JOHN W. LEWIS

An Oral History
conducted by Carla Hanawalt

STANFORD HISTORICAL SOCIETY ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

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John W. Lewis

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Introduction

This oral history was conducted by the Stanford Historical Society Oral History Program in collaboration with the Stanford University Archives. The program is under the direction of the Oral History Committee of the Stanford Historical Society.

The Stanford Historical Society Oral History Program furthers the Society’s mission “to foster and support the documentation, study, publication, dissemination, and preservation of the history of the Leland Stanford Junior University.” The program explores the institutional history of the University, with an emphasis on the transformative post-WWII period, through interviews with leading faculty, staff, alumni, trustees, and others. The interview recordings and transcripts provide valuable additions to the existing collection of written and photographic materials in the Stanford University Archives.

Oral history is not a final, verified, or complete narrative of events. It is a unique, reflective, spoken account, offered by the interviewee in response to questioning, and as such it may be deeply personal. Each oral history is a reflection of the past as the interviewee remembers and recounts it. But memory and meaning vary from person to person; others may recall events differently. Used as primary source material, any one oral history will be compared with and evaluated in light of other evidence, such as contemporary texts and other oral histories, in arriving at an interpretation of the past. Although the interviewees have a past or current connection with Stanford University, they are not speaking as representatives of the University.

Each transcript is edited by program staff and by the interviewee for grammar, syntax, and occasional inaccuracies and to aid in overall clarity and readability, while maintaining the substantive content of the interview as well as the interviewee’s voice. As a result of this editing process, the transcript does not match the recording verbatim. In the rare case that a substantive deletion has been made, this is indicated at the relevant place on the transcript. Any substantive additions are noted in brackets or by footnote.
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This oral history should be cited as “John W. Lewis, Stanford Historical Society Oral History Program Interviews (SC0932). Department of Special Collections & University Archives, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, Calif.”
Abstract

John W. Lewis, the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Emeritus, established some of the first study programs in contemporary Asian politics in the United States. He founded or co-founded centers at Cornell University and Stanford University, helped to draft foreign policy for the federal government, and built cooperative relationships with leaders and scholars in China, Korea, Russia, and Vietnam. Although now retired, he continues to be active, writing books and giving lectures.

In this oral history interview, Lewis talks about his experiences working in a field that challenged deeply ingrained cultural and political beliefs. He describes what it was like to come to Stanford as an expert on the highly sensitive subject of China at the height of public unrest regarding the Vietnam War, and how that affected his relationships with both students and teachers. He recounts his recruitment to Stanford by J.E. Wallace Sterling, establishing the Center for East Asian Studies, the visit of the Chinese ping-pong team to Stanford in 1972, the climate of protest against the Vietnam War at Stanford, and the beginnings of the Center for International Strategic Arms Control (CISAC).

Lewis also discusses his experiences as an educator, including his involvement in an interdisciplinary course on nuclear arms and disarmament and conducting simulations of arms control talks with students. He describes some of his foreign policy work for the U.S. State Department and the Department of Defense. He reviews the impact his work has had on relations between the United States and East Asia, the current state of the field, and his ongoing work as an author, lecturer, and researcher.
John Wilson Lewis

Biography

John W. Lewis is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Emeritus and a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. After receiving his PhD from UCLA in 1962, he taught at Cornell University until 1968, when he joined the faculty of Stanford's Department of Political Science. He co-founded and was a vice-chairman of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations; he also co-founded and directed the Center for East Asian Studies, 1969-1970, the Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1983-1991 (now the Center for International Security and Cooperation), and the Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy (now the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center), 1983-1990. He coordinated the Five-Nation Project on Asia Security and Economic Development, 2002-2008. He was co-founder and the first co-director of the National Committee on North Korea and continues as a member. He currently directs the Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region.

Lewis has served on the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences, headed the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council, and was vice chairman of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. He has been a consultant to the U.S. Senate, the Department of State, the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, the Office of Technology Assessment, the U.S. Congress, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Department of Defense. He has made numerous visits to the People's Republic of China (PRC), Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. He arranged for the first scholars from the PRC to come to the United States and led two Congressional delegations to Asia. In March 2010, he was awarded the Korea Peace Award for “efforts to support peace and reconciliation in Northeast Asia” by the National Association of Korean Americans. His other awards include an honorary doctorate from the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Lewis is the author of Leadership in Communist China, Major Doctrines of Communist China, and, with George Kahin, The United States in Vietnam. He edited The City in Communist China; Party
Lewis: [00:00:00] In answer to your question: I did go to Vietnam during the war there. I'd go to a village where there were members of the Vietcong and part of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, both sides sitting together. They were brothers. The notion that at the beginning this was an attack from the North or a plot from Moscow to Beijing, to Hanoi, to Jakarta, I thought it was all rubbish. In Washington there wasn't anybody in the high leadership and at what they called the Tuesday luncheon meeting at the White House who knew anything about Vietnam. I mean nothing. This was true of other conflicts that we've had in recent years. But in any case, I became very much involved with people who were working with Nelson Rockefeller, and one of them happened to be Henry Kissinger.

[00:00:59] Kissinger at one point asked me and a colleague, another China expert whom I brought to Cornell from the Rand Corporation, David Mozingo, to write a report. David and I wrote the report for Kissinger and, eventually, for Richard Nixon, on China policy. Kissinger was very pleased with it and said he knew nothing about China. This is Henry Kissinger, who is now one of the world's leading spokesmen on China and who has just
written a book called *On China*. He paid us extra money for the report, and he said it was the best thing he'd seen. It was important later because I also helped to start something called The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. I was not allowed to be named a founder because I was the first major China specialist who came out against the Vietnam War. China specialists had a special memory at that time of the McCarthy period. I had taught at UCLA. It was called the Little Red Schoolhouse. Most of the professors I knew—not my professor, because he had been a marine colonel in World War II but most of the professors—refused to sign the loyalty oath, and there was a huge controversy that hit China specialists especially hard.

[00:02:29] UCLA was near Hollywood, where many of the Hollywood actors and producers were being accused of being pro-communist. They were asked, “Were you ever a member of the communist party?” by good ol’ McCarthy [Joseph McCarthy] and McCarran [Patrick Anthony McCarran] and all these wonderful people. We had founded our committee at the worst possible time. Think of it. It was 1966, and China had 300,000 men in Vietnam who were fighting and killing Americans. Mao was in the midst of starting the Cultural Revolution and the Red Guard. He eventually killed or exiled most of his senior leadership pals, Liu Shaoqui for example.

[00:03:26] In Hubei Province, east of Beijing, where I studied, about three million people were killed or imprisoned. It was a pretty nasty period. That was 1966. By 1968, though, everybody was getting somewhat easy with those of us who opposed the war. By 1969, 1970, after the Tet Offensive and
things like that, a lot of us were viewed more favorably. I was named the vice-chairman of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. All that—the Kissinger piece and the National Committee—were important because we were in 1972, when the American ping-pong team, with Graham Steenhoven, went to China. Kissinger was already trying to figure out how to do something with China. He already had made the secret trip to China by then, and Nixon had made his trip in February 1972. I was now at Stanford, and Kissinger asked the National Committee if it would host a Chinese ping-pong team in the United States. The team, as you may recall, came first to Detroit, went to the East Coast, and then swung around and came through San Francisco. The team went to Napa as well. The chief ping-pong player was Zhuang Zedong. He and Steenhoven asked whether they should go to Berkeley or to Stanford. You should recall that Berkeley was in chaos and Stanford wasn’t in such good shape either.

[00:05:43] Every window on this campus was broken. We were in total riot at one point. There was blood on the steps of my center where somebody was banged by the cops. But we were in somewhat better shape than Berkeley. My colleague, also a vice chairman of the National Committee, was a very wonderful scholar at Berkeley--Bob Scalapino, mainly a Japan specialist. He said, “John, you should have the team invited to Stanford.” So in June 1972, we hosted ping-pong. The match was played in Maples Pavilion, and the Chinese beat the socks off us.

[00:06:51] In Maples, there were big signs that anti-communist people put up. “Defect!” “Defect today!” “Communist China is a prison.” Big signs.
I’m sure there are pictures in the archive of that visit. That visit and some other things got me involved with the Congress. I testified before the Congress. I became very good friends with Adlai Stevenson, the senator, not the father. He invited me to go with him to lead a delegation to Vietnam. We tried to go to China. We did go on to Siberia, to Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Irkutsk, and then to Moscow, where we met a lot of senior people.

[00:08:01] We found ourselves in bad odor because Adlai’s father had been at the U.N. when he accused the Russians of having put missiles into Cuba. He showed the photos to the U.N., and that made him very unpopular in Moscow. Still, we were taken over by the son of Anastas Mikoyan, Sergio Mikoyan, who became a very close friend over the years. He was here at Stanford. He wrote a book on his father, who was an Armenian and one of the thugs around Stalin. I became, at that time, very interested in Russia. I went sixty-seven times to Russia. There’s a whole different story.

[00:08:51] At Stanford, we spent a lot of time on arms control and built an arms control center, which is now CISAC [Center for International Security and Cooperation]. But that’s getting way ahead of myself. Anyway, that’s one story. Later, in 1975, I led a delegation of U.S. legislators to China, including our local congressman Pete McCloskey. There’s a picture in my office of the senators and congressman that I led to China. I was a China specialist on that delegation and wrote the report for it. That sort of thing got me into activist work. In addition to teaching, the other main thing I did at Stanford--it was all connected to Stanford--I co-authored one of the first
policy books on the U.S. in Vietnam. We held huge teach-ins. I don’t know if you recall the teach-ins at Stanford.

**Lewis:** [00:09:44] They were huge—in Frost Amphitheater and everywhere on campus. One of them I was invited to and gave talks. I was not a rabble rouser, although the provost thought I was. It was the first time that Stanford had brought police, sheriffs, onto the campus, even though we had it all under control. But the provost got very excited. I said to him, “If you don’t put the cops or the sheriffs on campus, we will hold this together.” We had this promise from everybody involved. They were totally organized. These kids were Stanford students. They were not about to riot. However, when the police came, they did riot, and I was blamed by my dear provost for having caused the riot. It was pretty messy. By that time I had founded the arms control program, later a center. It was, for me, a peace program. I have a peace award from the Korean people. I’ve been involved in peace my entire life. I was trying to bring peace in Vietnam, which was a tragedy. I mean it was a tragedy for our soldiers. I mean it was the worst. My wife later was a veterans’ advisor for the State of California in the State Employment Office. She did advising of the veterans because I was a Korea War era veteran. She would meet these guys who were in terrible shape.

[00:11:24] The way we’re treating our veterans now—pretty shabbily, but that period was just awful. You know, we say we always defend our veterans who have served our country so heroically. Baloney. Congress doesn’t care about them. They don’t care about them now in my view. Anyway, that’s another story again.
Back to Cornell, where I was from 1961 to 1968. I was beginning to found a peace center there, and I'd already founded a program called IREA, International Relations of East Asia, with David Mozingo, who wrote the report with me for Kissinger. Good guy. Wonderful guy. He was fluent in both Chinese and Indonesian. He’d been on the frontlines in the Korean War as a grunt. He had been a sergeant. He was an amazing guy but had an awful life. He and I were founding this program. We got some money from the Ford Foundation. Then I got a call in 1968 from Wallace Sterling and Gabriel Almond. Gabriel Almond was the chairman of the Political Science Department at Stanford, and Wally Sterling was the Stanford president. I didn’t know at the time that both of them were going to leave their posts in the fall.

[00:13:20] They invited me to come to Stanford in the fall. Wally said to me, “Terman [Frederick Terman] and I have built this university into a great university,” which they had. When I went to high school in Tamalpais--I came down and lived with my aunt in Mill Valley when my father was killed in the war--you wouldn’t have dreamt of coming to Stanford. You wanted to go to Berkeley or to some other good school. I’ve seen records in the houses at Stanford that people, my colleagues, had bought where the faculty positions of the predecessor in the house had been bought by the faculty person’s father. This was a rich kids’ school. It was pretty awful.

[00:14:06] In the 1950s Sterling and Terman just transformed it. They built a hugely important engineering school and other professional schools. He, and of course Terman, pioneered with others in the creation of Silicon
Valley. Sterling said to me, “I’ve built a university that is a major university. I’ve built it to where some of the departments are excellent. And I’ve built a relationship with industry, and a lot of those industries are flourishing. Hewlett Packard and Varian and a lot of others.” He said, “I would like you to come and build centers. We’ve never had an interdisciplinary, interschool center at Stanford, and I want you to do that.

[00:14:59] Professor Lewis, I will guarantee you a salary, I will guarantee you space, I will guarantee you a summer salary, I will guarantee you assistance forever. But you have to decide by Monday because we have a Ford Foundation grant that requires us to either give it to you to build centers or to give it to some other person.” This was a Friday. He didn’t tell me who. He said, “I want it to go toward building centers, and I want to start with an Asian center.”

Cornell at that time was not in good shape. There were the big riots, there were guns on campus, black students had occupied Straight Hall. It was really in crisis. [00:16:06] My department was going through its own crisis at that time. I talked it over with my wife and kids. I had three kids by that point, a very young daughter, an older daughter, and a son. (My younger daughter and my son both went to Stanford. My son’s wife went to Stanford, and my daughter’s husband went to Stanford. My grandson has been at Stanford. My granddaughter has just been admitted to Stanford.)

Hanawalt: [laughter] Congratulations.

Lewis: [00:16:51] He said, “If you come, you’ll do that.”

I came to Stanford. I said, “Okay.”
And he said, “You don’t have to be teaching courses,” which was anathema to me. I had loved teaching, and I was a great teacher at Cornell. We did two things. One, almost within a month after I came here I got everybody together, and I said, “As of today, we are the Center for East Asian Studies.” Two, I went to the provost. They gave us a trailer over where Sid Drell’s house used to be. They have since moved all those houses away from where the Law School is now, maybe the Law School Dormitory. Anyway, that area.

[00:17:41] They eventually gave me one of those wonderful old houses to create the center. We had a trailer and this house. That was extremely successful. I had a colleague who’d been at Cornell with me, and he left for Stanford. One of the reasons I decided to come here was because of him. He was a very famous Cornell professor. He and I wrote some articles together, wrote a lot of stuff together. His name was Bill Skinner. G. William Skinner. Bill Skinner was the power. He had written some of the great works on Asia. He was working on some marvelous things. I’d written two books, and I was truly privileged to come to Stanford and work with him. There were a number of Cornell people here. The head of the Hoover China Collection was from Cornell. Arthur Wolf, who’s still here, came from Cornell. He was a professor of anthropology. There was a lot of camaraderie in the place, but in the anti-war period, as I told you, there was a big crisis on campus.

[00:19:31] Every window in the Hoover Institution was broken. Not ours. They attacked the Hoover. They didn’t attack ours. They helped to get
rid of SRI, the Stanford Research Institute, which had government contracts. They got rid of ROTC, which I think was a travesty, frankly. I mean, this is a way young people could often go to college, the way I went to college. I wouldn’t have been able to go to college without an ROTC grant. It’s not just ROTC. It’s navy, as well.

Anyway, the students in the East Asian Center were very active. We were not only teaching--we had a wonderful set of teaching programs--but we also had research programs. Arthur Wolf and Bill Skinner had their research files in their own building, the trailer part of the building. We were incredibly active because the students were, as you can imagine, mostly radical. They were very upset with me because I wasn’t radical enough, and they didn’t like the fact I had been a naval officer. So what. They were very good to us. I had written the first book against the war, so what could they say? They knew nothing about Vietnam. They had more mythology going on in their heads than I can say. For example, they said we were carpet bombing Saigon. We were carpet bombing Vietcong areas in Vietnam, but that’s another story, again.

[00:21:19] A terrible war. I went everywhere in Vietnam. I’ve seen all the villages. I was there one time, after Tet and before the Easter Offensive. We went up to the Montagnard area in western Vietnam on the Laos border. It’s up in the mountains. I said, “Why are you building these trenches?”

They said, “We’re building the trenches because the Vietcong is going to launch an offensive, and they’re going to cut the country in half.” They said, “They’re going to come through,” which they did. “And then we are
going to bring in our forces by sea and drive them back. And these trenches
will be used to defend.” The guy I was with, John Vann, was one of the great
minds in Vietnam. He was the commander of II Corps, and the political
advisor, as they called them, of II Corps. Probably CIA, but a great guy. An
interesting man, a really fine man. He said, “There’s going to be this
offensive. I’m going to die.” Another guy, his name was Cross, said, “I’m
going to die in that offensive because no one in Washington believes that the
North Vietnamese have brought down all kinds of POL. They brought tanks.
Both their names are on the Wall [the Vietnam Veterans Memorial].

I went back to the U.S. government because I was a loyal citizen. I
said, “There’s going to be this offensive. They said, “It can’t happen. It will
not happen because there are no POLs. We know all that.” They were
wrong, and the rest is history.

[00:22:58] I later went to Kissinger after the Laos invasion by us, and
he said, “Oh, Professor, you don’t know anything. I know all of the details.”
Anyway, we had a lot of experience on the kind of issues that put us, at
Stanford, front and center. At the moment of truth, when the invasion of
Laos came down, the students poured blood, human blood, on all the card
files at the Hoover Institution, as many as they could reach. My colleagues,
who were doing research in our program at the center I helped create [Center
for East Asian Studies] said, “We want the students out of here. We want no
students in our center. It’s only going to be a faculty and research place.”
And I said, “There is no way on earth, ever, that I will allow myself to be
made a professor and have no students. It will not happen.”
My colleagues, who will remain nameless, took a vote, and they said, “Goodbye, John,” and I was gone. I spent the next couple of years focusing on the thing that had become very important to me. One of the teach-ins had taken place up at SLAC, where two of its leaders, Pief Panofsky [Wolfgang “Pief” Panofsky] and Sid Drell, had said, “Would you come up to SLAC and talk to a few of our people? Pief Panofsky was the director, and Sid was the deputy director. Wonderful men. Sid’s still here, but Pief has died.

Hanawalt: Sid is living at Vi?

Lewis: Yes, and he is doing very well. He had won major prizes. He was a fantastic teacher and colleague. Panofsky was the founder of SLAC and was one of the great figures in theoretical physics. If he hadn’t been so dedicated to SLAC, he would have gotten the Nobel Prize. SLAC helped build the Beijing proton accelerator in Beijing. Panofsky did all kinds of things. He met Deng Xiaoping. He met all kinds of people.

Anyway, they said, “Will you come out and talk to a few people at SLAC?” I went out to talk to a few people, and there were hundreds of people on the lawn, with a little microphone for John Lewis.

This happened to me earlier in Chicago when I was asked to give a speech before six thousand people on China. I did one of those things that you should never do in life. They said you must not talk about Vietnam. You should only talk about China. I got up on the podium, and I said, “I can’t do it. I’m going to give a speech on Vietnam.” I got a nice, rousing ovation, but the people who organized the meeting were not terribly
happy with me. But the Vietnam War was a travesty. We seem to like these kinds of wars we can’t win but destroy us. In any case, they invited me to SLAC, and I gave my speech. Panofsky said, “You know, the real battle is nuclear weapons.”

**Hanawalt:** The real battle isn’t…?

**Lewis:** [00:26:58] “It’s nuclear weapons,” he said. “We’ve got to do something.” He said, “The students don’t know anything about weapons, anything about what war is all about, anything about national security or global security, they don’t know anything about Russia, they don’t know anything about China.” He said, “Would you start a course on arms?” It was Arms and Disarmament. It's still Political Science something. I can’t remember what it is called now. I said, “Sure. I can try. I can do that. I love teaching.” Of course, I was teaching courses on China. I went to a wonderful guy over at the Law School, John Barton. He has since died in a bicycle accident on campus. He was a wonderful law professor. John said, “I’m already teaching a course like that, a little course in the Law School.”

I said to John, “There must be others teaching such courses.” It turned out to be the case. I made a list of twenty-three faculty members who eventually joined John and me, and we taught a political science course together. I’ve got their names: Herb Abrams, John Barton, Bart Bernstein, Chip Blacker, Alex Dallin, Sid Drell, Pief Panofsky, John Emmerson, who helped found the Japanese program here, Harry Rowen, and Alain Enthoven, who both were former deputy assistant secretaries of defense and in the Business School, Tom Fingar, who was Assistant Secretary of State and is
now back at Stanford, Alex George, who was a famous professor here, David Holloway, who’s still here, Don Kennedy, and Josh Lederberg, who’s a Nobel Prize winning professor, and so on. It was amazing. They each gave a lecture.

[00:30:17] There were others. I don’t think I named them. Bob North, Peter Paret from History, Jan Triska from Political Science. Who’s the other one? Oh, Gordon Craig from History. Gordon Craig was a magnificent lecturer. They used to tape his lectures because he was such a brilliant lecturer. He read them, but you couldn’t tell he was reading them. He would walk up and down. Altogether, the course was the most amazing performance. We had three hundred students, and on the second time around, which I think would be 1971, or somewhere in there, we were given a 4.0 rating by the students, by every single student.

[00:31:15] It’s the only time a class that size had received that kind of rating. Needless to say, that helped us with the trustees and with the school, because we weren’t just a bunch of professors preaching anti-war stuff, we were teaching a real course that was solid. I mean, when we talked about nuclear weapons, we had people from Lawrence Livermore Labs and people like Panofsky, who was in on the Manhattan Project, and people who flew over the first nuclear test at Alamogordo, who flew over in a plane and monitored the mushroom cloud. Anyway, these were people who had real science, real knowledge. We talked about biological warfare and we had Josh Lederberg, who was a Nobel Prize winning geneticist. This was an incredible group. We started taping our lectures, and we wrote the first textbook in the
field, called *Arms Control and Disarmament*. A visiting scholar, Larry Weiler, from the State Department, and John Barton, who was my wonderful friend, wrote this textbook. It was an extraordinary text. That helped to fund us. The university gave us $5,000.

[00:32:42] Then one day, because I’d given that crazy speech at Chicago, Ruth Adams, who had heard it and had just moved to the new MacArthur Foundation, called me up and said, “John, if you’re interested in doing the kind of stuff that you talked about and that I know you’re doing at Stanford, how would you like $75,000?”

I said, “Oh, my god. You know, that would be wonderful.” And because of Ruth’s involvement in the Aspen Institute, we began to be involved in Aspen.

[00:33:43] Aspen was beginning to organize a group of us who were working to create arms control and disarmament centers. There, in Aspen, I got to know Jack Ruina at MIT, Paul Doty at Harvard and Mario Einaudi, who, of course, I already knew from the Peace Studies Program at Cornell. McGeorge T. Bundy, the head of the Ford Foundation, decided to award us, the four centers, endowments in a limited competition. We were asked to compete for one of the endowments in 1982. We got the endowment in 1983. It had to be a matching endowment, and, bless his heart, Dick Lyman, who was then provost and who was still angry at me because of the speeches I made that led to the sheriffs coming on campus, said, “I will match the Ford grant because of your very good course.” I mean, we were not anti-war rabble rousers. This was the most solid course you can imagine. However,
when we got the grant, the students didn’t like that. In fact, they were very angry. They did not like arms control. They wanted peace studies. You know, all those big things that students wanted at that time. You were maybe one of them. [laughter]

Hanawalt: [laughter] Probably.

Lewis: [00:35:28] Anyway, there was a decision on the part of the university to match the award if we couldn’t raise a match. We couldn’t raise the match, and because of Dick the university matched the endowment. That endowment, which was a couple of million dollars, maybe a little bit more, therefore became $4 million. Now it’s $16 or $17 million, I think. It’s a good endowment. It’s not the biggest. Harvard’s, of course, is larger. Their center has a larger endowment. I should say that the program officer Bundy appointed for the grant competition was Enid Bok Schoettle. Derek Bok was the president of Harvard. Although Enid was negotiating the grant with me, she said, “Don’t ever try to be better than Harvard. You’ll never make it.” [laughter] Baloney. We are as good as any of them now. Maybe better. It doesn’t matter. They did one thing that really irritated me. They said, “Well, John, this is an endowment for arms control. It’s not an endowment for China. So you cannot use any of the money for China or Asia.” But China was my life, and since then I have had grants from Hewlett and MacArthur on Asia. Now, years later, both Hewlett and MacArthur are getting out of the Asia field.

[00:37:12] Everybody’s getting out of the field of Asia studies. As I move on in my eighties, I’m really sad about that. This is really tragic. I mean
there couldn’t be a more important part of the world right now. The same is true of Russia. I think you know I spent a lot of my time in Russia. I worked with the Russians on a number of things. I became very close to one of the Asian institutes there. I have an honorary doctorate from the Russian Academy of Sciences. I know them well. I was once pretty fluent in Russian. My grandson is now totally fluent in Russian. He’s just graduating from Stanford. He got the Sterling Award for Excellence in Humanities Studies. It was wonderful. So maybe the Russian influence continues.

**Hanawalt:** Wow. Excellent.

**Lewis:** [00:37:58] He’s also pretty fluent in Czech. So, I’ve spent now almost an hour telling you a little bit about me. Now it’s your turn. [laughter]

**Hanawalt:** You covered a lot of stuff, including how your appointment first came about at Stanford.

**Lewis:** [00:38:24] Oh, it was the worst thing I probably ever did, because [when] I came here, Wally Sterling had retired, Gabriel Almond had retired. I wasn’t interviewed by the Political Science Department. I wasn’t given a vetting. I never had met any of my colleagues. I came into the Political Science office and said something like, “I’m reporting aboard, sir,” to Heinz Eulau, the new chairman of the department. He said, “Who are you? Why are you here? I don’t know why you’re here.” I was never really a part of the Political Science Department. It was tragic. I loved the department and political science. If you read my bio--I’m in *Who’s Who*--I’m a political scientist. They never really accepted me.
Oh, one other piece of the story. I need to say that when I got fired from the Center for East Asian Studies, I really was fired. We put a good face on it, and I resigned in honor and all that stuff. The vote had been taken, and people then later apologized. It was ugly.

[00:39:55] By the way, when I left the Center, the faculty disappeared, and it became totally a student center for years. Now it’s a great center. It’s a wonderful center, thanks to Jean Oi. She’s gotten an endowment, which I helped her raise, by the way. My chair was funded by one of the Haas families, Madeleine Haas Russell, and I had the first chair in the United States in Chinese Politics. I told her to do that because, I said, “If you just endow a chair in political science, it will disappear as the China chair. She loved China, and she wanted to be a part. Madeleine has since died, and her kids don’t have any interest in China but they like Jean. [00:40:45] Jean’s a wonderful person. She’s truly a gifted person. She later helped to build the Stanford center in Beijing at Beida. She’s the second William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics. She’s a wonderful lady. Wonderful scholar.

Anyway, when I left the East Asian Center, I sort of sat around for a while, wrote a book and did a couple of other things. I was trying to figure out what I was going to do in life. Victor Li, a colleague of mine who was at the Law School--later left and has just died--said to Bob Ward, who was head of the Center for Research in International Studies, “You got to turn John loose.” Because I wasn’t allowed to do anything, I mean, their anger at me was pretty severe. Later, I took leave from Stanford and went into business. I was the lowest paid full professor at Stanford because my chairman didn’t
like me. A lot. [laughter] No one could increase a salary except the chairman of the department.

Anyway, Victor said to Bob Ward, “You should turn John loose.” I had this very popular course on arms control. A lot of my colleagues and I had just written a textbook. So Bob turned me loose, so to speak. In a very short time, we got the Ford endowment and founded the center in 1983. Before, we had been a program on arms control and disarmament, but then we founded the Center for International Security and Arms Control. Later, my successors here changed the name. They didn’t like the word arms control. That was a word that all twenty-three of us had wanted, and our book was called *Arms Control and Disarmament*. We founded the center with this name and these words in it. The center became very well known. We had fellows. Later Sid resigned as co-director in anger when two of his protégés weren’t given tenure, and so I took it over alone. I tried to make Condi [Condoleezza Rice] the director, because I had already decided to quit and return to research. I was in North Korea at the time I learned that Sid had resigned. I was still the co-director. Condi called me up in North Korea and said, “You’ve got to come back and save this place.” There were a lot of trials with what we did, but it was a great center and is a great center. Also, I said, “You know, we need to found another Asian center that does policy work.” I founded that one upstairs [in Encina Hall]. I became the director and then co-director with Dan Okimoto, That’s APARC.

**Hanawalt:** Now it’s APARC. Yes.
Lewis: [00:44:26] Now it’s the Shorenstein APARC [Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center].

Hanawalt: OK.

Lewis: [00:44:30] They got a big endowment, thanks to Gi-Wook Shin. In some sense, I founded one other program, which is not a center. It started out when [I was] mostly adrift and teaching in high schools in addition to everything else.

Hanawalt: Oh, Gary Mukai’s center?

Lewis: [00:44:54] Gary Mukai’s program. Yes.

Hanawalt: It’s a distance learning kind of program.

Lewis: [00:44:58] My kids were in high school at that time, so I taught in high schools and had a lot of fun. I love teaching. It was a very good thing to do. I also had graduate students. I had magnificent graduate students. I had forty-one PhD students on China. Moreover, there were four of us who remade the field. I was chairman of the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council. The four of us on that committee—Bob Scalapino, Lucian Pye, Doak Barnett, and I—together we remade the field of contemporary Chinese studies with the strong financial support of the Ford Foundation. Before, the field concentrated on Chinese history, literature, and language. We asked to bring all the social sciences into the field of modern Chinese studies. We had all the best students.

[00:45:50] In time, those students had students. Then the field changed. We brought the first students from China to Stanford, the first six Chinese scholars who ever came to the United States, and we sent the first
U.S. students to China. Then the government asked me to run something called the U.S. Committee on Advanced Study in China, where we selected Americans from all fields, from all over the United States, to go to China, and on and on. I was part of all such exchanges with China. We were in an incredible period. It was the most amazing period. America should have learned some huge lessons. It didn’t, I’m afraid. Now we’re undoing these lessons on China. It’s awful.

[00:46:50] We cannot make an enemy of China. There is no good or perfect country in the world. All of us have problems. China is not rising, it’s risen. It’s there. It’s changing. It’s changing dramatically under Xi Jinping. My God! Think of a country that if it’s still alive isn’t changing, isn’t moving, isn’t doing something. Even though it has great economic problems, and it is challenging America. Xi Jinping understands that as no recent president in the United States seems to have. I don’t mean to be politicizing this, but it’s just astounding what we’re not able or willing to do with China. I first went in 1972 to China as part of the U.S.-China Relations Committee delegation. I’ve been there now a hundred and fifty times.

[00:47:48] By now I know hundreds of people in China and have met virtually every leader in China. Almost every recent past leader has children and grandchildren in the United States, England, or Australia, most of them here. They’re all here. They’re not going to go to war with us. They’d go to war with their own children. It’s astounding what we’re not doing. That’s why at my ripe old age I’m still working on China and on North Korea.

[There’s] nothing that you can say about North Korea that’s good news right
now. Pyongyang tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile the other day. That’s a game-changer if they get it done. Anyway, we had a chance to make a real difference, and that chance is gone.

[00:48:48] As you saw, I co-authored a book on negotiating with North Korea. I was involved in much of the work on negotiating with North Korea. What we did on North Korea in the 1994 Agreed Framework was a major step toward stopping the North’s nuclear program. It’s like the agreement now with Iran. These are not treaties. These are agreements where each side agrees to take certain steps, and the agreements hold only if each side does what it promises. If not, the agreement is null and void. But a month after the Agreed Framework was signed between the two sides, there was an election in the United States and the Senate was turned over to the Republicans, who took control of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. The new chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee from South Carolina said, “I hate that agreement. It gave away the store.”

[00:49:40] The main part of the agreement was [that] we pledged to recognize North Korea. We were to be given the East German Embassy in Pyongyang, and there was a possible defunct embassy building in Washington. It was all set, and the senator stopped everything. So we never implemented the agreement. On some of the main points, they later cheated. That’s all anybody ever remembers about that agreement. Only that they cheated, not that we ourselves did not implement many provisions of the agreement. It’s amazing.
[00:50:23] The whole negotiation fell apart, and we were in on the falling-apart, unfortunately. We went to the North twenty-one times and spent a lot of time there. We invited the first North Koreans to come unofficially to the United States. I went in 1986 to North Korea, and I said to them, “I’m going to invite some of you to Stanford.” They’d never been [here]. They’d been to the U.N. where they are members, but they were not allowed to come to the United States. They said, “Oh, Professor Lewis, you Americans. You’re always promising this stuff.”

[00:51:08] I said, “No. I’ll do it.” I got permission to give them visas, three of them, and they came. They were going to fly from Pyongyang to Moscow to Havana to Mexico City to Los Angeles, and to here. They got to Moscow, no visa. They got to Havana, no visa. They got to Mexico City next and called me. They said, “Professor Lewis, you cheated us. There’s no visa.”

I said, “You fly to Los Angeles and there will be a visa for you.” There was. They were the first to come. I met many, many officials and ordinary people in North Korea. Not the very top. I never met Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il, or Kim Jong-un.

[00:52:08] I met virtually everybody else, including the number two North Korean leader, who came to Stanford to meet Bill Perry. Perry had just written an official report on how to deal with the North Korean problem, especially its nuclear weapons. Clinton and the North’s leader signed a joint communique. His name was Jo Myong-nok. Vice Marshal Jo was the number two to Kim Jong-il. He came first to Stanford because Bill was here. He thanked me for all our efforts, and so did the State
Department. Anyway, Jo met Clinton, and they signed this communiqué, which was an extraordinarily good document. It was based on the Perry Report. Then, of course, Clinton was soon retired from office, and Mr. Bush came in and repudiated the agreement that had stopped the North’s nuclear program.

[00:53:07] So they went nuclear. “Oh,” you say, “Oh, isn’t that terrible?” Yes, it is terrible. It’s getting worse and worse by the day. Sometimes people should remember history. Sometimes it matters. You know, the Chinese, we had a really bad history with them. Chou En-Lai said, “You should not let history imprison you. You should remember it, you should honor it, but you should also move forward.” Kissinger, bless his heart, said the same. We moved forward. They did it—normalized relations. Happily, it was a Republican, and with Nixon. It couldn’t have happened with a Democrat at all, ever. I don’t know what’s going to happen now.

Hanawalt: I understand you were part of a course where students engaged in mock Salt Talks [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks].

Lewis: [00:54:33] Oh, yes. The simulation.

Hanawalt: Yes.

Lewis: [00:54:35] Yes, we started the simulation. It was not my idea, but I ran it. We had a lot of experts and leaders. We had people who’d been to the Salt Talks. We had Adlai Stevenson take part, and I had gone to the talks with Adlai. Anyway, the students would play roles. They were wonderful, and it was a wonderful learning experience. We had a student who’s now the king of Belgium. Then he was the prince of Belgium. We had all kinds of roles. The
kids were fantastic. Condi got the teaching prize for running one of those simulations, I think. She was a great...is a great teacher. I don't know if she's still teaching. She's at the Business School now.

Hanawalt: I know she has a professorship there, so I'm sure she must be teaching.

Lewis: [00:56:21] I brought Condi to Stanford from Denver, and I got her on the faculty. Although she and I disagree on a number of things, she's a wonderful person. She truly is a great person. She taught the simulation. I don't know if they're still teaching it.

Hanawalt: I don't know. One of the things that occurred to me about the simulation of the Salt Talks was when it was occurring. It was like around the mid-1980s, right? More or less?

Lewis: [00:57:05] There was a movie about a nuclear war, and the end of the world was coming. It was a very famous movie called “The Day After.” I probably have a copy of it somewhere. One of the movie studios came to us and said, “We would like to give you some money and we would like to film a simulation with your students. They will negotiate a Salt Agreement, or an Arms Control Agreement.” The producers were the ones who’d done the movie about the Scopes Monkey Trial, “Inherit the Wind.”

[00:58:05] They wanted to do a film about students negotiating an arms agreement. We said, “Look, you can’t make characters out of the students or the professors. They are real students, they’re great students. They’ll love doing this.

[00:58:31] That became the deal-breaker. The producers wanted actors, one of whom would be Condi, and her character would carry a ghetto
blaster on her shoulder. Finally, I said, “There is no way. It never will happen. Take your money back. Thank you very much.” It didn't happen.

[laughter]

Hanawalt: That is too funny.

Lewis: [00:58:49] That's your simulation. It was great fun.

Hanawalt: It sounded wildly popular.

Lewis: [00:58:55] Oh, it was.

Hanawalt: I read that all these other schools came to you and said, “How do you do it? We want to know how to do this.”

Lewis: [00:59:16] Yes. They do it now. I know at the Law School they wanted to do a simulation. The professor wanted to run a Law School simulation. It does get taught elsewhere and in other parts of Stanford. It was really neat. Again, it wasn't my idea. It was the idea of a young professor from Pepperdine.

Hanawalt: You spoke some about the relationship of your academic endeavors and some about your efforts to influence government foreign policy in particular. Right?

Lewis: [01:00:40] Yes.

Hanawalt: I was wondering, what might be one or two of the greatest challenges in terms of balancing the academic side and that impetus to affect broader issues?

Lewis: [01:01:00] Yes. I learned a lot about Washington. First of all, Washington is a--what’s a nice word?--a place where most people are trying to get somewhere at the expense of whatever it takes. I was caught in the middle of it when I was on the Defense Policy Board at the Department of Defense. It
was the period when I had gone on leave and gone into business with the permission of the university. The people I was working with included the Defense Secretary, Bill Perry. All of it was absolutely above board, and everything was done absolutely correctly, but I was extremely controversial because I was close to Perry and was trying to stop a crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996. One of my critics, who called himself a general—he actually was a major—leaked a top secret document, or rather, a selective and thus damaging piece of a top secret document, to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, which is a *Wall Street Journal* publication, in 1996.

[01:02:11] As I said, I was very unpopular in the Defense Policy Board, which is the policy board for the Defense Department. For one thing, I challenged the government even though they have lots of resources. I challenged the government on several things. One was a ship that left from a Northern Chinese Port of Dalian, China. Her name was *Yinhe*, Y-I-N-H-E. She was allegedly carrying precursors of chemical weapons for Iran. I don’t know what she had when she left port at Dalian, but after she left Shanghai, the Chinese were acting….Tom Fingar [Thomas Fingar] was then in State Department intelligence. He and I said, “It can’t be true.” I mean, the Chinese don’t act that way if they’re guilty. If you’ve spent forty years working on a country and know it firsthand, you’ve got a pretty good clue about these things. But the CIA decided that absolutely *Yinhe* carried dangerous cargo. I said to Bill [Perry], “Don’t stop her on the high seas. That’s piracy. If you do, she will have nothing onboard.” CIA became incredibly angry at me, really, really angry, and said, “How can he possibly
know? We have the sources. We know exactly what’s on the bill of lading. We know all that stuff.” So, they stopped her on the high seas, put her into port at Bahrain, stripped her down to the keel, and there was nothing onboard.

[01:04:12] She had no topside crane so she couldn’t have offloaded cargo at sea. There actually were four other incidents like that, and the Department of Defense and the CIA didn’t like me, a lot. Speaking the truth is not good news for your career. I didn’t have a career. I mean, I thought my job was to just make a judgment. It was not my job. My job was to say, “Yes, ma’am. You know. I don’t.” They leaked this document, and Bill, for reasons that I can’t ever understand, got rid of me.

I had some really great experiences in Washington, by contrast. For example, when I was working for the State Department earlier, we acquired-- let me just put it that way--a set of documents called the Secret Military Papers published by the Chinese during the Great Leap Forward, which was a period in the late 1950s to the early 1960s.

[01:05:23] It was a terrible period in China. This set of individual documents were from a PLA [People’s Liberation Army] division headquarters in China, and they were amazing. There were more than twenty separate issues of these materials. It was my job to look through the documents and make reports. I wrote a bunch of these reports for the government. The materials showed what China was really going through during the Great Leap Forward. This should have taught the government a lesson about what we knew. I was interviewed when the secret military
documents finally were released. I was interviewed because I had written all the reports. Later, my career was largely made in the area of security developments on China because these were all military revelations. I was interviewed by *Time* Magazine. [01:06:28] On the cover of *Time*’s next issue--I still have it--was a cartoon of a big Chinese junk, with Mao and Liu Shaoqi at the helm, and all the other guys trying to keep from falling overboard from the ship.

[01:06:42] *Time* interviewed me for two days, and in a long, long article on conditions in China, there’s one line---happily they didn’t quote me---that said, “There are secret materials that have been released about China that tell us a different story.” Period. Didn’t say what, didn’t say how, didn’t say who. These were amazing documents. They showed that Mao was in real trouble. Years later, we can now get this kind of information directly in Beijing. In talking to a Chinese advisor the other day, he gave us details of China and Xi Jinping. We’re now going way beyond what I said here about the Secret Military Papers.

**Hanawalt:** That’s OK.

**Lewis:** [01:07:33] I’ll spare you that story.

**Hanawalt:** No, no, no. I find it very interesting.

**Lewis:** [01:07:38] The Chinese advisor gave us the image of Mao approaching a wall. He said when Mao went up against a wall, [he’d] go right at it and keep crashing against it. He’d keep banging his head at it and he made huge mistakes. The two most recent leaders before Xi Jinping--first Jiang Zemin and then Hu Jintao--would come at the wall, and they’d say, “Whoops, we’re
hitting a wall, let’s not go there, we’ll go around it, or we’ll avoid it.” The problem with that, the advisor to Xi Jinping said, is that you never know the limits of power. You only can know the limits of power when you either hit the wall or you bang yourself against the wall. Hitting again and again against the wall is stupid. Walking up to the wall and testing or dealing with it is intelligent. You know where it is, and you know what you’re doing. You know the limits of power. You may find you have more than you thought. That’s what Xi Jinping does.

[01:08:34] He goes right to the wall, he goes right at it, and then he says, “Oops, I’m going to change.” The advisor told us a number of things about changes under Xi Jinping, which make sense if you understand the wall image. A nice image, and I learned a lot subsequently.

[It] doesn’t relate to what your question was. I learned a lot about the limits of power. Limits of power in Vietnam, the limits of power in other places we’ve been. In fact, in the book we wrote on Vietnam, I called a chapter *The Limits of Power*. People in power have an exaggerated sense of their own knowledge, their own understanding. They’re almost superhuman when they get to that level of power. When they get out of that job they’re just plain old George.

[01:09:39] When they’re in power, they’re different, and it’s the whole structure of power that is so seductive. It’s true in every country. I’ve been to lots of countries. I’ve spent a lot of time in those countries, and in each, knowing the value and the limits of power is critical. It’s why I taught on leadership for a long time, that leadership should be about empowering
people. Teaching was the same. I had a slogan that I got from the Chinese. “Unless your students are smarter than you are, you're not a good teacher. You have to make them better than you are.” That’s what power should be about in the classroom, what leadership should be about. Dictatorships are not about empowering people, they're about empowering the leader. They’re about empowering yourself.

[01:10:33] I had a wonderful time teaching students about the limits of power, and how leadership can make people better. I judge people on that basis now, and I had to teach my students that. If you look at the whole history of leaders, way back to the most ancient times in China and other places, you can talk about authority in societies, about where the concept of government comes from, the structure of government, the bureaucracy. For example, did the concept of governing come from religion, which is bureaucratic, the gods and all sitting in a hierarchy of ancestors tracing back to the “original” one, or “God”? Or did government create religions? How did it work? We now know the answer from oracle bones. We’ve gone back to the ancients. People who’ve gone back to the oracle bones have now figured it out. There’s something about the nature of what happens to people and it has a kind of religious aspect to it. They become like gods. The religious figures and their gods easily become leaders, such as bureaucrats, and judges. They become like gods.

[01:11:40] Some people are real leaders, and they do empower people, they do make them better, and they’re not trying to judge them. You know, whatever you think about Ronald Reagan, he brought in people who were
better than he was. George Schultz and [James] Baker. These people were
tremendous. It’s very hard for a person who’s president to think about
bringing people who are smarter, better than he is. Ronald Reagan was not a
smart guy, but he made his administration smart by doing that. I respect that.
That’s what leadership is all about. It is said he didn’t know anything about
leadership, he was an actor. But in the sense I am talking about he was a
leader.

[01:12:30] He instinctively knew that you can empower people. In
fact, with the support of great subordinates, Reagan made the decisions to
end the Cold War. He made major decisions about arms control and some
other things, and you said, “Whoa. Where did that come from?” A guy who
said, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear that wall down.” [laughter]

Okay. Any other question?

Hanawalt: Just sort to wrap it up. I know you have retired as a professor, but it doesn’t
sound at all like you retired from life, either academically or politically or in
any way.


Hanawalt: Perhaps you could just talk briefly about what you are doing now. I mean
you sort of talk about it a little bit in the course of the interview.

Lewis: [01:13:23] I’m still trying to write. I’ve written two books since I’ve retired.
I’ve certainly written some articles. I have a wonderful coauthor, Xue Litai,
down the hall. He came here in 1983 as an émigré from China, and then
from Hong Kong. He’d come out of China when they allowed him out. He
came in through Hong Kong with his wife. Didn’t speak a word of English.
He arrived at Stanford and said, “I’ve come here to be your student.”

I said, “What do you mean? Are you admitted? Did they give you a
language test?” [01:14:10] He said, “No. But I’ve been working in a
newspaper in Hong Kong and I’m in the research part. I run their research
organization.” It’s a very good newspaper, actually. He said, “And I write
these books.” He showed me what they were. If you’ve been in Hong Kong
you’ll have seen kids sitting there with these lurid pictures on the book
covers of the leadership, you know, crazy people, on the covers of their
books, reading and sitting there. The Chinese are readers. They love reading
such books. The books that he had written, despite their covers, were really
interesting. They were all in Chinese. I said to myself, “Wow.” My Chinese
was pretty good then. Not so good now.

Just at that point I was working with the Chinese military, among a
lot of others. There were ten marshals in China, all famous, and only a few
were still alive. One of the marshals, Nie Rongzhen, was head of all of the
weapons programs in China, everything, the missiles, the nuclear weapons,
the submarines, everything. Nie was told about me by a general I was
working with, the only person who is both the vice minister of foreign affairs
and a deputy chief of the General Staff. The general told me, “Marshal Nie
wants you to write a book on the history of our nuclear weapons program.” I
laughed. [laughter]

I said, “You have got to be kidding.”

He said, “No.”
Just at that point Xue Litai from Hong Kong walked into my office.

I said, “Well, yes, I’ll give it a try.”

The general said, “You’ve got to write the first draft of the history of our nuclear weapons program on your own, see how far you can get, and then send us what you’ve written. We’ll tell you whether we’re going to allow you to go farther.” And so Mr. Xue and I worked and worked for two years, until about 1985. In 1985 I went to China to get their judgment. I had sent the draft in advance. They had translated it and said, “It’s a good job, but, you know, you need help.” I met every single person who had built a nuclear bomb. It’s like going to Los Alamos in the 1940s. It was astounding. I knew every person in every department who built the bomb. I can give you all their names, but that won’t help you. They helped me.

[01:16:58] The book *China Builds The Bomb* came out, and it’s still the standard work. Litai and I are seen as their historians on the bomb. It’s not an apology for the bomb; it’s just a straightforward book on how they built the bomb. There’s no other book like it. Then we wrote books on other pieces of their military system, on their submarine-launched ballistic missile program, on the Korean War. I had long been interested in that war. My whole interest in it started when I became a naval officer in the Pacific Fleet at the end of the war. I became an ROTC cadet on the very day the Korean War started in June 1950. My name is on a memorial for the Korean War. I told [former Congressman] Pete McCloskey that I didn’t fight in that war. He said, “Well, you were there, your ship was there.” [laughter] I replied: “I didn’t fight.” He said, “You’ve got to be there on the memorial.”
[01:18:00] I’m on the wall. Anyway, I became very interested in North Korea, which is a whole different story. It’s really one of the saddest stories of my life. I’m certain we could have avoided this terrible conflict. As I said, I finally did go to North Korea in 1986. And many times again. The North Koreans were thrilled to meet an American who knew something about their history. This is a tiny country. You know, if you go from the farthest north in North Korea, which is the city of Dandong, to the DMZ [Korean Demilitarized Zone], do you know how far that is? It’s the distance from here [Palo Alto] to Reno.

Hanawalt: [laughter] Yes. No distance at all.

Lewis: [01:18:46] Two hundred miles. A little over. It’s a tiny country. Their weapons programs are disrupting everything now. It’s going to get worse and worse. We were the only foreigners--Sig Hecker, Bob Carlin, and I--ever to see their uranium enrichment facility. We’ve seen the centrifuges, which are used to build enriched uranium. We saw it in 2010. We said to ourselves, this is going to be awful. It is awful. I don’t know what to do about that at this late stage.

Hanawalt: I totally appreciate all the time that you’ve given to me and to the Oral History Project. Fascinating.


[End of Interview with John W. Lewis, May 12, 2015]
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