toward the multiple crises that we face as independent nations and as a regional organization. This sentiment undergirds the formation of ASEAN.

We also recognize that by reflecting on our alternative futures, we in education can clarify and redefine the purposes and goals of education vis-a-vis our shared images of our future, and as a result we can begin to take appropriate steps that will lead us nearer to where we want to be ten, twenty, or twenty-five years from now. We believe that the very realization that we share the same values, hopes, and fears, will mean that we can then work together in greater harmony, in greater appreciation of each other's strengths and limitations, and in greater awareness of the importance of regional and international interdependence based upon equality and mutual respect.

Our scenarios for the year 2005 call for a set of shared values and goals as follows:

1. National unity and political stability.
2. A stronger sense of appreciation of, and pride in, our national and regional cultural heritages.
3. More efficiency and honesty in our government bureaucracies.
4. Greater equity in access to, and distribution of, social and economic opportunities, thereby minimizing if not eradicating poverty, illiteracy, disease, and unemployment.
5. Maintaining population levels conducive to social and economic growth and increased agricultural and industrial production.
6. Development and conservation of renewable and non-renewable resources.
7. Diversified exports and an expansion of the world market for these exports.

All of the above goals are, in our view, necessary conditions for attaining and fostering the total well-being of every individual in the ASEAN region.

In drawing implications for education from these goals, it is important to stress that the peoples of ASEAN tend to equate education with schooling, and to place great faith in schooling as the key to social mobility, economic advancement, and cultural enrichment. Moreover, the various national development plans in the region view education as a vital instrument not only for achieving economic growth, but also for maintaining political stability and fostering individual well-being.

In this context, we wish to examine the implications of alternative futures for educational policy and practice by raising the following issues related to the goals and values identified above.

In reading the remainder of this article, it would be well to bear in mind the immense potential of the microprocessor revolution to facilitate the kinds of changes in knowledge, competence, attitudes, and consciousness that the authors have in mind. This revolution will make ever-expanding amounts of information available to masses of people at ever-decreasing cost, thus making possible the democratization and diversification of education on a hitherto undreamt-of scale. It is vital, though, that ASEAN governments, and ASEAN
as an organization, take the necessary steps promptly to insure that this revolution serves rather than thwarts the humane ends here envisioned. -- RBT

8.1 EDUCATION AND EQUITY

Despite the gradual decrease we anticipate in population growth rates, the 240 million population of the ASEAN region in 1980 will, even by the most optimistic projection, be at least 200 million greater by the year 2005. About one-third of this population will be 14 years old or younger, while the rest will be in need of continuing education in order to cope with scientific and technological developments, and changing occupational and job Skill requirements arising from desired shifts in economic structures. Attaining equity implies eradicating existing inequities in educational opportunities in terms of both access and quality, by providing universal elementary education and an equal opportunity for further schooling for equally able students, regardless of socio-economic status, ethnic affiliation, community, residence, or sex.

In this connection the following questions may be raised:

1. Where will the resources come from to satisfy the quantitative and qualitative demands for education and schooling?
2. Will the formal school system have the resources and capability to democratize educational access and quality?
3. By what means and in what manner and form will democratization of education proceed and progress?
4. What kind of teachers are needed and what types of educational delivery systems are indicated?
5. What kinds of learning experiences are suggested in order to reduce the inequalities in benefits derived from education?

8.2 EDUCATION, NATIONAL UNITY, AND POLITICAL STABILITY

On this equally vital topic, the following questions and issues are raised.

1. How can education, particularly formal education, provide opportunities for learners to learn their political rights and duties?
2. Should schools encourage critical and questioning attitudes regarding the existing political system, the administration of government services, and the determination of national priorities? At what levels of the educational system should this process take place?

8.3 EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY

To what extent, and how, can education meet the manpower requirements of each ASEAN economy and increase labor productivity, considering that the correspondence between education or training, and job requirements, is usually quite imperfect in the real world of work? Moreover, educational interests and aspiration are partly defined by factors other than economic considerations, such as cultural biases for CT against certain occupations.
8.4 EDUCATION, SOCIOCULTURAL VALUES, AND THE GOOD LIFE

1. How can education reduce the discrepancies between what is valued and taught in school and what is learned and valued in the broader society? For example, school teaches that honesty is the best policy, but out there in the real world, dishonesty pays!

2. Similarly, how can discrepancies between the goals of education, and what actually occurs during the teaching-learning process, be minimized? For example, the objective of education is to develop self-reliance in a free society and appreciation of the national cultural heritage out the school atmosphere and teaching materials and methods reveal cultural and technological dependency in many forms, such as reliance on foreign textbooks and imported educational technology.

3. What traditional sociocultural values should schools perpetuate and what modernizing values and behaviors should schools foster? Who decides on these matters.

4. Will the use of the national language as the medium of instruction in fact enhance the quality of education and foster national identity and unity in countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia by A.D. 2005?

5. Our definition of "the good life" calls for sufficiency for all rather than affluence for the few. Can education sustain and reinforce this ethic against the impact of foreign values and lifestyle?

6. Finally, to what extent can education promote these kinds of sociocultural change, and to what extent must education be simply a reflection of changes already made or in the making? How can we, as educators, most effectively and proactively shape our national and regional destiny?

My own final observation is that this phrase, regional destiny, is freighted with meaning. It is in the logic of the existing international political situation, and of the existing and projected world-wide shortage of raw materials, that there be a strong, vital ASEAN. The capacity of creative educational policy to help develop both the image and the reality of such an ASEAN has yet to be fully appreciated, but this ASEAN Scholars Group is most certainly, in this sense, exceptional. - RET
NOTES

1.1 The use of the term "past and on-going processes of culture change" points to the linkage between the use of conventional ethnographic research, and the use of EFR. In a sense, the anthropologist who is skeptical about any futures-oriented research ought to be at least a bit skeptical also about a commonplace term like "on-going culture change," for the positivistic question can be raised as to how, strictly speaking, one can know that a change process is in fact "on-going." There is always the possibility, after all, that a given type of change that has been "going on" will not continue to "go on." The use of "on-going" implies that the analyst believes that the change will "go on," but there is utterly no way of definitively demonstrating that it will. Strictly speaking, the only truly sound strategem available is that of waiting until time has elapsed, and then checking to see if the change did go on. This strategem is, of course, equally available to the EFR researcher.

1.2 The methodology of cross-cultural comparison (statistically performed or otherwise) is an example of another such methodology. The researcher could, for example, draw a sample of 99 cultures distributed around the world, 33 of which are based on hunting and collecting, 33 on simple agriculture, and 33 on intensive agriculture Using the available ethnographic literature, he could then formulate and check hypotheses concerning different or differential ways of conceptualizing future events or possibilities, depending on subsistence base For numerous other possibilities, see Naroll and Cohen 1970.

1.3 In this connection, your attention is directed to Maruyama and Harkins 1979, which is the largest essentially anthropological compendium of Cultural Futures Studies and Research articles published to date. While this compendium contains much that is of value, and indeed is essential reading in CFR, one notes that (1) the "ethnography" category in the index contains only one entry, and that (2) none of the various articles uses, or calls for, the systematic use of de novo interviewing or elicitation.

1.4 While future events cannot be observed, there are a number of types of in-the-present events that the ethnographer doing EFR can and should observe, and these include the following:

1. In doing ER as described in this Handbook, the ethnographer should observe the facial expressions and "body language" of the interviewee. Such observation is needed not only during the give-and-take of the interaction between ethnographer and interviewee, but also during the dictation of a segment of the protocol by the ethnographer. See 2.724.

2. It is possible that special EFR interviewing rooms will be developed, in which audiovisual stimuli will be presented, and in which instant electronic feedback equipment might be provided. Once again, expressive and interactive behavior should be observed.

3. When a group of interviewees, after being interviewed, participate in a conference to discuss the subject matter of the interviews, the ethnographer should if possible be present and should observe facial expressions and body language as part of the total communication and interaction process. See 3.62.
4. Another kind of follow-up to the EFR interview might involve bringing a group of interviewees together, after their interviews, for various kinds of role- or game-playing situations, perhaps even with elaborate physical props, which might produce more complex forms of interaction -- again, worth observing.

Having said all of the above, however, we are still left with a bedrock difference between most conventional ethnography and EFR, namely that the former involves naturalistic observation of behavior outside the interviewing or artificial stimulus context, while EFR does not.

2.1 Some readers might object that I am too firm in discouraging Utopianism and encouraging realism. My reply is that I think I strike a happy medium in this respect, for whereas I request realism, I let the interviewee be the one who defines where the boundaries of realism lie. Some readers might reply that this is still too strict, and point out that over the past few decades there have actually occurred a number of changes that would have been ruled out as unrealistic by intelligent interviewees 20 to 30 years earlier. Examples in the 1960s would be the landing of a man on the moon, or, in a somewhat less technologically-mediated realm, the women's liberation movement. I hope that readers who hold this position will experiment with their own variant form of EFR, in which different definitions, or perhaps even no definitions, of "realism" are used.

2.2 In this respect, I treat the interviewee somewhat more as a "respondent" or "subject" than as an "informant," in the single, yet important sense that in conventional ethnography the ethnographer receives from the informant not only the latter's own perceptions, but also of his perceptions of other people's perceptions. In EFR, to date at least, I have sought only the interviewee's own perceptions, realizing, of course, that normally these perceptions are heavily influenced by his enculturation. This whole matter is, however, open to further experimentation and development.

I refrain from referring to the interviewee as a "subject" because that might imply that I am experimentally "treating" him, rather than asking him to more CT less take charge of the interview. Similarly, I refrain from calling him a "respondent" because that might imply that he is "responding" to a survey schedule or questionnaire of pre-formed questions with preformed answer categories, rather than participating actively in deciding what the important questions and variables are. The best term would seem to be either "interviewee" CT "scenarizer," and I use the two interchangeably.

2.3 The interviewee with training in statistics might assume that if the 1-to-100 continuum is an abscissa, then probability of occurrence might constitute an ordinate, and the shape of the curve might approximate a normal curve, with the highest point around 50. Some interviewees have asked whether making such an assumption is permissible. My policy is to answer that it is permissible, but not at all necessary in order to pursue the interview.

2.4 CI course, it was not just Thailand's culture as of A.D. 2000 that interested me, but also the relationship between that culture and the natural and international environment. Experience
suggests, however, that if the explanation stresses culture, the interviewee will still not ignore these environing factors, whereas the converse may not be true.

2.5 I am indebted to Jack Alpert for valuable suggestions concerning the placement of the Most Probable Scenario and the Interviewee's Model for Change within the EFR format.

2.6 The ethnographic record resulting from my conventional research in a Thai village included numerous "notes to myself." For example, I would occasionally work with an informant who, I thought, was unconsciously distorting the truth on a certain point, or perhaps even consciously lying. Since the informant did not hear or see what went into my ethnographic record, I was perfectly free to enter my own reservations or comments -- set off by square brackets or double parentheses -- indicating that on a particular point I thought the information given was untrue or misleading, and perhaps speculating in my own way about this particular subject. For example, villagers sometimes underreported minor peccadilloes on the part of monks in the village temple, and sometimes my explanation to myself was that they simply didn't wish to face or transmit such facts, as to do so would in some degree threaten their religious faith and sense of security.

In EFR, the ethnographer does not, of course, have the luxury of recording such "private comments" in the protocol, because the contents of the protocol are instantly and completely known to the interviewee, who would obviously be quite upset by comments of this sort. The question now naturally arises: How does the EFR researcher handle such instances of prevarication, bias, and the like? My short answer is that cases of this sort are much less of a problem in EFR than in conventional ethnographic research, and that where such problems do arise, there are ready ways of handling them. They are less of a problem because EFR interviewing, after all, deals with hypothetical future cultures; the interviewee is thus free to hypothesize more or less as he wishes, and need not be constrained by present facts in anything like the same way that a reliable informant, whose job it is to describe or portray present facts, must be constrained. In my conventional research, I could sense that an informant in my village was unreliable because I had other information about the same subject which permitted me to "reality-test" the material the informant was giving me. In the case of EFR, I have no such reality test available to me, because, so to speak, the "reality" hasn't happened yet, and might never happen. In short, the concern of conventional ethnographic research is with reality (however that complex concept might be defined in a particular instance), while the corresponding concern of EFR is simply with plausibility. In 1977, when some of my Thai EFR interviewees scenarized that by A.D. 2000 monkly behavior would in various ways be closer to ideal standards than it was in 1977, because of better recruitment and education of monks, more rigorous administrative organization, more modern communication patterns, and the like, I felt no difficulty in incorporating this into the protocol without free probes (2.622) of any kind -- for such scenarizing struck me as plausible.

Indeed, throughout the Thailand EFR Study, there was not a single occasion in any of the 25 interviews in which I thought that it would have been appreciably more convenient if I had had the "luxury" of dictating my "ethnographer's reservations" into the protocol. Such problems simply did not arise.
What did arise, however, were certain scenarios or part-scenarios which the interviewee advanced as realistic, which I judged to be unrealistic and implausible. For example, some interviewees scenarized widespread, stubborn political revolt by exploited farmers, which would occur within a short time frame, and would be successful. While I did not doubt that, objectively, Thai farmers are exploited, I did doubt that they were, or could soon become, as politically alert, informed, active, and organized as these scenarios demanded. I knew from the biographical Sketches that these interviewees, on the whole, were urban people who had had extremely little exposure to rural Thai life -- much less than I had had as a field ethnographer. This bias in their background was so obvious that no "ethnographer's reservations" needed to be entered into the protocols. I was, however, quite free to use free probes to check on consistency (2.6223), and did so.

2.7 The decimal system is more than amply flexible. Suppose, for example, that in addition to interleaving a page and numbering it 17.1, you later encounter a need to interleave another page at 17.2. Then -- though this is extremely unlikely -- suppose you later needed to interleave a third page between 17.1 and 17.2; this could be done by designating that page as 17.11. And so forth.

Another advantage is that even a quick scanning of the upper left corners of the pages of a protocol is sufficient to let you know which paragraphs were re-ordered at S's instruction, because they all, and only they, are identifiable by page numbers containing decimal points. This means, further, that if you, or someone, were to inspect the protocol (even years later) and note certain differences between the raw (left corner) and final (right corner) page number order of the paragraphs, you would be able to tell easily whether the re-ordering was done by S (in which case there would be the tell-tale second and decimaled page number in the upper left corner) or by the ethnographer during editing (in which case there would be only one, undecimaled, number in the upper left corner). Such after-the-fact checks, especially by persons other than the original ethnographer, might be quite important at some later date, for as ethnography becomes progressively more scientific, it is likely that the raw order in which topics were originally dictated will assume greater importance in determining whether there has been distortion of the essential spirit intended by S, during the process of interviewing or editing.

2.8 Some ethnographers might object to any "tampering" with the ethnographic record by re-ordering a section or sub-section here or there. My first response to such an objection, should it be expressed to me, would simply be that if you have objections to doing this, don't do it! You, the ethnographer, after all, are the one who must ultimately interpret the protocols, and if you would rather work with protocols that have not been re-ordered, that should be your prerogative.

It should be further noted, however, that in conventional ethnography there are numerous types of cases in which the ethnographer probably (I would guess) feels fairly free to re-order content as he "writes up" the ethnographic record from his raw notes - even though his informant will rarely have a subsequent opportunity to see whether this re-ordering of material was, in the informant's opinion, distortive - while in the case of EFR, the interviewee
does get to inspect the protocol, and correct it, before it is considered final. Nonetheless, I
grant that this does not really set the matter at final rest, for there are some kinds of
conventional ethnographic record, such as direct testimony, tales, histories, etc. -- especially
material that is tape-recorded verbatim -- which the ethnographer would probably prefer not
to re-order, and correctly so. The whole question of how much re-ordering is permissible in
EFR can, I think, be left to the gradual accumulation of experience to decide. Meanwhile, a
good general rule is to lean on the conservative side whenever a marginal decision is to be
made.

2.9 My guess is that most ethnographers have discovered, in the field, how some kind of
"repeating back" to an informant can result in better data. I first discovered the advantages of
a kind of cumulative summarization while doing conventional ethnography in a Thai village.

After I had been working in Thai culture for four years and had learned the language well,
one day I was working with an informant, generating the ethnographic record directly by
interviewing in Thai and typing the record in English (and transliterated Thai) onto Unisort
cards, when I decided that perhaps I should repeat back to the informant, sentence by
sentence, the descriptive material I was about to type on the card, prior to actually typing it,
so that he could certify or correct the record. I did this, and found to my consternation that a
good bit of what would otherwise have been entered into my permanent ethnographic record,
needed considerable correction before it met with the complete approval of my informant. It
was a bit disconcerting, at this point in the fieldwork, to reflect upon the considerable number
of cards that had already been typed, without the benefit of this kind of check. I did not,
however, decide to disregard all my previously typed cards, because the material had in fact
been otherwise carefully gathered, and most of it after I had become proficient in the Thai
language. Nonetheless, it is sobering for me to reflect upon how much better in quality my
notes could have been, if I had engaged in something like cumulative summarization, where
appropriate, from the very start of my fieldwork. A good informant is an intelligent and
resourceful person, and it makes little sense to me to bar such a person fram all knowledge of
the actual content of the ethnographic record, much less any opportunity to correct or amplify
this content.

While there are obviously types of conventional ethnographic situation where no procedure
even remotely like cumulative summarization or item-by-item feedback would be appropriate,
I think there are others that would benefit from some such procedure -- especially where the
ethnographer has yet to learn the field language well.

2.10 Of course, this calculation "externalizes" the time it costs the interviewee to check over, and
edit, his protocol. With regard to whether such externalizing is legitimate, my response would
be Yes, because S gets a quid pro quo of some value, namely a copy of his final protocol
which he may refer to from time to time throughout his life, as a means of achieving some
sort of control over his tempocentrism, and as a basis for consciousness, insight, and perhaps
even personal plans. This would certainly appear to be more of a quid pro quo than most
unpaid informants receive in a conventional ethnographic situation.
Another point must also be confronted. Suppose, in Situation A, you had used traditional write-up methods, and then, as a means of inviting S's feedback, had sent him a copy of the interview record. At the very least, the amount of time it would take S to edit his record would be as long as it would in Situation B - and probably longer, since (in my judgment, at least) the record would be less faithful to the actual interview, and thus require more of S's time to put right.

4.1 Some further understanding of the use of sampling in EFR can be gained by a brief examination of the use of sampling in conventional ethnography. Sociologists and members of other sampling-oriented disciplines tend, it seems, to regard conventional ethnography as lacking in rigor due to the use of too-small or improperly-drawn samples. While these criticisms are sometimes warranted, it should also be pointed out that, especially in recent years, ethnographers engage in considerably more probability sampling than some critics would seem to believe; Pelto and Pelto (1978: 127-40) give numerous cogent examples of this.

Nevertheless, the bulk of the fieldwork done by a conventional ethnographer does indeed involve the use of samples that most sociologists would consider, at first glance, to be "too small" and "improperly drawn." However, when we look at the field situation the ethnographer actually faces, and the purposes he actually pursues, we may question whether these two charges are justified.

Let us first ask whether the conventional ethnographer's sample is "too small." In working intensively, interactively, and open-endedly with key informants or peripheral informants, the field ethnographer does indeed select a relatively small sample. The ethnographer really has no choice in the matter, however, for time does now allow for, let us say, a month of intensive interviewing of each of 100 members of the local community. Furthermore, a hundred key or peripheral informants would hardly be necessary, for the ethnographer is not asking them primarily about their individually varying behavior (as is usually the case in a sociological survey); he is, instead, asking them about behavior that does not vary, or vary widely. The ethnographer is primarily seeking cultural rules, not individual or idiosyncratic perceptions. It is in the nature of cultural rules that any member of the community is likely to know them (in some sense of the word, "know"), and many in the community are likely to be able to articulate them, when properly questioned.

For example, one does not need a large, meticulously selected probability sample of people to learn what the cultural rule is about incest. One might, however, need such a sample if one is seeking to learn how people feel about the rule, or how often they think it is violated, etc. Here, one is shifting from a need for a few good informants, to a need for a proper sample of respondents -- the difference being that informants are usually asked about how "people around here" feel or behave in some respect, while respondents are usually asked how "you yourself" or "you and your family" feel or behave.

Now let us ask whether the conventional ethnographer's sample, small though it is, is "improperly selected." Here, we must face the fact that ethnographers characteristically ask great numbers of questions of each of a limited number of informants (rather than a limited
number of questions of a large number of respondents, as is usually the case in sociological survey research) means that rapport is all-important. It little avails the ethnographer to select a statistically flawless sample, only to discover that his rapport with those selected is seriously flawed. Accordingly, ethnographers have tended to choose their informants on the basis of rapport, and on the basis of whether the individual under consideration seems well informed, reliable, and articulate. Rapport, in the typical conventional field situation, takes time to develop -- and often, indeed, the individual who becomes the ethnographer's informant, especially key informant, has already been his acquaintance or friend for some while. Friendship is hardly the sort of relationship that can be started by random selection! True, as the anthropologist remains longer in the field, he can, to some extent, steer the formation of his friendships and his informant relationships in such a fashion that his friends and informants will come to be roughly representative of the community as a whole -- by age, sex, status, occupation, and the like. But that is about as close to formal suppling as he normally comes, in the selection of informants.

Thus, in assessing whether a particular ethnographer in a particular situation has used a sample of proper size, and whether the sample was properly drawn, one must first consider whether the ethnographer was essentially using informants to understand cultural rules and commonalities, or whether he was using respondents to understand variation (and, perhaps, deviance from cultural rules). This is a distinction that most ethnographers make. And when the ethnographer decides that he needs the latter type of data, he will indeed often draw a fairly large supple, using probability procedures, and proceed to conduct a sociological-style survey in which respondents are asked questions about themselves and their families, in order to gather relatively straightforward (and usually quite variable) data with respect to demography, economics, and various indices of overt behavior -- as well as opinions on various subjects. Such surveys (aside from basic censuses) are normally done only after a considerable amount of intensive interviewing of informants has been completed, during which the ethnographer identifies those subject matter areas and items which lend themselves to the survey approach. Such surveys make rather limited demands upon the respondent, and hence require only moderate rapport. The form of such surveys is much more structured than in the classic ethnographic interview, the interaction more limited, and the scope much shallower.

Now let us look at EFR. The EFR "interviewee" is not quite an "informant," because he is being asked questions strictly about his own personal perceptions and preferences. At the same time, S is certainly not a "respondent" either, since the interview is in every other respect ethnographic rather than survey in style; that is, it is open-ended and semi-structured, as well as highly interactive -- and the interviewee rather than the interviewer is essentially "in charge." Accordingly, in EFR, rapport is about as important as it is in conventional ethnography. Fortunately, my experience with EFR to date, and that of my students, suggests that rapport building has typically been considerably less of a problem than I would guess that it would have been if we had approached the same individuals with the request that they serve as informants for a conventional ethnographic research project. Even though our interviewees have been selected impersonally from a list of names (as would be the case in true probability sampling), and even though the interviewer has been previously unacquainted with the interviewee (as has usually been the case), the refusal rate has been gratifyingly low and, once
the interview gets started, rapport has tended to grow quickly and naturally, clearly fostered by the fact that people tend to find the EFR interview attractive, challenging, enjoyable, and enhancing.

These experiences point to what appears to be an important difference, namely that in conventional ethnography there tends to be a conflict (or trade-off) between good rapport and the use of probability sampling, while in EFR there tends not to be. This being the case, there is every argument for using probability sampling in an EFR project, and none against it.

It must quickly be added, however, that the statements above are based on a limited range of experience to date. So far, EPB. has been systematically used almost exclusively with intellectuals. Whereas I believe EFR can be adapted for use with less educated members of various cultures around the world, including immediate post-peasant agriculturalists, this belief has not yet been put to the test. It should be, soon. The results of such tests may indicate that EFR can only be used with intellectuals (which seems unlikely), or that it can be used with others, but that various adaptive changes must be made, including the sacrifice of probability sampling (which seems more likely).

4.2 The selection of the order of interviewing pre-designated interviewees as a means of minimizing contamination might follow either of two possible strategies, depending on my judgment of the immediate realities of the situation. First, I might decide to interview all members of my sample who are from the same department in as rapid succession as possible, making the assumption that this will minimize the chances of A's having time to tell department-mate B what the interview is about, and how A handled it, before B is interviewed. Second, I might decide to interview A and then wait as long as possible before interviewing his department mate, on the assumption that whatever remarks A might make to B, would by then have been more or less forgotten by B. Further minimization of contamination, particularly in cultures and structures where hierarchical status differences are pronounced, can probably be achieved by interviewing junior members of each department first. Because a junior has less prestige, and is expected to show deference toward a senior, he is less likely to contaminate a senior, than vice versa.

It should be added that in many situations, simply requesting the interviewee not to discuss the interview with his colleagues until the study has been completed, might serve effectively to minimize contamination. Further, the confidentiality of the EFR interview, and the mood of privacy it helps create, ought to provide some marginal protection against contamination. Finally, the very complexity and elaborateness of the scenarios that A provides, means that A will be less likely (than in the case of certain other types of research using more structured interview formats) to be able to relate to B enough about A's scenarios to seriously contaminate B's scenarios.

4.3 The example of my collaborating with the hypothetical Dr. Prasoed is also intended to illustrate how EFR can be used to encourage intercultural research while at the same time discouraging what is sometimes referred to as "academic dependency." The sampling design provides for Dr. Praseod's producing a sufficient number of protocols so that should he elect,
for any reason, to publish his own results separately from his foreign collaborator, he has an adequate data base of his own which would enable him to do so. While the normal expectation is that collaborators work together on the analysis and interpretation of results, and publish jointly, I consider it appropriate to the spirit of the times to plan and design research in such a way as fully to preserve each researcher's independent status.

5.1 An example from my own conventional anthropological fieldwork on religion in a Thai village will illustrate. I knew from in-depth interviewing of key and peripheral informants that people tended to worship a certain spirit, and I was able to establish ethnographically, to my satisfaction, the mythology associated with this spirit, and the types of behavioral and affective contexts in which, according to cultural rules, this spirit was propitiated. Moreover, my ethnographic fieldwork gave me some basis for inferring that such worship was more frequent and more deeply felt in instances where the household possessed a statue of this spirit. Further, I learned from informants that some households possessed such a statue, and others did not. However, it was quickly clear that no informant could answer my questions reliably as to how many households, and what kind of households, actually possessed such statues. For an informant to have such information on hand, he would need to have already visited a proper sample of households, noted whether or not each household had such a statue, noted certain other demographic variables in connection with each household, and remembered such information accurately -- clearly an impossible task. In other words, my questions on variation had, in effect, departed from the cultural level of analysis conceptualized in terms of patterns, and moved to the individual attitudinal or behavioral level of analysis. Toward the end of my field research period, after I had ethnographically identified and refined this and many similar variables, I did administer a survey (using field assistants) to a proper sample of households, in order to obtain this type of information. And, after inspecting the results of this household survey, I was free to carry out whatever additional ethnographic inquiry or checking might have been needed in order to clarify ambiguous or conflicting points raised by the survey data. Although the time taken by the survey component was measured in weeks, and the ethnographic component in years, the use of the survey method definitely helped strengthen the final product.

5.2 It takes nothing away from the manner in which Chumphol uses EFR to generate items for his Delphi questionnaire, to point out that various forms of the Delphi Method also involve the preliminary elicitation of suggestions of possible Delphi survey items from the Delphi respondents themselves. See, for example, Linstone's (1978: 271-85) accounts of the Delphi studies done by the RAND and n1 Corporations, published in 1964 and 1967, respectively. The elicitation procedures used in these studies appear to be quite structured and oriented to discrete events, and to place considerably less emphasis on holism, context, and process than in the case of EFR

5.3 It Should be mentioned that Delphi panelists are usually experts who are likely to value their consulting time highly, and to whom it is sometimes necessary to pay a fee, in order to insure their cooperation throughout the length of the Delphi project. Indeed, a general drawback of the Delphi method is that such panelists might sometimes resent having their "brains picked" by a particular investigator, out of a feeling that this investigator will, through publications, be
getting the credit for their ideas. However, it should be emphasized that these problems do not appear to be a problem in the case of Chunr phol's EDFR Project.

In the case of EFR and survey research, by contrast, the researcher bothers the interviewee only once, and anyway the latter is, in most cases, not an expert or a scholar who would fear or resent losing credit for his ideas. Further, in the EFR case, the interviewee receives, as a prompt quid pro quo, a copy of his protocol, the value of which is enhanced by virtue of the fact that it is an idiosyncratically personal product (rather than a group product, as in the case of Delphi). And if the interviewee should be a scholar or writer who wishes to publish or otherwise utilize his protocol for scholarly or professional advancement, he is free to do so. Of course, to avoid contamination (Note 4.2), the researcher will ask that the interviewee refrain from such activity until after the EFR project is completed, but this is not usually a very serious constraint upon the latter.

5.4 Carefully used, an EFR approach would appear to have an advantage over the use of the Delphi method alone, in combatting what Linstone (1978: 298) calls the "simplification urge," of which he says: "We prefer certainty to uncertainty and simplicity to complexity. Typically, we forecast by taking one or a few innovations and fitting them in a mental image into an environment set in the familiar [structural] context of the past and present. We do not visualize a future situation in its own holistic pattern where change has had a pervasive influence."
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